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ABSTRACT
Using intensive fieldwork methods, this thesis examines the value of children
in two villages in Bijnor District in Uttar Pradesh, North India, within the
context of the 'economics of fertility'. Bijnor was chosen to allow for
comparison between Hindus and Muslims.
The research upon which its conclusions are based was conducted during the
agricultural year July 1982 - June 1983. A sample of thirty-seven men, whose
wives were currently pregnant or had delivered in the year before fieldwork
began, were chosen for study. The men were asked, using a semi-structured
questionnaire, about the work and income of their household throughout the
year. Data were also collected on landholding and land transfers, using
official records and accounts from villagers, for the whole village in
addition to the sample. In addition the men were asked for their views on
fertility and family planning and fertility in relation to their own family
size and composition. This data was compared to similar data collected by
the Social Organisation of Childbearing Project on similar topics from the
men's wives during the same time period.
It was found, using sample data that children perform very little labour for
their households, except among some of the poorest. Richer households stay
in joint production for longer and therefore are able to benefit more from
the labour of sons in the long run than poorer households. The prevailing
work patterns and system of marriage and residence suggest that there are no
economic grounds for wanting daughters. Consequently sons are preferred.
However, only three sample men, all among the richest in the village, foresaw
no limit to the number of sons from whom they would benefit. Among the rest,
the benefits of having children - especially sons - must be balanced against
the costs of bringing them up - especially daughters.
Village level census data and maternity histories collected from all women
suggest that while fertility remains high, mortality has been declining for
at least twenty years, villagers face the prospect, perhaps for the first
time of having 'too many' children. For women, who would by and large choose
to have fewer children than their menfolk, the support of their husbands in
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Chapter 1:
Introduction: Method in the Madness
The main focus of interest in this thesis is how we might best understand the
extent of economic rationality in human fertility among a small number of men
and women in two North Indian villages.
The Chicago economists of the "New Home Economics" school would have us
believe that we can understand fertility decision making by use of the
classical economic theory of consumer behaviour. One of the earliest versions
of this form of the economic theory of fertility decision making is that
expounded by Gary Becker (1960). He argues that the determinants of fertility
at the household level are best understood if children are treated 'as if'
they were consumer durables goods. This treatment is justified according to
Becker because:
"For most parents, children are a source of psychic income or
satisfaction, and in economist's terminology, would be considered a
consumption good" (1960: p210)
By treating children in this way, Becker re-characterises fertility
motivation as a demand for children, which can be analysed by the economic
theory of consumer behaviour, in which the explanatory variables are*, tastes;
income; costs and uncertainty. Fertility decisions are affected by the
household's preference for children compared with other goods. Becker admits
that differences in fertility may be due to non-economic variables by
suggesting that tastes for children may be affected by background factors,
but these do not enter into his analysis explicitly. The major explanatory
variable in Becker's analysis is income. With any given level of income, the
household attempts to maximise the satisfaction it obtains from children and
other goods. Becker argues that since consumption in general rises with
income, and since children are not an inferior good, for which demand is
relatively constant in the face of rising incomes, one would expect
consumption of children to rise with income. This hypothesis presents Becker
with two problems. Firstly, if there is a positive relation between income
and fertility, the rich would have more children than the poor in any society
at any point in time. Secondly, increases in the general level of income
through time, as development occurs, would cause fertility to rise. Neither
of these propositions is empirically founded (Farooq and Simmons: 1985).
To deal with these problems while maintaining his theory intact, Becker makes
an analytical distinction between the number of children demanded and the
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quality of each. He suggests that richer households invest more in a given or
lesser number of children, increasing the quality of each child. This
substitution of quality for quantity is made possible by the knowledge and
practice of effective contraception. Becker argues that knowledge of
contraception is unequally distributed. Richer households know more about
contraception than poorer ones and by putting this knowledge into practice
are able to have fewer children each of greater quality. If only the poor
were equally well endowed with this knowledge, they too would have fewer
children and Becker's theoretically positive relationship between income and
fertility would become the empirically observed relationship.
Economists subsequently contributing to the debate surrounding Becker's work
have tended to modify, rather than refute, the original theory, to take into
account factors which they think important: the opportunity cost of time
(Mincer: 1963; Becker: 1965); the appropriate measure of income (Easterlin
1975); and the role of uncertainty (T.P. Schultz: 1974, T.W. Schultz: 1974).
Social scientists from other disciplines have contibuted to the growth
industry by doubting the validity of viewing children as consumer durable
goods at all. This literature is succinctly summarised by Namboodiri (1972)
and Farooq and Simmons (1985).
Criticisms of the "New Home Economics Approach
In spite of the very substantial controversy surrounding the 'New Home
Economics' approach to fertility, the central tenets of the approach remain
the same. The central theme of this work is that fertility decisions can be
understood in terms of the household's search for the optimum number of
children in the face of economic constraints and will vary as the appropriate
price and income factors vary. Several criticisms which ultimately undermine
its value as the sole explanation of fertility decision making can be
levelled at the economic theory of fertility.
Concepts
At a theoretical level some of the concepts used are more than a little
difficult to handle. I have already alluded to some of the difficulties which
some authors have raised regarding the idea of children as consumer durables,
see for example Blake (1972). In addition to this, some of the concepts are
difficult to operationalise. For example, the household indifference map,
central to the theory of consumer behaviour is difficult to use in empirical
situations as it requires respondents to know which combinations of children
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and other goods they view as somehow being equal, inferior or superior to all
other combinations. In fact for this reason, some economists have explicitly
excluded the indifference map from their analyses, arguing that households
bring preferences, tastes etc to the decision making forum and that we,
therefore, need not know how these arise (T.P. Scultz: 1969; 1976; 1978). If
however, we are making any attempt to understand how fertility fits into
patterns of development, we must know what linkages exist between changes in
economy and society and fertility decisions, and not merely pick up such
changes in price and income effects.
Demand Oriented
As outlined above, the economic theory is a theory of the demand for
children. In less developed countries like India, supply factors also have
great importance. Households may want to have a certain number of children,
but this may not be possible. For example, if parents aim for a number of
surviving children, then child mortality which may by and large be outwith
the control of households will have an effect on fertility. (McNicoll: 1980;
Cain: 1981).
Some authors have suggested that the value of children is, in developing
societies like India, not only to be seen in terms of 'psychic income or
satisfaction'. Many authors have pointed out that where children have an
economic role to play, either by working for their household (Mamdani: 1972;
Rozenweig and Evenson: 1977) or providing security for aged parents where
alternative forms of social security are lacking (Cain: 1981), that motives
for having children may include the economic contribution which children may
make to the household economy.
Applicability to Developing Countries
Becker's original model of fertility decison making was applied to
Indianapolis in the USA, and many of the concepts and and explanatory
variables which have been introduced into the analysis were really intended
for use in developed countries : where per capita incomes are high, schooling
for children compulsory, with particular patterns of marriage and sexual
relations, with particular patterns of income generation, where child
mortality is low, life expectancy at birth high and modern contraception
freely available. Oppong (1985) and Farooq and Simmons (1985) are at pains to
point out that these conditions do not obtain in less developed countries and
that we must realise this difference when we analyse fertility patterns
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there. For example a universal feature of the economic theory is that the
costs of children should include the opportunity costs of the time of the
child rearer, usually the mother, calculated either as income foregone, or
the cost of childminding or nursery services.
In many Third World villages, including the present study villages, the major
portion of women's work is not performed in the market for wages, but in and
around the household for consumption. Furthermore, this work is often
performed in conjuction with rather than at the expense of childcare. As
often as not, it is older siblings who look after their younger brothers and
sisters and not the child's mother. In these circumstances, the opportunity
cost of childrearing may be either negligible, very difficult to calculate or
an inappropriate indicator of the cost of childbearing to both women and
households.
Focused on Micro Factors at the Expense of Macro Factors
In an early contribution, Leibenstein (1957) attempted to link micro and
macro explanations by asking how development and change affects the value of
children and their parents' perceptions of this value. In the course of his
explanation he suggests that there may only be a limited rationality to
explain by recourse to economic factors. He suggests that there is in any
society a culturally acceptable minimum number of children which parents must
endeavour to attain as quickly as possible. Only after this minimum number of
children has been born is the addition of each 'marginal child' amenable to
economic analysis.
Leibenstein's contribution is important in that it introduces variables which
are not economic into the analysis of fertility. He suggests that fertility
decisions cannot be explained by the economist alone. Cultural and social
factors all affect the 'natural' fertility of a population. Thus seasonal
migration, the age at marriage, length of breastfeeding, morbidity and
mortality all affect the frequency of intercourse and hence the possibility
of conception quite apart from decisions to have more children. Neither are
parents blank sheets of paper when they come to the fertility decision.
Decisions will be affected by the cultural and social conditions within which
decision makers finds themselves.
An Alternative Approach
It is, then, necessary to analyse fertility decisions within the context of
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the economy and society in which they occur. I am not here suggesting that we
follow the well trodden route first explored by Maithus in the nineteenth
century. Rather I am suggesting that we start to tread the middle ground
between micro explanations of fertility on the one hand and macro
explanations on the other. The first examines relationships at the smallest
units of aggregation while the latter examines only gross relationships
across the whole of a society.
As an example, how does the local economy affect household decison making
within communities? How are these various entities linked to the larger
society and economy? McNicoll (1980) suggests that we look at the groups
which bind people together and differentiate them - class, caste, ethnicity,
gender and household structure for example. The focus of study requires not
to be the household - out of context; or the whole of society - devoid of
people; but the ways in which the immediate environment and structures
surrounding decision makers impinge upon and affect their decisions. In this
more holistic form of analysis the household becomes one of many social
institutions important to the analysis of fertility rather than the only
one.An early example of this approach is Mamdani (1972). Mamdani's book is a
response to the findings of and approach to fertility of the Khanna Study
(Wyon and Gordon: 1971). The Khanna Study is a good example of birth control
projects sponsored by U.S. agencies through to the early 1970's. The approach
may be described as Neo-Malthusian, with a theoretical approach to fertility
behaviour very similar to that adopted by Becker (1960). The basic
'population problem' was construed to be one of the lack of modern effective
contraception. One had only to provide this and the peasants of North India
would take to birth control like a duck to water. There were thought to be no
other obstacles to fertility decline. Mamdani came to very different
conclusion. He suggested that the economic and social changes which had taken
place there meant that it was in the villagers' interests to have large
numbers of children. Their unwilling refusal to accept the contraceptives
offered to them by the Khanna Study workers was not irrational, but rather
represented an outcome based on a proper appraisal of their needs by the
villagers themselves. Mamdani argued that new employment opportunities had
been created by the "Green Revolution" and in these changed circumstances,
children had an economic contribution to make to their households.
Mamdani's idea is an appealing one. But it is too simplistic to say that all
children are a net asset to all parents always. For example, several studies
have suggested a relationship between landholding and fertility, (Meuller:
1976; Cain: 1985), while others reviewed by Nugent (1985) have suggested that
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some children may have a role in providing old age security for their parents
in the absence of other sources of institutional security. Cain (1980) and
McNicoll (1978) have suggested that children may act as insurance against
risk, providing income and food in times of natural disaster.
These works raise several questions for the study of fertility: for which
households are children an asset? Under what circumstances are children
assets? What are the links between the environment of risk and fertility and
how has this changed over the years? What sorts of work do particular
children of particular ages perform for particular households and what is
such activity worth? Are children a net asset or liability for different
households?
Another criticism which may be levelled at both Mamdani and the 'New home
Economics' is that neither makes any attempt to distinguish between the value
of sons and the value of daughters. If Mamdani's peasants are rational then
there must be some explanation of why the sex ratio in the Punjab, where he
conducted his study consistently has one of the most adverse sex ratios for
females of any state in India (Kynch and Sen: 1983). An adverse sex ratio
for females is a widely reported feature of North Indian Society, yet Mamdani
does not mention it, let alone try to explain it. We cannot assume that boys
and girls are equally 'demanded' by parents. This raises the issue of
gendered inequalities in society and how these affect fertility.
Sex blindness is also apparent in Mamdani and the 'New Home Economics" in
their treatment of the household. Whitehead. (1981) suggests that social
scientists the world over are mesmerised by the very existence of the
household. She points out that the existence of the household does not allow
us to assume that its operation, function and content will be the same in
every society. Rather such features of the household, especially the
relationships which it embodies and the distribution of power among its
members, requires to be the subject of study, not assumption. We must
endeavour to understand hegemony, rather than replicate its logic.
Writers in a feminist tradition (eg Beneria: 1982; Whitehead: 1981; Young et
al: 1981) have suggested that in order to understand the position of women in
society, we must look at the way in which women are embedded in society by
the structures of kinship and marriage and how this relates to the sexual
division of labour. Specifically, how much autonomy and power do women gain
from prevailing arrangements and how does this affect control over resources.
What effect does this have in turn on women' s ability to determine their own
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fertility?
This is not to be confused with the classsical economic view on the relation
of women to fertility (Becker: I960; Mincer: 1963; Becker: 1965; Farooq and
Simmons: 1985). Writers in the classical economic tradition, including the
'New Home Economists' consider the basic decision-making unit to be the
household. I am suggesting here that, following Seccombe (1974), relations
between household members are implicit or explicit relations of exchange.
This social relation cannot be assumed away and needs to be the subject of
investigation.
To sum up, then, my own view is that the classical economic view of fertility
decision making is too narrow in its remit for the reasons I have outlined
above. Mamdani was a red herring for those of us who wanted to lay to rest
the spectre of Malthus which had been set stalking the plains of Northern
India in the 1960's and 70's with reports of famine and predictions of
overpopulation to come. His was an interesting thesis, but too simplistic to
be accepted wholeheartedly.
Subsequent studies and theoretical developments have suggested that an
adequate study of fertility must distinguish between the value of different
children of different genders to different households with different
relationships to economic resources. In addition it must examine the dynamics
of the relationship between the household and the wider economic and social
structure of which it forms a part. Furthermore it must deconstruct the
household and investigate whether its different members - the old and the
young, men and women, hierarchically structured by age and gender have
different fertility aims and how these are put into practice. These are the
issues which I address in the remainder of this thesis.
The Study Setting
The research on fertility which forms the basis of the present study was
conducted in two adjacent villages in the Bijnor District of Western Uttar
Pradesh. One village, Dharmnagri, has an entirely Hindu population, while the
other, Jhakri, has an entirely Muslim population. The research was funded by
and ESRC studentship linked to The Social Organisation of Childbearing
Project, (SOCP) conducted at the same time, in the same villages by a team
headed by Roger and Patricia Jeffery.
Bijnor District is demographically interesting. It was chosen by the SOCP
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because it has a highest proportion of rural Muslims, about 34%, of any
District in Uttar Pradesh, providing the opportunity for systematic study of
ethnic differences. The study villages themselves were chosen a little less
systematically. We were given an introduction to a local landowner by a
relative of his in Delhi. Any anxiety which we may have had about the types
of bias this might introduce to our work faded as fieldwork proceeded. The
period chosen for study was a year. This would allow for the observation and
recording of various patterns of work and associated activity through the
whole of an agricultural cycle. Working through the cycle of seasons in
village India is essential if one wants to know what goes on there. The
seasonal cycle of life,work, illness, birth, death and marriage vary markedly
with the seasons. The study design was set up to capture the differences.
The Study Itself
The Sample: One major advantage of being a member of a research team was that
I was able to collaborate with Roger and Patricia in choosing a sample. The
SOCP had two research strategies. The first was to be a sample survey of
recently delivered and currently pregnant women from 11 randomly selected
villages in the district. These women would be interviewed once mostly about
their most recent pregnancy. The major strategy, however, was an intensive
study of a systematic sample of recently delivered or currently pregnant
women from Dharmnagri and Jhakri, our base villages. This sample of women was
to be followed closely for a year and participate in intensive systematic
conversations about their natal and affinal households, their maternity
histories, workloads and most recent pregnancy.
As the holder of a linked studentship, I was uncertain about how close the
link could be. My doubts were not about whether it would be valid to proceed
in this way from the point of view of the informatiom we would obtain by such
collaboration, but rather whether such a study would be considered
independent enough for a PhD thesis. In the end I decided that access to
relevant information on women overode all other considerations and chose my
sample to be the husbands of the women in Patricia's sample of recently
delivered and currently pregnant women from Dharmnagri and Jhakri.
These men are not representative of the village men as a whole, precisely
because their wives were having or had recently delivered children. In the
extreme, it could be argued that all other villagers at risk of pregnancy
were effectively contracepting. Such a logical possibility was not the case
as our village census showed. However the representativeness of the sample
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was something I was aware of at the time it was drawn and due care was taken
to make it as representative as possible in the following way.
A census of both villages was taken and from this we drew up a sampling frame
of currently pregnant or recently delivered women. From this we drew our
sample of husbands and wives to be representative of the major caste, class
and religious configurations of the two villages. We also took into account
household structure. In essence this meant following the economic activities
of groups of brothers where they were all joint in production, even if only
one of them had recently delivered. Though it would have been possible to
abstract from such production groups the share of the brother we had
selected, I was sure that we would gain greater insights in household
strutures, economic relationships etc. by studying groups of co-producing
brothers together. Care was also taken to ensure that the sample was evenly
spread across the childbearing years in terms of parity. The characteristics
of the sample are shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1:




Status RAJPUT SAHNI DHIMAR HARIJAN TOTAL
II 2 - - 2
III 4 5 1 10
IV 1 2 2 5
V 2 2
2 5 7 5 19
MUSLIMS
Landholding SHEIKH TELI TOTAL
Status
I - - —
II 2 - 2
III 10 1 10
IV 1 - 1
V 1 3 4
14 4 18
Source: Village Census, 1982
Note 1: I followed three fewer households than the SOCP for
reasons of time.
2: The landholding categories here are developed more fully
in Chapter 3. In the meantime, it is sufficient for the
purpose here to know that group I are most landed and
group V landless
3: Comprising Chamars and Jatabs.
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Table 2 summarises the childbearing experience of sample women.
Table 2:
Numbers of children everborn















M F A M F A M F A M F A
Rajput 2 4 8 12 1 0 1 5 8 13 2 4 6
Sahni 5 7 13 20 1 4 5 8 17 25 1.4 2.6 4
Dhimar 7 10 10 20 0 1 1 10 11 21 1.4 1.4 2.8
Harijan 5 5 5 10 1 2 3 6 7 13 1 1 2
Total 19 26 36 62 3 7 10 29 43 72 1.4 1.9 3.3
MUSLIMS
Sheikhs 14 28 17 45 7 13 20 35 30 65 1.9 1.1 3
Telis 4 8 4 12 6 3 9 14 7 21 2 1 3
Total 18 36 21 57 13 16 29 49 37 86 2 1.2 3.2
WHOLE
SAMPLE 37 62 57 119 16 23 39 78 80 158 1.7 1.5 3.2
Source: Key Informants Maternity Histories 1982-83.
Any particular choice of sample will mean that several groups of people
cannot be the subject of systematic study. These omissions are important.
Perhaps the most obvious groups are those couples outside the childbearing
ages, those practising effective contraception and those who had not had a
child in the previous year for some proximate reason relevant to the study,
for example undernourishment leading to amenorrhoea for the women among
poorer households.
Another group missing from systematic study are single-person households and
female-headed households. The latter is particularly important as these are
among the poorest households in India. In the study villages, however, these
households are few and where appropriate I have included less systematic data
for these groups than those used for the sample. In the absence of any major
proximate reason for infertility, the justification for choosing a sample of
recent proven fertilty is that if any group have a pro-natalist economic
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rationale, it is more likely to be those who are having children.
Aspects of Method
Gender: My sample was, then, set up in a specific locale, to study systematic
differences in fertility in particular households with different
relationships to land and other productive resources, with different
religious and caste backgrounds. I was, however, still left with one problem.
My reading of the literature had convinced me that gender is an important
issue in relation to fertility. As a man, collecting data on fertility from
women was perhaps the trickiest methodological problem of all to solve. India
is a purdah society with all the attendant problems for research (Papanek:
1984). Segregation between the sexes makes it difficult for men to talk to
women about anything at all, let alone the intimate details of their own
fertility. Part of the system of social relations which I wanted to study
prevented me from studying it.
Consequently, most male researchers only talk to men and the social reality
of the world of women is often ignored. Later in the fieldwork period, as I
became more known and trusted, I was able to talk with women. Conversations,
though, were usually instigated by them, and I never took the initiative in
conversations about fertility or related matters. Sometimes the conversations
were about fertility or sex, but I was not able to pursue these
systematically among the women. The content of my exchanges with women varied
according the woman's age, her status in the village and whether she was in
or out of the childbearing age range and of course whatever was on her mind
at the time.
It could be argued that this was an opportunity lost. I could have, like
Hershman (1981) in the Punjab, established contact with these women. My
contact with the women though was always predicated on my behaviour and
contact with their menfolk. I felt that if I had tried to be more intimate
with the women, I would have offended local norms and jeopardised valuable
relationships. In most cases, my relationships with the women were too
fragile and conditional to allow for much more than pleasant conversations
and polite greetings. Had I been on my own, I would have been left with a
conundrum: how to get to grips with women's lives without being ab :le to
speak to them in any depth. One of the many advantages of being part of a
mixed gender research team was that I was able to share the rich data about
women which Patricia was collecting.
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Many authors (Beneria: 1982; Seccombe: 1974; Caldwell: 1980, 1983; Cain 1979;
1984; Dyson and Moore: 1983) have argued that in order to understand the
relationship between women and fertility it is necessary not only to
understand their immediate childbearing histories, but also women's position
within the household and how this relates to the structure of kinship and
marriage, the division of labour and the distribution of the gains from
labour.
The data which Patricia collected from the sample women for the SOCP
addresses itself to precisely these issues. Accordingly the data I use from
the SOCP relates to the strucure of households within which women perform
both production and reproduction. I also use information collected from the
women in their maternity histories as well as women's views on their own
fertility. All of this information was collected from each sample woman by
research assistants working for the SOCP, or by Patricia herself, in a series
of semi-structured conversations over the fieldwork period. This data used in
conjunction with conversations with their husbands (my sample) gives some
levereage to discussion of possible differences between men and women in
relation to fertility.
The Method Itself
The method of study chosen might well be called 'the cafeteria method'. By
this I mean I used a combination of different methods for different types of
information gathering: Observation, Semi-structured Interviews and the
collection and use of official records.
Observation: This is perhaps an obvious choice of method. I decided that to
study such complicated relationships in any meaningful sense required
intensive fieldwork. Partly this also reflects my own cultural style. My own
upbringing and work experience in the West of Scotland, for better or worse,
have meant that friendly banter and building relationships is something which
I am good at and enjoy immensely. I also felt that a survey in India after
the state of Emergency in 1976, when some local people were forcibly
sterilised, would lead to an identikit set of responses from respondents
based on what they thought I wanted to hear. Outsiders rarely go to villages
and when they do it often means trouble. Recent work in Nepal suggests that
the non-sampling error in survey techniques is very large indeed for the sub¬
continent (Stone and Campbell: 1984). The issue of fertility needed to be
dealt with sensitively in an atmosphere of trust if it was to be wrothwhile.
Living in the village and observing seemed a good way to achieve this. To
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obtain worthwhile information on the value of children I knew that people had
to know me well enough to tell me what they thought and not what they thought
I wanted to hear. In addition as Hershman (1981) points out, it is difficult
for people to lie consistently throughout a whole year. Spending time with
people is a good way, perhaps the only way of getting to know the interstices
of their lives. In view of the cultural and scial milieu of fertility
'hanging around' was also an important part of my method.
In addition, there is also a new approach emerging which combines the best of
both the macro and micro approaches to the study of fertility (Caldwell:
1982; 1984; IUSSP: 1984). The attraction of this approach is that it pays
attention to and takes seriously both the immediate environment and the
context in which it is set.
Semi-structured interviews: Agricultural work patterns in the village are
complex enough to drive any anthropologist trying to understand them under
his or her string bed with a bottle of the local 'hooch'. The work of each
household varies according to the resources they have and the season of the
year. In order to keep track of the economic activities of 37 households
systematically by observation alone is simply not possible. Accordingly I
collected information from sample men about the major economic activities of
household members throughout the year by semi-structured questionnaire.
In order to minimise errors of omission, I asked these questions as soon as
possible after the completion of each major agricultural operation. In all I
asked these questions of each informant four times at different stages of
the agricultural year. Each time the session concentrated on the work
completed since the last round of questions.
The schedules covered all inputs and their costs, the time taken to perform
each operation, by whom it was completed and the social relations involved in
the labour. Basically this information falls into three broad time periods
for each of the major crops in the agricultural cycle. These time periods
are:
1. Preparation and Planting
2. Cultivation
3. Harvesting
Information on Non-agricultural laboux- performed by household members was
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also collected for the same time periods, as well as information about
animals owned by sample households. In addition, the non-agricultural
workloads of women were included via information collected by the SOCP.
This method of data collection worked well in combination with observation.
For example, I 'helped' as many people as I could in their agricultural
operations. Apart from enjoying this it meant that I could observe and record
in my fieldnotes how the operation was performed, who was there working etc.
This helped in turn to obtain more accurate information at the semi-
structured interview sessions. Lapses of memory are probably less frequent
among fieldworkers in this regard than among farmers. The former have the
luxury of being exclusively interested in who did what for whom, for how much
and how, while the latter are more interested in getting the work done.
In addition to semi-structured interviews on work patterns and the part which
children played in them, I also wanted to collect information on the possible
value of children as insurance against risky environments. Cain (1980)
suggests that a reasonable indicator of the environment of risk is the
"distress sale" of land. In short this may be taken to mean sales of land to
meet consumption. Accordingly I collected data from two quite different
sources on landholding and transfer. The first source is interviews with
sample men on their present landholding and how this has changed over the
past twenty five years. The second is the official record of landholding held
in the Tehsil Office in Bijnor town.
Interviews on Landholding with sample men: In these interviews I asked sample
men what their current holding of land was, where this land was situated and
whether they rented or sharecropped anyland, either in or out. I also found
out how this holding had changed over the past twenty five years by asking
men about losses and gains of land since 1957. I also asked the same
questions of some landless men in both villages, lest the downward mobility
of that group had been severe. In addition I asked them about current and
past indebtedness.
Official Records: However, 25 years is a long time over which to remember
transfers of land. Accordingly I also collected information on the sales and
purchases of land by men in the study villages, from the Official Records.
These records are kept at the local Tehsil office. They are an invaluable,
though sometimes difficult to use set of records. I was able to use them as
memory joggers for sample men, by taking them along to interviews on
transfers of land. In addition I also used the official records as a rough
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guide to current holding patterns. The sugar cane society also provided me
with a record of amounts of cane sold to the crushing mill by local farmers
and the extent of their indebtedness there.
Fertility
In addition to generating data with which to assess the benefits of children
directly, I also interviewed sample men on their views regarding their own
fertility as well as fertility in general. In these interviews I covered a
wide range of topics: ideal family size, the desire for additional children,
preferences for sons or daughters, Government propaganda on fertility,
health service delivery, contraceptive practice and intentions as well as
decision making between husband, and wife.
This information if collected on its own by a survey say, would not be very
elucidating. However, by the time I collected it, I had been in the village
living with my sample for eighteen months all in. I knew a great deal about
their households, their hopes, aspirations and their economic lives. In this
context, the information on fertility is highly valuable. It gives a great
deal of insight into what men of different classes, ethnic and religious
groups with different age and sex compositions of children think of fertility
and its limitation. While great care must be taken in the interpretation of
this data, I am sure that it is of high quality - both valid and reliable. It
reflects the many hours spent working, travelling and sitting with these men
before the conversations ever took place.
The Structure of the Thesis
In order to examine these various aspects of fertility in the study village,
the rest of my thesis takes the following format.
Chapter 2 takes us into the study villages themselves by describing some of
their key features and setting them in their historical, social and economic
context. As well as outlining these features of village life, the chapter
also gives a thumbnail sketch of their environmental and geographical
locations. There is also a brief description of the village populations and
how these have changed over the years.
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of landholding in Dharmnagri and Jhakri. The
chapter delineates the differences in landholding among the major groups in
the village - classes, religions, castes and genders. In the light of recent
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studies, (e.g. Cain: 1985), the chapter also takes a look at the relationship
between landholding and fertility and defines the household structure
typology which is used in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 examines the argument made by Cain (1980) and McNicoll (1980), that
children have an "insurance value" in risky environments which is
analytically seperate from any value which they may have as labour to their
parents. Transfers over a thirty year period are examined for both villages.
Data is presented from interviews with sample men to examine the nature of
the local environment with respect to risk before drawing some conclusions as
to the insurance value of children among the sample.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine work throughout the agricultural cycle. Using the
data from the semi-structured interviews, chapter 5 deals with the labour
process of each of the three major crops in the agricultural cycle. These are
rice, wheat and sugar cane. The returns to sample households are presented
for each crop and summarised for the whole of the agricultural year under
study. This yearly summary takes account of any work performed outside the
three major crops so that it more adequately represents net income over the
year. Chapter 6 deals more explicitly with the contribution of children to
the labour process. Here the number of hours and approximate value of child
labour is imputed, to draw a conclusion about the value of children as
workers to their households.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the structure of kinship and marriage and the
sexual division of labour. The starting point for analysis here is that both
household structure and the sexual division of labour are not natural but
socially constructed phenomena. The composition of the household as well as
the norms which hold it together are embedded in the structure of kinship and
marriage are examined in chapter 7 through an examination of post-marriage
residence patterns. This in turn sets the scene for the sexual division of
labour which is examined in chapter 8. These chapters examine the effect
which the operation and existence of these two features of the local social
system have upon fertility, especially upon the ability of women to determine
their own fertility.
The final two chapters examine and compare the views of men and women on
fertility. Chapter 9 is based on the conversations, outlined above which I
had with sample men about fertility. Chapter 10 is in addition partly based
on data collected by the SOCP and looks at the views of women on their own
fertility and compares these wiLh those of their husbands.
Chapter 2: The Setting
In this chapter, I set the study villages firmly in their context, by
describing the key features of the environment in which they are situated.
Although this environment may be described by reference to location, climate,
cropping patterns and so forth, it should always be borne in mind that these
features have developed out of centuries of interaction bvetween humankind
and nature. It is important therefore not only to describe what these
features look like today and what their relationships to each other are, but
also how they have changed. History is not as immediately striking as the
Indian countryside and its people, but it must be considered if we are to
understand the present more than superficially.
Bijnor has provided no heroes for the annals of Indian history; nor does it
have the princely past of Rajasthan or the Punjab. The story of Bijnor
district and its people is one of what George Orwell might have called
"catastrophic gradualism." It is forged from the struggle for survival and
moderate prosperity and a life which is just a little more comfortable.
Location
Bijnor, in which the study villages of Dharmnagri and Jhakri are located is a
district of almost 100,000 kms2, about 160kms north east of Delhi. It is in
the west of India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh, which is swathed across
north India from the Punjab in the west right across the Indo-Gangetic plain
to Bihar in the east. The district's location is shown in Map 1. The district
is further divided into four administrative sub areas, called Tehsils, each
centred around its own market town. The study villages are in the most
westerly tehsil of Bijnor. As Map 2 shows, the district hugs the eastern bank
of the Ganges for the first 50kms. of its plains life as it thunders out of
the Himalayas at the pilgimage town of Haridwar due north. The study villages
themselves lie about eight kms. from the district's administrative
headquarters of Bijnor, a town of some 50,000 inhabitants.
Until 1983, the journey from the villages to Bijnor town was about 8kms by
metalled road. Then a new road cutting the distance to 5kms was opened. There
are regular bus services from Bijnor town to all major points, and many less
major points in the district as well as to Delhi. There are no bus links
between the villages and Bijnor. The journey can, though, be made by tonga
or cart, bicycle or foot, with the chance of a cheap ride on a passing lorry.
During the study period, there was substantial through traffic to the
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Map 1, shpwing the position of Bijnor District
in Western Uttar Pradesh. The inset shows its
position in India.
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Map2, showing the position of the study villages
in Bijnor District.
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construction site of the Madya Ganga Barrage. Villagers could often be seen
clinging tenaciously to the sideboards of trucks on which they had managed to
negotiate a lift - either to Bijnor, or on a site-seeing trip to the barrage.
The Barrage across the Ganges is a major irrigation construction spanning the
river by a dam, doubling as bridge. Phase one of building was completed
during fieldwork. Phase one involved the construction of dam and bridge, plus
irrigation networks to the west bank of the river, into Muzaffanagar
district and roads into Bijnor district. The second phase which
involves irrigation in Bijnor and roads in Muzaffanagar has not yet
commenced.
The construction of the barrage will play and important part in opening up
the two districts to each other. It will for example, shorten the journey
time from Delhi from six or seven hours to three or four. But perhaps more
importantly, some people look to the new road link across the river to
Muzzafanagar to open up trade and business opportunities where there were few
before, or to increase the number of wedding trans-factions across the river.
The People
According to the 1981 census, 86% of the population of District Bijnor live
in villages of less a thousand people. The 1981 census puts the district
population at 1,925,637. Of these, 525,891 live in Bijnor Tehsil. In the
Tehsil, about 74%, 388,782 inhabitants, live in rural areas. The villages of
Dharmnagri and Jhakri then are in this respect in the mainstream of the
Bijnori population - rural dwellers living in villages of less than 1,000




Comparison of Decennial Population Variables, Bijnor District:
1961-1981
1961 1971 1981
Total Population 1,190,987 1,490,185 1,925,637
Men 634,468 804,264 1,033,432
Women 556,519 685,891 892,205
Decennial Increase(%) 21.1 25.1 29.2
Sex Ratio
(females per 877 853 863
1000 males)
Source: Census of India.
In common with most other areas in India (Cassen 1978) Bijnor has experienced
substantial population growth since the 1921 enumeration. Before that date,
the population fluctuated somewhat between enumerations. In the District
Gazeteer, frequent references are made to the effects of epidemics. After
1931, the pattern is clearly one of uninterrupted growth, which implies
natural increase in the absence of migration, of which there has been little.
The table also shows clearly that the sex ratio (expressed as females per
thousand males) has been less than unity for at least twenty years and may be
declining. A sex ratio of less than one has been a long standing feature of
Bijnor's population. The district was designated a "blood red area" - the
most extreme adverse category during the the British administration's
campaign, which began around 1875, to stamp out the practice of female
infanticide in the North West Provinces and Oudh (now Uttar Pradesh). This
has been documented elsewhere, notably by Miller (1983). However, although
the Indian Census is a marvellous institution, it, like any other
conglomeration of social facts should not be taken at face value. There is
some evidence (Jeffery and Jeffery: 1984) to suggest that at least some of
the discrepancy between the sexes in Bijnor District can be explained by
errors of enumeration. For more recent times, the same argument has been made
about the 1981 census of India (Mari-Bhat et al 1984). Even allowing for
errors of enumeration, however, the size and increasing discrepancy
between the numbers of males and females in Bijnor warrants some
explanation. I will return to this subject in later chapters when discussing
the structure of kinship and marriage and fertility.
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In general then, the demographic profile of the district in which the base
villages are located are what one would expect for North India in the light
of other studies (eg.Dyson and Moore 1983b) - an adverse sex for females and
rates of population growth in excess of 2% per annum. Such growth rates over
a substantial period of time have resulted in a substantial proportion of the
population being aged under 15 years old, as table 2 shows, with the
attendant implications for future growth.
Table 2
Population of Bijnor District by Age and Sex (%): 1981
Females Males Total
Agegroup
0-14 20.4 24 44.4
15-59 22.8 25.9 48.7
60+ 2.4 4.0 6.9
Total 46 54 100
Source: Census of India.
The richness of Bijnor's population history is enhanced by its large Muslim
minority. The district has the largest proportion of rural Muslims of any
District in India. One of the reasons Bijnor was chosen as a study location
was to allow comparison between Muslim and Hindu populations in the same
locale.
Furthermore, the proportion of Muslims in the district population is roughly
similar in the 1931 1971 and 1981 censuses as table 3 shows. It is therefore
reasonable to suppose that that there was no mass upheaval and migration of
the Muslim population around the time when Pakistan was created as a Muslim
State at Independence in 1947. The presence of a high proportion of sunni
Muslims in the district population is then a stable feature of local life




Religious Composition of Bijnor District (%): 1931, 1971 and 1981
% of Total Population
Religion 1931 1971 1981
Hindu 61 62 60
Muslim 34 37 39
5 1 1
Note: 1, Others include Sikhs and Christians.
Source: Census of India.
These district patterns are reflected in the population of the study
villages. Dharmnagri, and entirely Hindu village has 691 inhabitants, while
Jhakri has 365. These figures represent 64% and 36% of the study population





















































Total 124 677 s-5
Note 1: Other clean includes Patnagar and Gurkha. Kumar Satiya Viras
household consisting of four adults is excluded from the table.
2: Includes Dhobi and Balmiki
The bulk of Dharmnagri's population is, then, made up of middle to low clean
castes. The Harijan group are Gandhi's "children of God", untouchables in the
Hindu caste system, made unclean by the nature of their traditional
occupations. As I shall argue below, caste differences are not great, and for
most of my discussion I shall group the clean cultivating castes - Rajputs,
Jats, Sahnis and Dhimars - in one category, and the Harijans - mainly
Chamars and Jatabs - in another and discuss them collectively.
The traditional occupations of these castes have little significance in
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determining occupation followed in Dharmnagri. Nor were they economically
important in the past. With the exception of two Brahmins, responsible for
the village temple, almost the whole population has, for as long as anyone
can remember, earned their living from the land, either as owner-
cultivators, or as labourers.
Some signs of caste specialism do linger on though, through the
patronage of the local landlord. The only professional gardener in the
village - working for the latter, is a Sahni. While the only Dhobis
(washers of clothes) in the village, earn their living from washing his
clothes. One man listed "seasonal ice cream seller" as his secondary
occupation while another two men earn their living from a village store and
from the post office, though the latter is also a substantial owner of
land. There is also a small shawl weaving factory in the village, but
those employed in it are from outside the village. A few men had
seasonal jobs generated by the construction of the barrage. Apiart from
these few exceptions, the rest of the population earn their living from
farming, either by cultivating their own fields, or working on the fields
of others.
Neither is the work of women greatly affected by caste. High-caste and rich
women, as widely reported in other studies (e.g.Saradamoni: 1983) do not work
in the fields. Lower caste poorer women tend only to work in the fields
outside the childbearing years. Differences in the work which women do are as
much affected by the life cycle, demographic factors and class as they are by
caste. I will take a closer look at these when discussing women's work.
The men in the Gurkha households earn their living by working for Raja
Juala Parsad's son, Kumar Satiya Vira, who is resident in the village. There
are also a large number of Bengali families living in a sepierate village
nearby. They came to Bijnor as refugees after the troubles in East Bengal in
1959 and were settled on land taken from Raja Juala Parsad under the
Abolition of Zamindari Act p>assed in 1952, as well as on land made cultivable
by his eldest son, a senior civil servant responsible for refugee
resettlement, who madea special effort to follow government policy in this
regard. Some Bengali women have married into the village in bride-price
marriages to poor men, who cannot afford conventional marriages. By and
large, however, the Bengalis have a seporate social and economic life and
they do not feature in this thesis.
Jhakri, the Muslim village, has a longer settlement history and this porhaps
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partly explains the more straightforward nature of its caste system.
Table 5























Total 63 365 5.8
Note 1: The table goes from Highest to lowest caste, and gives
traditional caste occupations in brackets.
Source: Village Census 1982
Jhakri is more heavily populated by higher castes than Dharmnagri, with
Sheikhs accounting for 74% of the population. According to accounts by
village men about the past, there seems also to have been more general
adherence to the pattern of caste occupations among the lower castes than in
Dharmnagri. At the time of study, however, all of the adult men in the
village were involved in agriculture or the making of raw sugar. One man also
had a seasonal job as a clerk in Eijnor. No one followed a traditional caste
occupation.
As the tables below show, the populations are roughly similar to each other
in terms of their age structures. In both villages, about 48% of the
population is aged less than fifteen years of age.
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Table 6
Population by age and Sex
6.1: Jhakri
0<1 1<5 5<9 9<15 15<45 45+ Total
Female 10 35 21 18 68 18 170
Male 5 33 23 30 70 34 195
Total 15 68 44 48 138 52 365
6.2: Dharmnagri
Female 13 49 41 45 130 54 332
Male 17 42 63 52 124 47 345
Total 30 91 104 97 254 101 677
Source: Village Census 1982.
Table six shows that both villages have an adverse sex ratio for females
(exjvressed as females per thousand males), in keeping with the general North
Indian pattern (Sen and Kynch: 1983). On the basis of this census data,
Dharmnagri has a better sex ratio (962) than Jhakri (872). Howev/er, these data
are too crude to be of use in a detailed analysis of the sex ratio. This is
a question to which I return, using more sensitive maternity history data
when considering fertility in more detail In the meantime it is sufficient
to note that in keeping with the general North Indian pattern, - both
villages have an adverse sex ratio for females.
The Study Villages
The villages themselves are about 500 yards apart, separated from each other
by a narrow path through the fields. In the monsoon, villagers prefer to walk
the long way round on the metalled road, especially after dark, to lessen the
possibility of meeting a snake on the way. This doubles the length of the
journey.
In both villages the houses are predominantly of mud construction, with
thatched roofs (katcha), with a few notable exceptions. Mud houses tend to be
simple one-or-two roomed constructions with each room seldom being more than
10' by 12' in floor plan by 6'to 8' at the apex of the roof. Once built, the
walls of these houses need a minimum amount of maintenance. They are
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resmeared with white mud periodically, or perhaps for a special occassion
like a wedding or a birth. The roofs, which are made from boos grass from the
alluvial marshes, have an effective life of about three years or so, after
which they much be changed if the roof is to remain watertight. The thatch,
is collected, dried and tightly bound and layered onto a cane framework
hinged along its length into two equal parts. This frame is then heaved
across a heavy bamboo pole slung from one gable apex to the other. This is
heavy work, but acheived in great spirit amidst laughing and joking.
Houses have not always been of mud construction. Older people in both
villages can remember when houses were made of latticed wood covered over
with rushes. This was before the low lying soils were completly
cleared for cultivation. The change over to mud came as less and less of
these materials were available as swamp was converted to agricultural
land. The older houses represented a severe fire hazard and one or two of
the older men remembered a time in the 1940's, when the whole of Dharmnagri
was razed to the ground after a fire started in a high wind.
With mud houses the risk of such devastating fire is lessened. It is further
lessened by the increased number of pucca or brick built houses. Pucca houses
are easily distinguished into two broad categories and these are symbolic of
the changing fortunes of the two villages. Pucca houses are a lesser
proportion of the total housing in Dharmnagri than Jhakri, but tend to be
both more elaborate in their construction and more established than their
Jhakri counterparts. The pucca houses in Dharmnagri belong to the long
established wealthy, whereas is Jhakri, they tend to be a sign of recently
acquired wealth.
In addition to dwelling houses, Dharmnagri also has two schools, two shops, a
co-operative store, a sub post office and a dispensary. The shops - small
huts on wooden legs - act as meeting places for village men and passers by as
well as supplying basic provisions like eggs, tea, soap, potatoes, spices and
tobacco. The owner of one shop also serves as the village sub- postmaster
from a similar hut by the village temple.
The sub post office is dwarfed by the large and grand village temple. The
temple was built by Raja Juala Parsad on the lines of the Birla Mandir in
Delhi. There is a full time priest and the temple provides the focus of
attention for singing and prayers by the children of clean caste families.
This activity increased in popularity after the temple was provided with a
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public address system in 1983. The temple comes into its own around the
major Hindu festivals of Janammasti, Dusshera, Holi, and Shivaratri, when it
is more widely used by villagers rehearsing and performing plays of stories
from the Ramayana and Bhagavad Gita.
The co-operative store is a governement institution, which supplies villagers
with sugar and parafin at ration prices, when these commodities are
available. Villagers also buy seed for planting there, if none are available
elswhere.
The dispensary is in a substantial compound with quarters for a Doctor and
ancillary staff. During the fieldwork period however the doctor chose to
reside in Bijnor, primarily because he could run a private practice there.
The dispensary, consequently was open for consultation for only about four
hours a day. Outside these hours, villagers could consult the pharmacist
privately and often preferred to do so, maintaining that the medicines
received during regular hours though cheap, were ineffective, or unavailable.
During the fieldwork period, I lived, with Roger and Patricia Jefferey, and
their children, in the disused operating theatre attached to the dispensary.
The only institutional building in Jhakri is the Mosque. This is used more
consistently for day to day prayers than is the temple in Dharmnagri. The
faithful are called to prayer five times a day - via the mosque's own public
address system. At any one Azan, there are about twenty to thirty men from
the village to be found praying there - during the day at any rate and
depending on season. The mosque has a full time maulvi whose upkeep comes
from land held by the mosque and sharecropped by villagers.
The mosque has a lesser part to play in festivals than the temple in
Dharmnagri. At both the Id celebrations, the village men prefer to go to
Bijnor and worship at one of the large mosques there, where gatherings of
hundreds at each mosque are not uncommon. Ramzan and Moharam, the other two
major Muslim festivals, are either a personal feature of religious life - the
fast, or at Moharam, taken into the streets and celebrated there in a dance
parody of the battles of Muslim martyrs. The public face of these
celebrations is a male one. Women are not allowed in the mosque and if at
all, pray and fast at home.
Despite the presence of two primary schools in Dharmnagri, literacy rates are
not high. About half of adult males attended the school at some time, while
only about 10% of girls did. Muslims girls do not attend school, but learn
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to read,/Koran Sharif at a specially convened class in Jhakri.
The lay out of the two villages show some interesting differences. In some
cases, clean caste and Harijan houses share the same street. Clean castes and
Harijans are to be seen sharing a hooka (hubble-bubble pipe) or a bhaitak
(men's sitting room), especially if there is some work to be arranged, or
perhaps playing cards together. Norms governing the consumption of food
(Harriss: 1982) seem to be more strictly observed among Hindus. Clean and
Harijan castes are never seen eating together and neither do they share hand
pumps for drinking water, though one or two Sahnis claimed that they did eat
at the houses of Harijans whom they considered to be their friends.
Jhakri, partly because it is smaller and encompasses fewer castes, has a more
close-knit feel to it. But the pattern of building reflects a lesser
separation among the castes than the Hindu village. Dharmnagri shows the
tendency, reported in other studies (Beteille:1965; Miller:1975), for
building and settlement to follow caste lines. To suggest, however, there is
strict adherence to caste principles in settlement would be misleading.
In Jhakri the only road in the village is around its perimeter. The houses
are all built in a central cluster, with access by arches and passageways
from one house to another. Caste is not a strong organising feature in
Jhakri, at least not overtly so. The houses of caste groups do tend to be
clustered together but not seperated from the clusters of other castes
by roads as in Dharmnagri. At weddings and other celebrations, castes in
and
Jhakri share the same food^eat together.
So much for internal restrictions in each village, what about relations
between Hindus and Muslims in Dharmnagri and Jhakri? The most suitable way to
sum them up is probably as a relationship of public tolerance and private
disdain. The inhabitants of the two villages do not cross each other's paths
more than is absolutely necessary. They tend to conduct business with each
other in neutral places. They will for example, buy and sell sugar cane from
each other, but will not share in each others festivals or celebrations. What
is religiously special to one group is anathema to the other. Hindus revere
the cow, Muslims eat it. Muslims do not eat pork, Hindus relish it. Alcohol
is taboo to Muslims, Hindus distill and drink it.
None of these differences exhibited itself in any overt animosity or violence
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during the fieldwork period. The verandah of our quarters became a meeting
place for Hindus and Muslims alike. When representatives of both groups were
present, the relative merits of each religion would be discussed openly, but
not too profoundly, lest animosity be aroused or feelings hurt. It is worth
noting that there were no communal riots in Bijnor District during our stay,
even though they were reported in nearby Districts.
Climate and Agriculture
A key environmental feature of the villages, which must be mentioned at this
stage, is soil type. Dharmnagri and Jhakri farmers effectively farm two types
of soil. The first is known locally as khader. This is low lying land
alluvial soil closer to the river. It is heavy clay and does not drain
readily. The second type is known as bangar. This land is lighter in texture
than the khader and because of this - and its elevated position, it drains
readily.
Most of the rainfall in the Ganges plain comes during the South East Monsoon,
which lasts from about mid-June to mid-September. Rainfall per annum has been
remarkably constant over the past 50 years or so. The district has not been
shorter of rain than comparable districts in western plains Utaar Pradesh. In
fact the 1951 census records Bijnor District as having a fifty year average
annual rainfall of 10,833mms. (standard deviation 12.25) (Census of India:
1951, vol xv, part ix, p339). This places Bijnor District about middle rank
in precipitations by district for Uttar Pradesh, with only the hill districts
having higher average rainfalls per annum. The monsoon gives way to drier
cooler weather and it is not unusual to have a day or two of mist around
December. From March onwards, the temperature climbs steadily. In the year
previous to study, there was a heavy hail storm just as the wheat was
ripening and the standing crop was damaged. The timing of precipitation is
important, not only the yearly volume.
The 1908 District Gazeteer comments that the District's proximity to the
hills make it a little cooler than those further south in U.P. in both summer
and winter. In the early part of this century, British officials commented
that conditions of agriculture in the District were not good. The major
explanation for this was the absence of any widespread reliable irrigation. A
few schemes had been suggested for the building of a canal irrigation system
in the tehsil, but Nevill the District Magistrate in 1908, suggests that:
"The history of canal irrigation in the district is one of ambitious schemes
and modest acheivements" (1908:p53). Some canals were built in Bijnor
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district in the 19th century, but these were in the south and east of the
district. In the west, where the study villages are located, there was very
little permanent irrigation at all. Descriptive accounts suggest that there
was no important source of reliable irrigation in the Tehsil, and H.E. Bates,
author of a rent and rebate report written in 1931, explains the poverty of
the cultivators there as a result of this lack. In 1931, irrigation was
confined to vegetable plots and only 1.5% of the cultivated area in the
Tehsil was irrigated. Bates was in no doubt that the farmers in Bijnor Tehsil
were, under existing economic and social conditions, dependent on adequate
timely rainfall for any properity at all, viz:
"The cultivators as a whole are extremely poor and live in
wretched unsanitary conditions. This is mainly due to
combination of high rents and variable harvests. The outurn is
always uncertain in this Tehsil [Bijnor] because there is no
means of irrigation and crops depend entirely on rainfall"
(1931:pl3).
Bates also highlights the frustration of farmers living in a Tehsil which has
different soil types so near the Ganges, but in the absence of canal works,
only being able to irrigate land which needed less and not more water.
"Outurn depends entirely upon rainfall there is no chance
of irrigation, except near the Ganges khader. This latter is
damaged by ample rainfall, while the remainder [the bangar]
demands it. Most of that [soil] is light and westerly winds soon
damage standing crops which begin to shrivel at once even after
fair rains" (1931:pl8).
This led Bates to the conclusion that: "If the rains are feeble, there is
no return at all except in the khader area. A cultivator in Bijnor must be a
born optimist" (1931:pl8). By the time of the present study, this situation
had changed dramatically, as Table 7 shows.
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Table: 7




Canal - - -
Masonry
Wells 4,333 1,160 6,890




Other - 353 7,062
Total 4,333 99,863 162,672
Source: 1931, Rent and Rates Report, Tehsil Bijnor;
1971, Census of India, District Census Handbook
Part X-A, Town and Village Directory;
1981, Bijnor Statistical Diary.
Note 1: Separate figures for diesel and electric tubewells not
available in 1981.
This pattern of the growth of irrigation is confirmed by verbal accounts
from villagers and by the numbers of wells and pumping sets they now own.
Table 8:





Source: Village Census 1982
This picture is complicated by those owning engines but no wells and vice
versa. In 1982, however, all land on the bangar owned by villagers is now
irrigable while about half of the khader land is so endowed.
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Cropping Patterns
Although villagers describe the weather by reference to four seasons,
agricultural statistics divide the year into two. This classification in to
Kharif (Spring/Summer) crops and Rabi (Monsoon/Winter) crops has for a long
time been somewhat mismatched with the complexity of cropping patterns in the
village. The classification fits well with the major staples of wheat (Rabi)
and rice (Kharif) but sugar cane, the major cash crop, has a growing cycle of
ten months with ratouned crops being cut between eight months and a year
after this first harvest. Within each season, a number of fodder and fuel
crops are also grown, but in order to provide a succinct description of
changes in cropping, I shall concentrate only on the major crops.
Unfortunately, the data sources on which this discussion are based are far
from perfect. Furthermore, these shortcomings are of an unknown quantity and
therefore it is difficult to compensate adequately for them. It seems though
that Bijnor is by no means alone in having inaccurate cropping and acreage
statistics for the early part of this century.
Dewey (1978) criticised Blyn's attempt (1966) to construct trend statistics
for the early part of this century from official records in Bihar and West
Bengal, suggesting that a number of features in the way the statistics were
collected make them unreliable for this purpose. There was, for example, no
incentive on the part of any government official responsible to collect
accurate figures. He quotes contemporary statements from District Magistrates
and a number of independent sources after 1943 to support his argument which
in its turn has been criticised, notably by Charlesworth (1982) for being too
negative.
Here, however, I am not trying to delineate trends, merely to sketch major
changes, and as the figures below show, these shifts are too large to be
explained entirely by the inadequate collection of data. Dewey's conclusion
is supported by my earlier attempts to be more detailed. I found
fluctuations around base years and statistics which were inconsistent with
themselves for single years; in one case, the arithmetic in a published
table was wrong!
I have resolved these issues in a number of ways which minimise the effect of
shortcomings in the statistics. I chose 1902 as a starting date as the
statistics were affected by a number of unusual years before that, and
totally collapsed due to census operation in 1901. To compensate for the
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unreliability of the figures, I have used five year averages around 1902 and
1927-1931.
Table 9:
Acres under Major Crops, in Bijnor Tehsil, Selected Years
(Percentages of Total Cropped Area for Each Season in Brackets)
RABI
5 Year 5 Year SEASON
1902-06 1927-31 1979/80
Wheat 27,061 (29) 31,621 (40) 98,050 (95)
Gram 9,948 (11) 6,166 ( 7) - ( -)
Barley 52,919 (57) 42,520 (52) 1,483 ( 1)
Oils 1,928 ( 2) 569 ( 0.7) 632 ( 0.5)
Masur 496 ( 1) 315 ( 0.3) 3,730 ( 3.5)
Total Rabi 92,352 (100) 81,191 (100) 103,895 (100)
KHARIF
Rice 25,103 (22) 18,006 (20) 37,300 (26)
Bajra & Arhar 45,248 (39) 14,082 (15) 3,453 ( 2)
Maize 2,425 ( 2) 1,218 ( 1) 470 ( 0.3)
Dais 17,686 (15) 28,609 (32) 2,237 ( 1.7)
Cotton 6,603 ( 6) 4,936 ( 5) - ( -)
Sugar Cane 18,968 (16) 24,692 (27) 102,455 (70)
Total Kharif 116,033 (100) 91,543 (100) 145,915 (100)
Total Cropped 208,385 172,734 249,810
Area
Source: 1902-6 & 1927-31 Bijnor District Gazeteeer,
1979/80 Bijnor Statistical Diary, 1981
The major shifts in cropping pattern since the early part of the century are
clear. Rougher Barley has given way to wheat which has more than trebled in
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area, while chick peas (gram) have ceased to be important at all. The area
under oil crops has declined. Since oilseeds are not a major cash crop in the
tehsil, the decline probably reflects a constant demand, improved strains of
seed and better extraction rates now than earlier.
The area under rice has increased dramatically since the begining of the
century. The increase in area alone - almost 50% - underestimates the extent
of change. The 1902 figures consist of rough varieties of rice while the 1979
figure consists mostly of improved and transplanted varieties. Cotton has
ceased to have any importance as a cash crop. While the net acreage of all
other kharif crops has declined, sugar cane has increased its sown area by
more than five fold to 102,455 acres since the begining of the century. These
patterns are well reflected in the study villages. Older men in the villages
remember growing a greater variety of less fertile crops, which include all
of the above. The variety of crops has reduced more recently and the major
crops are now wheat, rice and sugar cane.
The cropping intensity in the villages has also increased. Before the
introduction of water lifting technology the land could support only one crop
a year, and the main agricultural activities were intensive soil preparation
and praying for rain. All farmers in the village now operate a double
cropping pattern involving wheat and rice. The turn around between between
these crops is short, perhaps a month, but not so intense as those further
south in Moradabad ( Bliss and Stern:1982).
Wheat, according to the Handbook of Indian Agriculture (1982) should be
planted out before the end of December otherwise yields are adversely
affected. By and large, this recomendation is followed by farmers in both
villages. Organic manure, a valued commodity, will be ploughed in before
wheat planting, but only if the land is to be planted with sugarcane after
the wheat harvest. The land will be ploughed and watered as many times as
funds and pressing needs for other work allow before the wheat is planted.
However, it would be wrong to think that wheat planting is the only obsession
at this time of the year, for November is also the month when the local sugar
cane society opens its gates for the purchase of sugar cane for crushing at
the mill in Bijnor.
The cane harvesting season begins after a long lean spell when there has been
relatively little money around; farmers are understandably keen to cut their
cane and reap some of the benefits of the ten months work they have put into
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it. Some farmers, if they had a desperate need of cash, will already have
sold some of their crop to the colhus (local cane crushers) to make gur (raw
sugar) used either for final consumption, or as the intermediate stage in the
production of boora - country sugar, much prized for its fineness and
sweetness. The begining of the sugar cane cutting season is a time of great
excitement. Those who are to operate colhus clean and repair them and
overhaul the diesel engines which will be used to run the crushers when the
electricity supply, which runs for only eight hours a day, is not available.
Groups of men operating as partners on different crushers will meet to
discuss prices with each other and hire labour to stoke the fires. Informally
there is a great deal of competition among them to begin crushing first.
November through to May is a very busy period with wheat planting and harvest
and sugar cane operations all taking place during that period. The other
major crop in the cycle, rice has two separate methods of cultivation,
depending on whether it is planted on khader or bangar soils.
In khader soil, rice is planted behind the plough in June. On the bangar,
rice is first cultivated in small tightly-planted nurseries, before being
plucked and transplanted out into flooded fields in July. These different
cultivation methods as well as being related to soil types are dependent on
the varieties of rice chose. On the bangar, new, High Yielding Varieties,
requiring timely irrigation to be successful are chosen. In the khader, which
drains less well, the required control of water is not possible. Farmers
growing rice in the khader then grow older varieties of rice which are more
tolerant of the conditions there, to ensure uniformity of yield in the long
run. The foregoing represents the briefest possible sketch of the
agricultural cycle and I shall discuss each of the crops involved in more
detail in spoecific chapters on each. In the meantime the table below
summarises the pattern of work throughout the year.
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Table 10:
Cropping Pattern Dharmnagri and Jhakri
SEASON








Source: Agricultural Questionnaires 1982-3.
In addition to the work outlined above, a great deal of work is also
associated with the upkeep of animals. Details from the village census show
that almost every household in Dharmnagri keeps animals.
Table 11:










Milk Buffaloes 37 9
Calves 14 4
Draft Buffaloes 24 3
Calves 20 0
Goats 3 0
Households with no animals = 10.
Source: Village Census, Dharmnagri, 1982
Systematic information of this type is not available for Jhakri. This is
because the census of households collected there extended only to persons and
39
not to livestock. It was collected from a small number of people who did not
know how many animals each household kept. My impression is that the pattern
is much the same, with perhaps more goats being kept for meat. The pattern of
ownership of animals is examined in more detail for the key informants in
chapter 7.
As one might expect, the landed keep more draft animals than the landless,
though they also have more milk animals. Unlike North Arcott (Harriss: 1982),
the landless in Dharmnagri and Bijnor do not earn a living by keeping draft
animals and hiring out their ploughing services. With the exception of three
draft buffaloes, the draft animals held by the landless are a function of
milk production rather than ploughing.
Patterns of animal husbandry in the village are complex. People looked after
their animals as best they could, depending on the purpose for which they
were kept, the resources available for their upkeep and the season. For
example animals kept for producing milk for sale are often better fed than
those kept for domestic milk production, while draft animals are fed grain
and oil cake if they are set to the plough, and if their owners can afford
it.
Conclusion
This setting chapter has provided the briefest of outlines of the study
villages. It tries to describe a complex location, where for example tractors
are in evidence but most ploughing is still done with animals, where people
put the resources which they own together in ways which deny and bewilder the
imagination and catch unawares the student who might expect one set of
resources to go with another. This is not the case. In the chapters which
follow I explore some of this myriad variation, with particular reference to
the role of children. I will begin in the next chapter by looking at what is




This chapter has three main purposes. The first is to describe the structure
of landholding in the study villages. Land is the most important productive
resource in these two villages and has a significant effect on standards of
living and the ability to generate income and wealth.
The second purpose is to make particular reference to women's relationships
to land and other productive property. In the study villages/tend not to own
land in their own right. The significance of this is not to be overlooked as
it tells us a great deal about the position of women and their relations with
men. The important questions to be answered here are what kinds of property
do women hold, how does this differ in nature from that which men hold, and
what are the consequences of this?
Thirdly, possible relationships between landholding and fertility in the
study villages are examined in the light of the debate about whether this
relationship is positive or negative. Before turning to the first of these
objectives, I will outline the sources of data on which the arguments are
based and highlight some of the problems encountered in their use.
Sources of Data
The two main sources of data on landholding used in this chapter are the
official land records held by the Tehsildar's office in Bijnor and accounts
from villagers themselves about the amount of land they held.
Official Records.
The official record of land ownership in Bijnor, as elsewhere in Uttar
Pradesh, consists of two sets of volumes. The first set, the Khatoni is a
record of current ownership from a specified date, usually the date of the
last settlement or consolidation. A typical entry of ownership consists of
the owner's name, his father's name, the plot number and area of the plot
owned and the year in which ownership commenced or the date of the last
settlement, whichever is the later.
The second set of volumes is the flotation Dakhilkar Register. This is a
record of land sales and purchases. A typical entry includes the names and
father's names of those involved in the transfer, the plot number and area
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of each plot involved and the price of the land transferred and the date
oftransfer. Mainly Khatoni records will be used in this chapter. The
Motation Dakhilkar Register will be used more in the next chapter when
transfers of land are considered.
The Khatoni is an impressive document, but in the process of using it to
calculate landholding figures for the base villages I encountered some
difficulties. These difficulties are greater than accounts by other scholars,
would have led me to expect from a set of records which are not much
different from theirs (Beteille: 1965; Bliss & Stern: 1982; Kessinger:
1974).
The first problem is that landholding records are held by revenue village of
ownership, not village of residence. The landholdings of one owner are not
held in a single ledger entry by name and address, but are held in the ledger
which relates to the village where the land is. To have a complete record of
landholding by the residents of the study villages, it was necessary to
examine the Khatonis of surrounding villages as well as the study villages
themselves. To do this I spoke to and examined the records of all patwaris,
the officials responsible for village land records, at the Tehsil office. In
all I examined the records of about sixteen villages. Residents in the study
villages hold land in six of these. I am certain that the landholdings of
the villagers in Dharmangri and Jhakri have been exhaustively covered by
this approach with two important exceptions.
The first is the village of Chandpuri which adjoins Dharmnagri on the upland
Bangar soil and can therefore now be regarded as prime agricultural land.
Unfortunately for me, this village was going through the process of chakbandi
- land consolidation - during the study period. Consequently, the records
were not at the Tehsil but at the Chakbandi office, to which access could not
be negotiated. To compensate for this omission (which affects only a few
residents of Dharmnagri) I have included figures for landholding there by
asking the villagers concerned about their landholding in Chandpuri. The
effect on the structure of landholding will be small, since all owners of
land in Chandpuri are already in the top category of ownership before their
Chandpuri holdings are included.
The second omission relates to the existence of the Bareilly Co-operative
Society. I was told by a patwari that this was a way in which some of the
wealthier owners of land in Dharmnagri had managed to avoid the land ceiling
after the abolition of Zamindari in 1952. Once again an estimate of the
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amount of such land was obtained by speaking to those concerned. The effect
on the structure of landholding is minimal as these owners are also already
in the wealthiest category. If anything, then my figures underestimate the
concentration of land in the top catgeory.
Much of the land held by Dharmnagri residents is not in the village of
residence at all but in adjacent, or sometimes more distant villages. Jhakri
residents did not own land outside the revenue village. Conversely, and
following on this, it should be obvious that not all of the land in the study
villages was owned by the residents who are the subject of this study. Other
holders are primarily farmers from neighbouring or close by villages.
In order to use the data in the sources described above several assumptions
must be made. The first is that only those whose names are in the record book
hold, operate or have control over any land. On the face of it this seems
like a reasonable assumption. However if structures of landholding were based
simply on these categories, several important features of landholding in the
villages would be overlooked. Quite apart from cases where the books are not
up to date with current ownership of land, for example where a father has
died but legal ownership has not passed over to his sons, the patterns of
land operation are not completely covered by this type of categorisation.
For example, in several families in both villages the father though still
alive, has chosen to hand over effective control of family land to his sons.
One man, Kishin Singh, is recorded in the Khatoni as holding 13 bighas of
land. He himself opierates none of this. His three sons operate equal shares
and each gives him an equal share of the produce from wheat and rice crops
and a cash sum, RslOOO each year. In this case, then, land is not operated as
a single unit, but as three units each based around a single cooking hearth.
Each of these hearths supports varying numbers of people. Decisions on how to
operate the land vary according to the needs of three separate units, each
with diferent numbers of people, not the needs of one extended unit. In cases
like these the records overestimate the operational concentation of land.
In addition, the records themselves give no idea of how individual holders
came to hold the land which they do. Some idea of how current patterns
emerged is possible by examination of the Motation Dakhilkar Register. By
combining this with the Khatoni, and a bit of adding and subtracting, and
using information gathered from more informal fieldwork in the village, it
becomes clear that that some sons do in fact manage to buy land before their
inheritance. One cannot assume, therefore, that a holder's name appears on
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the books only after he has inherited. This leads to several confusions
between what I knew about landholding from living in the village and what the
records told me about it.
For example Sukhan Singh an elderly Chamar had three sons, and held some 25
bighas of land (one bigha is approximately one-fifth of an acre). While he
was still alive two of his three sons managed to buy small plots of land,
less than a bigha each. These holdings are recorded separately from that of
the father in the Khatoni. The sons, however, lived and worked jointly with
their father and their standard of living and expectations of land ownership
were determined by this, ie being in a family which owned 25 bighas of
largely prime bangar land. If we relied on the records alone, two of the sons
would be recorded as owners of less than a bigha, and are therefore among the
poorest households, while the father is registered as an owner of 25 bighas
and appears among the wealthiest. During the fieldwork period Sukhan Singh
died but the land had still not been transferred to the names of the three
sons by the time I left some six months later.
If my account of the structure of landholding is based on records alone I
also have the opposite problem. What was I to do if more than one man was
recorded as having a share in a single plot or several pieces of land. Once
again the records say nothing about the relationships between the people who
hold jointly except where they are brothers. In this case they will be listed
as a,b and c sons of d. But even then, as in all cases, it tells me nothing
about how the land is operated. Is the joint holding in name only or does it
have operational significance? Only after discussions with landholders
themselves does the relationship between the records and the operational
patterns make sense. One half-bigha plot in Jhakri, for example, is listed as
having eight joint owners. I knew from my field work that these were three
sets of first cousins. I asked one of them, Said Uddin, about it. He told me
that this plot was the one by a colhu which has a tubewell on it. The well
had been sunk jointly by their three fathers when they operated the land
together in the previous generation. It is still held jointly as none of the
men involved is prepared to give up his right to the water which it and the
machinery there provides. Hardly surprisingly the particular significance of
this small plot is not recorded anywhere on the official records.
Said Uddin also taught me that there might be no lasting connection between
or among men who bought land together. He is an only son and has received his
father's land intact. He has also bought land pre-inheritance. Over the past
ten years or so he has been the most prolific buyer of land in either study
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village. The records told me that he had been buying land with men with whom
he had no ostensible connection. When I asked him about this he said he was
not fussy about who he bought land with. He said that if a plot came which he
thought worth buying but did not have the money, he would enter into
partnership with someone who also wanted to buy but did not have enough
money. The plot would then be split between them. He said he would buy land
in partnersip with me if I had enough money!
This was also a lesson in not reading into transactions relationships which
did not exist. Said Uddin had also bought land with his FYBS's but these were
on the same basis as those he had bought with unrelated men. They were simply
an expedient to raise enough money to buy the plot which was then shared
according to contribution. The connection lasted for the transfer only,
although the records show that the the men hold jointly in all cases. The
complexities of relationships surrounding land need to be borne in mind in
the account which follows.
Caste and Laridholding in Dharmnagri and Jhakri
Of the various ways in which a distribution of landholding can be constructed
for the study villages, caste is probably the easiest. Table 1 shows the
distribution of landholding by caste in Dharmnagri.
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Table 1:
Landholding in acres by Caste
Dharmnagri*
(percentages of totals in brackets)
CASTE LAND % OF NO OF LAND NO iOF LAND
HELD TOTAL HOUSE¬ PER PEOPLE PER
(acres) LAND HOLDS HOUSHLD. CAPITA
Brahmin 1 0.3 4 ( 3) 0.25 13 ( 2) 0.07
Rajput/Jat/
Patnagar
62 22 11 ( 9) 5.6 62 ( 9) 1.00
Sahni 105 38 40 (33) 2.6 234 (35) 0.44
Dhimar 24 8.3 11 ( 9) 2.18 71 (10) 0.33
Other
Clean
8 3 10 ( 8) 0.8 36 ( 5) 0.20
Chamar 56 20 31 (25) 1.74 180 (27) 0.30
Jatab 18 6 11 ( 9) 1.51 60 (10) 0.31
Other
Harijan
1 0.3 5 ( 4) 0.2 21 ( 3) 0.04









Notes: 1 Excludes Kumar Satiya Vira
2 Includes Ghurka, Barhi & Bishnoi.
3 Includes Dhobi & Balmiki.
Source: Khatoni Land Records, Tehsil Office Bijnor, 1983.
This table shows that no caste, with the possible exception of the small
number of Brahmins, is wildly disadvantaged in relation to land holding. The
Sahnis, for example comprise about 33% of total households in the village and
about 35% of the total population and hold about 38% of the land. Other clean
castes are the most disadvantaged as a group, reflecting their historical
position as service households in the village. They do not fare so badly in
terms of their per capita holding. The most advantaged group are the Jats and
Rajputs having twice their proportionate household share of land. This
reflects the proportion of landless households from each caste. Of the 21
landless households in Dharmnagri, 12 are Jatab and Chamar and rest low clean
caste households, except one Brahmin household which is also landless.
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The position in Jhakri, shown in Table 2, is different, with a greater
concentration of land in the higher caste group.
Table 2:
Landholding in Acres by Caste
Jhakri
(percentages in brackets)
CASTE LAND % OF NO iOF LAND NO OF LAND
HELD TOTAL HOUSE¬ PER PEOPLE PER
(acres) LAND HOLDS HOUSHLD. CAPITA
Sheikh 150 (92) 46 (73) 3.26 271 (74) 0.55
Julaha 11 (7) 6 (10) 1.83 42 (11.5) 0.26
Teli 2 (1) 7 (ID 0.28 42 (11.5) 0.05
Dhobi 0 (0) 2 (3) 0 4 (1) o
Faquir 0 (0) 2 (3) 0 6 (2) 0
Totals 163 (100) 63 (100) 2.58 365 (100) 0.45
Source: Khatoni Land Records, Tehsil Office Bijnor, 1983.
Almost all land in Jhakri is concentrated among the Sheikhs. They comprise
73% of village households containing 74% of the population, holding 92% of
the land. The average holding per household and per capita is similar for
both Dharmnagri and Jhakri. However, Table 2 hides the fact that over one
third of Jhakri households are landless and that the largest single landless
caste group is Sheikh. Of the 22 landless households in Jhakri, 8 are Sheikh,
3 Julaha, 7 Teli, 2 Dhobi and 2 Faquir.
Class in Dharmnagri and Jhakri
As I have already suggested in Chapter 2, most people in the study villages
are dependent, in one way or another, upon agriculture for their livelihood I
intend therefore to use landownership as the major indicator of class in
Dharmnagri and Jhakri. There are no rich households in either village without
land. However, people do not fall easily into class categories - they must be
pushed. Accordingly any classification is bound to raise problems. The task
in hand is not to produce the ideal classification, but rather a grouping
which adequately and reasonably represents the relative groupings of the
47
people under study. In this study, the major problems may be split into four
groups - the unit of account, non-agriculural income, demographic variation
among units of account and the interpretation of data sources. I will deal
with each of these problems and their resolution before presenting class data
for the study villages.
The Unit of Account
Since the standard of living of village inhabitants is affected by the
resources of the household to which they belong, it is reasonable to base the
structure of class upon the household. I do not wish to be read here as
saying that all members of the household benefit equally from its resources.
Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating just the opposite.
Chen et al (1981) and Kynch and Sen (1983), for example, argue that access to
household resources is based upon age and sex, with a positive bias towards
adult males. I myself shall argue a similar point below. Here I am more
simply arguing that the occupants of more landed households will generally be
materially better of than those in less landed households.
It would be misleading to suggest that all households are homogenous. We must
not think that the mere existence of the household in any way suggests this.
The structure of the household in the base villages varies with respect to
generation, production and consumption all gathered around groups of equally
inheriting affinal kin. Households in the village therefore vary from
consisting of two or more generations of affinal kinsmen, their wives and
children, all engaged in joint production and consumption at its most complex
to a straightforward nuclear family or perhaps single person at its most
simple. I have already made some reference to the extent of this variation in
Chapter 2 and will return to it in some detail subsequently. I do not plan to
refer to it in any depth here, but it should be borne in mind that the
household is not a homogenous unit.
Non-Agricultural Income.
There are some households in the study villages whose class position is not
closely related to landholding. In Dharmnagri, this may be because the
household head has a permanent job. This applies to the sub-postmaster and
the large landowner's permanent farm manager. Alternatively a few households
derive income from human capital invested in the skills of its members. This
applies to the village carpenter, who also owns land, and the mechanic, who
does not. Three men in Dharmnagri also own small shops selling small
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comestibles. However the amount of capital invested in these and the return
to them is small. One shopkeeper is a member of a landowning household and is
therefore not difficult to place. The other two are categorised landless. In
Jhakri, there is only one household where non agricultural income is earned,
by a man who has a seasonal job as a clerk in the sugar cane society in
Bijnor. He is also a substantial landowner and is therefore easily placed.
In addition to these adjustments, there are also anomalies in land operation
to be taken into account. For example one female-headed household owns about
2.5 acres of land, but because of the proscription on women ploughing she
cannot operate any of this herself. She leases it out to a jat household and
consequently earns about half of what she would were she able to operate it
herself.
This example raises the more general issue of sharecropping. While it is true
that those who sharecrop or rent land in enjoy a higher standard of living
than they otherwise could, such arrangements are generally short lived and
the amounts of land involved small. In addition, most of the land available
for rent is the very poorest of the low lying khader. It is sandy soil, prone
to flooding about an hour's bullock cart ride from the village. Clearly such
rental does not bestow the same security as ownership of an equivalent area.
It does not therefore figure in the class structure which follows.
Demographic Variation Among Households.
It is possible for some households that the hiring out of labour power is
more closely connected to the structure and composition of their particular
household than to its class position. This is evident in the types of work
which various men perform. Men and sometimes women from poorer households
tend to work as casual labour on the land of others while men from richer
households tend to work in household enterprises using household capital.
Examples of this are the renting of orchards for sale of fruit or operating
colhus. The major exception to this was work on the barrage which was
undertaken by Hindu men from all types of households. It was recgonised by
all, however, that such seasonal and temporary work was unlikely to affect
the class position of households in the long run.
The Class Structure of Dharmnagri and Jhakri
In constructing a hierarchy of class for the study villages I have used one
main guiding principle. This principle is the way in which the household uses
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its labour power in relation to its resources. The social relationships which
these uses of labour power give rise to has been at the centre of a long and
sometimes fruitless debate on the mode of production in Indian agriculture
(Thorner: 1982). This debate is not the centre of attention here. Rather I
simply want to structure households in Dharmnagri and Jhakri according to
whether the extent of their landholding means that they are households which
hire labour in or hire labour out at current levels of technology and
cropping intensity. I have chosen not to use individual holdings as the basis
for classification, for two reasons. Firstly, using de facto landholding as
an indicator does not give a reasonable idea of who benefits from the working
of this land. For example, if a household head has two married sons and they
all work the land jointly, it is reasonable to argue that the material
standard of living of the sons is enhanced by the fact that they have
entitlements to the produce of their father's land. If the structure of
landholding took account only of the father's de facto holding, the sons
would be classed as landless, a situation which does not accurately reflect
their class position.
Secondly, if there is a relationship between landholding and fertility, one
could reasonably argue that this will be based on the land a man expects to
inherit rather than his current holding. It is my contention that the
position of a landless labourer whose household has no land, and therefore
can expect to inherit no productive property, is different from that of a man
who currently holds no title to land but farms joinly with his father who
owns 20 acres. To account for these differences, I have used household
landholdings in the classification which follows. This at least has the merit
of taking into account what heads of household can expect to inherit in the
future.
Bearing in mind the above caveats, if households are structured in this way, it
leads to five categories each of which is outlined below. Kumar Satiya Vira's
household's has a category of its own. This reflects the unique character of
the household in the village and its importance to the village economy. His
household owns and controls land extensively and he hires a substantial
amount of permanent labour. In addition, the household has extensive
industrial and political interests at a national level.
Category I: Consists only of one household, that of Kumar Satiya Vira. His
household and class position is quantatively and qualitatively different from
the rest of the village and so is treated separately. His households owns and
controls in excess of 250 acres and has industrial and political networks at
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a national level.
Category II: Consists of households which hire labour in to do almost all of
their major agricultural operations. Men in these households see themselves
more as farm managers than farmers. In local parlance, these households are
engaged in kheti - farming. These households have enough land to ensure both
that they are comfortably off and that their household heads seldom have to
work the land themselves. In addition they may have household resources which
they are able to hire out to others, including threshing machines or cane
crushers, for example.
Category III: This consists of households in which the agriculture work is
mostly performed by adult household men. They may occassionaly hire labour
in to perform weeding and harvesting operations. Normally these men do not
hire themselves out as casual labourers. Where they do work away from their
own land, it tends to be in tasks which are funded by a considerable amount
of family capital. Such tasks include the sub-contracting of fruit orchards
or the operation of a sub-contracted cane crusher. In local parlance, these
households are engaged in khudkast - farming for oneself.
Category IV: This consists of households in which the men, in addition to
working their own land must also hire themselves out to work for others
whenever possible. These households do not have enough land to maintain an
adequate standard of living without performing additional wage labour. These
people will describe their primary occupation as farming and add that their
secondary occupation is mazdoori - casual wage labour.
Category V: This consists mostly of households which own no land at all. It
also includes six households which own operationally insignificant amounts of
land. The members of these households must sell their labour power to others
in order to survive. They have no other means by which to earn their
livelihood. These people describe themselves as rozdari - daily wage
labourers or mazdoors. Some of the households in this category are servants
in the Vira household, while others may be able to obtain seasonal work on
the cane crushers. Such households form a small proportion of the total in




Landownership in Acres by Class
Dharmnagri.
(percentages of totals in brackets^)
LAND NO OF LAND NO OF LAND
HELD HOUSE¬ PER PEOPLE PER
(acres) HOLDS HOUSHLD. CAPITA
CLASS
I 250 (46) 1 (0.8) 250 4 (0.8) 62.50
II 98 (36) 7 (6) 14 62 (9) 1.6
III 133 (48) 45 (36) 3.1 270 (40) 0.49
IV 44 (16) 37 (30) 1.24 185 (23.2) 0.23
V 0 (0) 34 (28) 0 160 (28) 0
Totals 275 (100) 123 (100) 2.24 677 (100) 0.40
Ex Satiya Vira
Note 1 Percentages for the Classes II - V exclude class I.
Source: Khatoni Land Register, Tehsil Office Bijnor, 1983.
Table 3 shows a marked difference from that for the caste distribution of
landownership in Dharmnagri. The distribution shows a marked concentration of
land among the higher classes at the expense of the the lower. In
Dharmnagri 84% of land is held by just 42% of households accounting for 40%
of the population. Over a quarter of households in the village are landless.
ortd ha<j£.
Those in class III account for 36% of households/^ about 48% of of land.
Classes IV & V fare less well. Together they comprise over half the
households and population in the Dharmnagri but hold only 16% of its land.
This pattern is slightly less accentuated than in Jhakri as Table 4 shows.
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Table 4:
Landownership in Acres by Class,
Jhakri

















II 23 (14) 3 ( 4) 7.8 18 ( 4) 1.3
III 125 (77) 30 (48) 4.2 189 (52! 0.66
IV 15 8 (13) 1.9 45 (12) 0.33
V 0(0) 22 (35) 0 113 (31) 0.0
Totals 163 (100) 63 (100) 2.59 365 (100) 0.45
Source: Khatoni Land Records Tehsil Office Bijnor, 1983.
Classes IV & V account for 48% of households in Jhakri and about 43% of the
population and yet hold only 9% of the land. Each of the classes in Jhakri
owns, on average, about twice as much land per capita as that immediately
below in the ranking, a more regular pattern than that for Dharmnagri, though
it is not clear why this is the case. As with Dharmnagri, the largest single
group are those in class III.
Women and Landholding: of Land and Jewellery, The Sexual Division of
Property.
One striking feature of the Khatoni is the all-but-complete absence of women
from its pages. In all, only six women from the study villages are registered
in the Khatoni. What light can these isolated instances of landholding by
women shed on the position of women in the study villages? How do they fit in
with the general proposition than women in North India do not own land or
other productive resources? (Sharma: 1980).
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The first point to note is that five of these six women listed as holders of
land are widows and their landholding stems from the fact of their husband's
death. Among them, they are registered as holders 40 bighas of land. The
sixth woman's recorded holding is, I discovered on speaking to her husbandan
attempt to avoid the land ceiling. This woman had been registered as an owner
by her husband to ensure they would retain the excess land. For her it has no
operational significance. It is farmed by her husband, and she colludes with
him in retaining the land for their family. Of the remaining five, four have
remarried since having their husband's land transferred to them. The land is
operated by their new partner as if it was his.
None of the women then had inherited land from her father, hardly surprising
in a system of patrilineal descent. Furthermore, two of the women are not
recorded as outright owners of land, but as the guardian's for their under¬
age sons. Each of these sons will become the 'rightful owner' when he reaches
the age of majority. Both of these women have remarried, and their new
partners operate the land jointly with their sons. Remarriage would seem to
be an effective startegy for retaining land on the part of these women. Jumri
for example managed to keep her husband's 11 bighas of land intact from his
death in 1971. Chotiya, wife of Ram Rekha had a little more trouble, since
she had to repay debts which her husband had incurred while still alive. She
sold about 3 bighas to do this and has not sold any land since.
Of the remaining three widows, one owns an operationally significant area of
land and has entered into sharecropping arrangements. Significantly, perhaps,
this woman is a Harijan outside the childbearing agegroup so she is unlikely
to remarry.
A general conclusion which may be drawn here is that none of these women were
able under the existing sexual division of labour - a subject to which we
shall return - to operate the land on their own. In the extreme, this means
that in order to survive, women may have to sell land. This is more likely
when a woman is widowed while her children are still young. This general
conclusion is similar to that drawn by Cain (1981) using Bangladeshi data.
Though the circumstances for women in the study villages would seem more
convivial than those in Bangladesh, it should be noted that women managed to
retain land not by working it, but remarrying someone else who could. Where
this is not possible, the consequences are dire indeed.
One Muslim woman, Ramzani, for example lost her husband after a protracted
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illness in 1972. This household owned 10 bighas of hangar land. Ramzani also
had six young children - four daughters and two sons, who at the time of her
husband's death were too young to take responsibility for the farm work. In
addition she was also left with debts of about Rs400 incurred from her
husband's illness and an outstanding fertiliser loan. Over the next eight
years, Ramzani was forced to sell the household's entire landholding to pay
for both consumption needs and the marriages of her children. She was unable
to farm the land herself and local farmers who had refused to sharecrop with
her were queuing up to buy the land.
Women in the study villages do not, then, inherit productive property like
land. They are only likely to find themselves with title to land if they are
widowed. In this event, they are unlikely to be able to retain land unless
they remarry or enter into another union with someone who can work the land.
It has been argued by Goody (1973) that it is useful to see dowry as a form
of pre-mortem inheritance. This is true only in a limited sense. It draws our
attention to the fact that dowry is a substantial outlay on the part of
peasant producers. Sharma (1980), suggests that for both areas which she
studied, dowry was roughly the equivalent of a year's income for most people.
The notable exceptions to this were the poor who seemed to favour some form
of bride price marriage.
Changes in the general level of dowry are discussed in the chapter on kinship
and marriage. What I want to argue here though, is that dowry given to
daughters at the time of their marriage is a very different kind of
inheritance from that which sons receive when they are given land or
productive property. The main characteristic of dowry is that it is not
productive property. Women cannot earn an independent living from the
household goods, clothes and jewellery which accompany them to their sasural
at the time of marriage. {Sharma: 1980)
The goods of which dowry consists are assimilated into her husband's
household and she has relatively little control over them. They do not
provide her with the means to earn a living, nor can she sell them to raise
money should she need it for any reason. Dowry is given with her, but it does
not belong to her. The use she obtains from it and the extent to which she
has control over it are more under the control of her affines than herself.
Even jewellery, which to western observers might seem like the most personal
of property, can be taken from her. Several men in my sample said that
pawning their wife's jewellery was one way of raising a loan. Most said they
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would not hesitate to do so and several already had. It not unusual either
for the jewellery of a daughter-in-law to be used in part payment for the
marriage of a daughter.
A woman arrives then at her sasural, with a set of non-productive property,
in the form of dowry. She cannot earn a living from it. This property is more
under the control of her affines than herself. She has no source of income
independent of her affines, she is dependent on them for her food shelter and
well-being. She cannot expect to inherit land as a matter of course. Even if
she has no brothers, her father's land is more likely to pass to her husband
and their offsspring than to herself. Neither has she any control over the
land and assets which her husband owns. If she marries a landless man, she is
dependent on her husband's income. The management and control of productive
property are firmly in the hands of men.
This has been the briefest of excursions into the relationship gender to
property. The Sexual Division of Property outlined above is only a part of
what Young et al (1981: pxii) refer to as the 'relations of everyday life'.
To understand it more completely, we must look at the structure of
relationships within which it is embedded. The subject will be taken up again
and extended when I consider the structure of kinship and marriage and the
sexual division of labour in later chapters.
Of Land and Fertility
In this final section on landholding, the relationship between landholding
and fertility is examined in the light of the debate abuot whether this
association is positive or negative.
A positive association is claimed between the two variables by adherent's to
Becker's (1960) 'New Home Economics' theory that the relationship between
income and fertility is a positive one. More recently however, Arnold et al
(1975), and Bulatao and Lee (1985) have argued, in reviews of the literature
that there is a strikingly consistent relationship between landholding and
fertility. Some spice has been added to the pot by Schutjer and Stokes
(1982), who argue, using Egyptian data, that size of operational holdings
(land owned plus land rented in minus land rented out) varies positively with
fertility while land ownership varies negatively with fertility.
Great care is required in the interpretation of these data most importantly
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because they assume that observed differences in fertility are the outcome of
calculating, rational, purposive maximising behaviour. In short, the outcome
of deliberate fertility control. This in turn carries its own assumptions.
For example, if Schutjer and Stokes are to be given any credence, a market
for land rental must exist and be sufficiently flexible to allow adjustments
with fertility to take place.
In the study villages, land rental and sharecropping arrangements tend to be
affected by short term factors which are unrelated to fertility in any
measurable way. For example a farmer is more likely to sharecrop land to
another better placed to make use of the land than he is, by renting an
isolated plot to a farmer whose land is contiguous with it to save him the
long journey to farm such a small area. He may sharecrop his land to someone
who owns a tubewell, or other material resources which will ensure a better
yield from the land than he himself could obtain in the absence, of these.
These arrangements may also vary seasonally. A farmer may have no resources
with which to farm a plot of land for one crop and will share it out for
three months, but take it back into sole cultivation during the months when
he has more resources with which to farm himself.
It has also been suggested by Cain (1985), that to explain the positive
relationship between landholding and fertility as intentional and purposive
may be spurious. Drawing on the work of McNicoll (1980) and Bongaarts (1978),
he suggests that the observed relationship may not require an explanation at
the level of purpose at all. He suggests that the relationship between the
two variables is best explained by reference to proximate variables;
behaviour which has no intentional purpose to affect fertility, but does so
none the less. In the absence of systematic differences in contraceptive
practice such variables affecting fertility would include: frequency of
intercourse; abortion; miscarriage; and infecundability.
What light can data from the study villages throw on this issue? The class
categories developed above are combined with a second source of data, the
maternity history. These histories were collected by research assistants
from all ever-married women in the two study villages during the course of
fieldwork and include details of all births. This allows us to look at the
relationship between socio-economic variables and fertility, all live and
still births. Let us first of all look at the relationship between religion
and fertility, before going on to look at that between class and fertility.
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Table 5:
Mean Number of Children
Everborn to to Ever-married Women
By Class Position of Household and Religion
(NUMBER OF WOMEN IN BRACKETS)
CLASS RELIGIOUS GROUP
Muslim Hindu Harijan Total
I&II 5.89 ( 9) 5.31 (16) - 5.52 (25)
III 5.60 (43) 4.92 (36) 6.59 (17) 5.52 (96)
IV 6.37 ( 8) 5.22 (27) 4.10 (20) 4.98 (55)
V 4.00 (27) 4.15 (20) 5.42 (12) 4.34 (59)
Total 5.21 (87) 4.91 (99) 5.28 (49) 5.10 (235)
Source: Maternity Histories, 1985
Average fertility for women in the study villages is 5.10. The table shows,
however, that there is very little difference in fertility across religious
group. The Hindus have slightly lower fertility than the other two groups,
but the standard deviations - in the region of about 3 for all three
religious groups are too high to allow for the analysis of such small
apparent differences. There are larger differences in fertility by class. The
most landed, when compared to the landless, have on average about just over
one child more overall (5.52 compared with 4.34). Within religious groups
this difference remains about the same for Hindus and Harijans, but is
somewhat larger for Muslims.
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Table six looks at patterns of fertility by age and class.
Table 6:
Mean Number of Children Everborn
by Age of Ever-Married Women
and Class Position of Household
(NUMBER OF WOMEN IN BRACKETS)
AGEGROUP
15-24 25-34 35-44 45+ Total
CLASS
I&II 1.17 ( 6) 4.25 ( 4) 7.22 ( 9) 8.17 ( 6) 5.52 (25)
III 1.44 (18) 4.38 (29) 6.62 (21) 8.50 (28) 5.52 (96)
IV 1.18 (11) 3.83 (18) 5.83 ( 6) 7.85 (20) 4.98 (55)
V 1.27 (15) 3.13 (15) 5.62 ( 8) 6.90 (21) 4.34 (59)
Total 1.30 (50) 3.94 (66) 6.45 (44) 7.85 (75) 5.10 (235)
Source: Maternity Histories, 1985.
Admittedly, the numbers in this table are small from a demographic point of
view, however, the strongest relationship which emerges is a positive one
between the amount of land owned and fertility. In short, land owners have
about one more child at what may be regarded as completed fertility, age 45+,
than the landless. The relationship does not, however, appear to be a
continuous one. In all age groups, except the first, women in landed
households have higher fertility than women in landless households. The
higher fertility in the 15-24 agegroup for landless women is most likely
explained by a lower age at marriage. Although I do not have reliable data on
the age at marriage, this view is supported by the rest of the table. Women
in the landless group are overtaken by the others in the 25-34 agegroup.
However, one must also admit the possibility of secular changes which may be
affecting the landed first, or indeed, explanations which appertain to
individual households in each group. We shall return to this in a later
chapter when discussing fertility behaviour.
In the meantime, can we explain this difference in observed fertility by
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reference to deliberate control? When we arrived in the study villages, only
ten women in the reproductive age-group were recorded as "protected" from
pregnancy by either sterilisation or IUD, other modern methods of
contraception were from the accounts of village women even less used. The
explanation of these class differences in fertility will be taken up in later
chapters on fertility when sample men explain the rationale behind their
family size. In the meantime, we should bear in mind that there is a positive
relationship between class and fertility to be explained.
Conclusions.
In summary, this chapter delineated the structure of landholding in the study
villages. The structure of landholding is not as straightforward as one might
expect from even a systematic handling of official land records. Landholding
is too important an indicator of social position to be handled in a hap-
hazard-way .
In this chapter I have argued that it is more useful to use information from
various sources, official records, conversations and semi- structured
questionaire to arrive at a more complete understanding of the structure of
landholding and its meaning.
This is of course only a partial view of landholding. The absence of
substantial, frequent and rightful ownership of land by women is also a
social indicator of great significance. The lack of property by which to earn
an independent source of living severely limits the freedom of choice which
women as social actors have. This absence of right to productive property
along with patrilineal descent and virilocal residence after marriage sets
the structural framework within which women and men live and work. I am not
suggesting here that the men and women who are the subject of this study
merely act out the imperatives of the social structure of which they form a
part. They are not entirely the the objects of the social structure within
which they live. The content of their lives rather than its form also depends
on other factors, such as the structure of their haveli, the number and sex
compositon of their children, stage in the life cycle, caste, religion etc,
all of which affect the patterns of work and life in their own ways. This
shall be the subject of the next chapter. These are examined in more detail
in the chapters on kinship and marriage and the sexual division of labour.
The final section in this chapter examined the nature of the relationship
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between landholding and fertility. It was suggested that a positive
relationship existed between landholding and fertility, but that this could
not be explained with reference to deliberate fertility control. No attempt
was made to explain why this difference exists.
In this chapter, we have been taking a look at a static picture of of the
structure of landholding as it is in the study villages today. In the next
chapter I want to look at sales and purchases of land with particular
reference to what they can tell us about how stable the economic and social
environment of the study villages is and how well children act as a kind of
insurance policy against emergencies which might otherwise result in the sale
of land.
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Chapter 4: The Insurance Value of Children
In this chapter I wish to examine the idea, raised by Mead Cain (1981), that
children have an insurance value which is at least analytically separate from
any value which they may have as labourers, or as providers of support for
parents in their old age.
In writing of the insurance value of children, authors have tended to
concentrate on this latter aspect of security - that which children provide
for parents in their old age. The logic underlying these arguments is that
in the absence of institutional forms of old age security, such as pension
schemes, children may be an important source of provision for parents in
their old age. The usual method of analysis is inferential cross-sectional
data on pensions and fertility levels. Using these methods of analysis,
Leibenstein (1957; 1977) suggests that the old-age security motive is an
important determinant of fertility, while Lindert (1980) argues that it is
not. Vlassof and Vlassof (1980) using village level data suggest that it is
not children, but economic resources which provide security in old age.
Nugent (1985) suggests that two important questions need to be asked when
considering the value of children as a source of old age security for
parents. Firstly, under what conditions would one expect such a motive to be
important; and secondly, do these conditions prevail in the area under study.
In Dharmnagri and Jhakri, there are no institutional sources of security to
which parents may turn in their old age. The need for children in this
respect is more accurately construed as a need for sons. Depending on a
daughter in old age offends local norms. It is only considered as a last
resort. Furthermore, it is only a plausible strategy for those with enough
land to attract a daughter's husband into the unattractive role of ghar-jemai
(husband who lives in the home of his wife's parents), which should be
avoided if at all possible.
"Boys look after their parents when they are old but people without
sons would have to work till they drop. They will always be in
difficulty. Besides, boys keep their father's name going and as
soon as they are old enough they will do fieldwork. Girls don't do
fieldwork, and if they were to it is never for their parents. they
don't earn money for their fathers. When a girl goes away to her
own house .who will look after the parents if their is no son? You
can bring in a ghar-jemai but this is not the same as your own line.
Instead of saying it was your son, people would comment that it was
your son-in-law who was doing the work." (Liaqat, class III)
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Sons should provide support for parents in their old age in Dharmnagri and
Jhakri, though sons cannot be guaranteed to live up to expectations.
Landowning parents can ensure compliance from their sons by refusing to allot
land to them until the parents die. Parents also have pressure on their side
to maintain their sons' sense of duty. But poor peasants and the landless
have least hold over their sons for they have few or no resources with which
to hold their interest. Vikram, a landless man, did not think that support
in old age from sons would be substantial for people like him, he only
expected that his son would carry his name forward to the next generation:
"sons eat from their father's hand until they marry, then they go
alagh (form a separate hearth)"
(Vikram, class V)
To sum up, it is expected in Dharmnagri and Jhakri that sons will support
parents in their old age. For wealthy parents, this support will be
material. For the poor, material support is less certain. For them the
benefits are more psychological, such as the perpetuation of name.
Hie Environment of Risk and Fertility
Cain's perspective on the insurance value of children is worthy of separate
consideration because it concentrates on a different aspect of the security
which children may provide against social and 'natural' risk in the short
term. Cain made a comparative study of two areas prone to natural disasters.
Char Gopalpur, the study village in Bangladesh, is in a flood-prone area,
while the three villages chosen for study in Maharashtra are in a drought
prone area. Cain's main interest is in the consequences of the interaction of
natural disaster and the forms of social security which those affected have
recourse to in times of natural disaster and at other times. He argues that
the environment of risk in Bangladesh is much higher than in Maharashtra,
because of the absence of institutional sources of insurance. In
Maharashtra, during the 1973-74 drought, a great many people were able to
find work in an imaginative set of public relief works and/or obtain credit
at reasonable rates of interest. Maharashtra, despite its tendency to
drought, has one of the lowest fertility rates in India. In Cain's view, this
is because relief schemes operate and children do not have such a crucial
part to play in riding out the lean times of drought.
In Bangladesh, by contrast, no such schemes exist. This leads Cain to the
conclusion that in times of social stress induced by natural disaster,
children have a much higher value in Bangladesh than Maharashtra. They can
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be called in to bolster family income and this contribution is of much
greater importance because institutional forms of relief are non existent.
Cain concludes this is a major incentive to high fertility. He argues that,
in environments such as Char Gopalpur, where risk is high and institutional
forms of relief or insurance do not operate, unconstrained fertility may be
justified.
In addition, Cain argues that social life in Bangladesh is more risky in
normal circumstances than in Maharashtra. Infrastructure in the form of
metalled roads and other communications networks are notable by their
absence. There is no ready accessible police force for the residents of Char
Gopalpur to call upon to maintain law and order. This provides an added
impetus to high fertility where strength in numbers and physical prowess are
the best, or perhaps even the only way to ensure that rights over property
and land are maintained.
The villages in my study present a conundrum in this respect. The area is not
prone to natural disater. Chapter 2 showed that general conditions have
improved since the turn of the century, and more particularly since the
exclusion of the seasonal intrusion of the Ganges onto khader land by the
building of a retaining wall in the 1960's. Neither an examination oflocal
records, or verbal accounts from villagers reveal any life- threatening
natural disasters for at least fifty years. Yet the fertility rate in Bijnor
continues to be one of the highest in India. We have already seen that
annual growth rates in the district are in excess of two per cent per annum.
The last chapter revealed that women in the base villages have a mean number
of about five children.
How can this be explained in the light of Cain's conclusions? Cain's data
sources are strong. The Bangladeshi data consist of the land holding
histories of 114 heads of household including a record of their sales and
purchases and the reasons for the latter. This is primary data generated by
Cain and his research team. The Maharashtrian data is part of the long run
data set generated by the Indian Council for Research in the Semi-Arid
Tropics (I.C.R.I.S.A.T). In order to examine the risk insurance thesis, I
draw on similar data sources for Dharmnagri and Jhakri. Firstly I examine
some general chamcteristics of the village which one might associate with
risk. Secondly an examination of the local land transfer records is presented
and finally I analyse the landholding histories of the key informants and a
few extra landless households. The aim of these investigations is to
determine whether there is any link in Dharmnagri and Jhakri between the
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level of fertility and the environment of risk.
The examination follows Cain's method closely. The specific aim is to discern
whether the history of sales and purchases give any clue to the environment
of risk. Are there any distress sales of land - where land has been sold to
finance consumption rather than direct investment in production? If so, what
do such sales tell us about the relationship between children and the
environment of risk.
Risk Characteristics of the Villages
The villages are next to the Ganges and some of the older villagers in
Dharmnagri can remember when the river used to flood right across the low
lying khader area, sometimes as far as the temple steps during heavy monsoon
rains. Some farmers used to lose some standing sugar cane in this way, but
also said that the deposit of silt left on the fields as a result of the
flooding meant a bumper crop and enriched soil in the years when it did not
flood. The cycle of cultivation, before the introduction of new technology
also meant that there were no other major crops in the fields when the river
flooded.
The problem of flooding was minimised about 1965 when a retaining dyke (band)
was built to keep the Ganges out of the agricultural khader area. This was a
large undertaking and the twenty mile long dyke has meant that there has been
no major flooding in the villages since it was bulit.
During 1982-83, the monsoon rains were moderately heavy and some farmers from
Dharmnagri did complain that the rain had washed away their rice crop. These
complaints, however relate to land in the distant revenue village of
Ranjitpur, a sandy bank, right next to the river and outside the dyke. This
land is rented by Dharmnagri villagers at a nominal rent of Rsl8 a year from
the government. For those farming it, this land is not their only source of
income or returns. It is land planted in addition to their own land which is
situated inside the dyke, and therefore safe from flooding. The outlay on the
rented land is small in relation to the possible returns. This makes the risk
of losing the crop by flooding one worth running, especially when its output
is not crucial to family food supply. The role of this land is to supplement
family income, not to provide subsistence.
Agriculture in the study villages has improved beyond recognition since the
1930's. With the exception of rice grown on the khader, all of the crops sown
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in the study villages are the new HYV's associated with the green revoltuion.
This has improved returns and with the development of assured water supplies
has placed agricultural returns on a fairly stable footing.
Social Risk: The Development of Infrastructure
In discussing social risk Cain argues that the levels of infrastructure are
very different in Bangladesh and Maharashtra. Char Gopalpur was not well
served by roads or other communications networks. In the absence of any
readily accessible police force, this makes it an isolated place in terms of
law and order.
In Maharashtra communications were better and Cain identifies the
availability of a police force as a factor reducing risk. Dharmnagri and
Jhakri are easily accesible to the District Police Headquarters in Bijnor,
but risk here is reduced more by the lack of police contact than by their
presence. A police presence may represent a source of risk as well as one of
insurance. In Bijnor the police or government officials are not expected to
handle cases in a disinterested manner. Those most able and willing to bribe
the police to the greatest extent are most likely to be the winners in any
dispute. Bribes are an endemic feature of any interaction between villagers
and government officials - great and small. For example, it is not unusual
for villagers to have to pay Rs2 to a chaprassy (a bearer) on arrival at some
goverment official's office to go and tell the office bearer on the other
side of a curtain that there is someone waiting to see him outside.
At the other end of the scale, a local police inspector is rumoured to have
asked a fee of Rsl0,000 to file a case, for insurance purposes, of deliberate
fire setting as malicious damage by theives. Aphocryphal stories abound and
all villagers will spontaneously lament the passing of the British Raj. The
law was just and fair; now if you have enough money to pay in bribes you can
murder someone and get away with it. The point is then that a readily
obtainable police presence and a well developed set of government
institutions do not necessarily reduce risk uniformly for all.
This situation is made more complex by the presence in the village of Kumar
Satiya Vira. This man and his family have important political and industrial
connections and he is the main arbiter of law and order in the villages and
their surroundings. The extent of his power should not be underestimated.
When the police inspector was called to Kumar Satiya Vira's house to explain
his behaviour in the above case, Kumar sahib kicked the chair from underneath
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him and literally threw the eminent man out of the house by the seat of his
pants and the scruff of his neck with a warning to go easy on the bribery.
There is also some evidence to suggest that bribery is less in Dharmnagri and
Jhakri because of Kumar Satiya Vira's presence. A village kamdar (village
level extension worker) responsible for the administration of loans was
called to a quickly convened panchayat (village council) meeting at the
house, where he was told to cut down on the level of bribe he was taking to
accept loan applications from Harijan s. In one case, he had asked for a
bribe of Rs2,000 to accept and process an application for a buffalo and cart.
He was told that the going rate in Dharmnagri for such cases was to be Rs400
from then on otherwise he would lose his job. One man said that he kept to
this stipulation, but continued to charge higher rates outside Dharmnagri and
Jhakri where Kumar Satiya Vira's influence was not so strong or his interest
likely to be so aroused.
The benefit of Kumar Sahib's presence is dual edged though. Villagers in
Dharmangri and Jhakri could turn to him to be arbiter in disputes, without
expensive recourse to the due process of the law, which would inevitably
involve expensive bribes. They could rely upon him to ensure that the demands
of officials were kept to a reasonable level. They could even indulge in
particular forms of lawbreaking themselves - for example the illicit
distilling of alcohol safe in the knowledge that there were not too many
policemen around to catch them on Kumar Sahib's patch. The disadvantages for
village residents are that they must take care not to invoke Kumar Sahib's
wrath. In such a situation they would be powerless. Having such a large and
powerful family in their village also means that there is less land to go
around than there might otherwise be.
Other Aspects of Infrastructure Lessening Risk:
Sources of Credit
Developments in agriculture have, by increasing yields, and intensifying
cropping patterns ensured adequate yields from year to year. These
developments have mostly come through the auspicesof the green revolution.
Improved varieties of seed require larger inputs of variable resources than
their predecessors did in the form of chemical fertilisers and water. In
Dharmnagri and Jhakri most of these developments have been financed by an
increased amount of agricultural and other forms of credit. Access to credit,




For those with land, the land bank in Bijnor, a government financed operation
will provide loans for capital expenditure with land as co-lateral. One
Dharmnagri farmer, Chet Ram, with just over 20 bighas of land was able to
raise such a loan for the purchase a diesel pumpset and an artesian boring to
provide irrigation for his khader holding. He borrowed Rsl0,000 at an annual
interest rate of 14% to be repaid over a period of ten years. He estimated
that the amount of bribe he had to pay out of this was about Rs250, or less
than 5% of the whole loan. Data from key informants shows the extent of
borrowing from this source for productive investment.
b) The Cane Society
Farmers with enough land to grow sugar cane have access to working capital,
mainly used for nitrogenous fertiliser, through their membership of the local
sugar cane society. A farmer may borrow up to ten percent of the value of the
cane which he is expected to supply to the sugar cane mill during the current
season. The amount he borrows is then recorded and deducted from the first
payments which he is due to have from the sugar cane society. Rates of
interest vary according to the length of time for which the money is
borrowed. If repaid within six months, the loan is free. Thereafter, the rate
of interest is 22% until the end of the season, rising to more punitive rates
if the loan remains unpaid. Strictly speaking the loans are for sugar cane
cultivation only, but farmers readily admit that they use fertiliser
purchased with such loans for all their crops. The cane society manager is
fully aware of this, but maintains that he cannot prove this or effectively
police fertiliser use. The cane society ledgers show that about 90% of all
loans are repaid within the season, with a low number of defaulters. So far
as I was able able to find out, there are no schemes by which a farmer may
bribe officials to avoid paying interest, probably because of the nature of
the scheme.
Farmers do have a number of ways in which they may prolong the life of a loan
if they so wish. A favoured way of extending the life of a loan is for two or
more brothers or agnatic kinsmen operating together to take a loan for
fertiliser from the sugar cane society in the name of one brother. They then
bribe the kamdar to arrange their supply so that the other brother supplies
all the cane due in his name first, with the brother in whose name the loan
68
has been taken supplying his cane towards the end of the season. The effect
of this is that it releases money to purchase necessary household items
before the onset of winter at the begining of the cane season, which comes
after the lean agriculturalmonths of the monsoon. If handled adroitly, such a
scheme also avoids the necessity of paying interest on the loan. In principle
all members of the cane society are treated equally. However as the table
below shows, the allocation of loans from the Sugar Cane society, clearly
favour the larger farmers. This is by virtue of the commercial way in which
the money is allocated.
Table 1:
Loans taken from the Sugar Cane Society by Dharmnagri and Jhakri
Growers 1982-83 season, by landholding
RUPEES
JHAKRI
0-500 501-1000 1001-2000 2001-4000 4001+ TOTAL
CLASS
II 1 4 6 4 - 15
& III
IV 2 1 - 1-4
DHARMNAGRI
II- 8 6 4 6 2 26
& III
IV 4 4 2 - - 10
Total 15 15 12 11 2 55
Source: Sugarcane Co-operative Society, Bijnor, Loans Register
1982-83 season.
This pattern reflects findings in other parts of India, with richer farmers
able to obtain more funds than smaller. However it should be noted too that
small farmers have a considerable number of loans from the cane society
reflecting the ease with which money can be borrowed from that source. The
number of loans in Jhakri is proportionately higher than one might expect
given the relative sizes of the two populations. More importantly, loans are
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available roughly in proportion to landholding so that small farmers are not
excluded from this source. Nor are they paying higher rates of interest than
their richer counterparts.
c) Kin
So far we have been talking about sources of funds which only landed people
can obtain. How easy and cheap is it for landless people to obtain money in
Dharmnagri and Jhakri? The land and loans questionnaire, suggests that landed
and landless alike can borrow small amounts of money for consumption, up to
perhaps RslOO without too much difficulty, mostly from kinsmen.
However, it is mistaken to think that relatives are always a risk free source
of money. As Caldwell et al (1982) note for South India, in times of stress,
your relatives are likely to be in the same boat as you and therefore unable
to lend money. One or two cases from Dharmnagri suggest that borrowing from
relatives is not risk free. Who is more likely to know more about your
finances than your brother or perhaps an in-migrant sister's husband? In
Dhamrnagri, brothers are notoriously untrustworthy in financial matters.
There is one case of a man losing land to his sister's husband after
borrowing money. Rohtash borrowed Rsl900 to pay for the emergency treatment
which his wife received, at the birth of their second child. His sister's
husband resident in Dharmnagri at the time was working at the barrage. With
such a steady income he was able to lend Rohtash the money he required. To
obtain the money, Rohtash agreed to hand over all the produce of his 5 bighas
of khader land to his sister's husband by way of interest payments, until he
could repay the capital. Without the produce from his fields, he was unable
to pay back any of the capital and two years later he had sold his entire
bangar holding of 1.75 bighas to repay the loan and was left with only his
khader land.
d) Moneylenders
The major source of funds for those unable to borrow from institutional
sources is the baniya (cloth merchant/moneylender). The riskiness of this
source of funds is well illustrated by the steady increase in the landholding
of Dariya Lai, a Bijnori cloth merchant, who was the major lender of funds at
the time of fieldwork. According to one reliable source in the village, the
year under study had been a relatively good one, and few people had to
borrow money from Dariya Lai. In less prosperous years, substantial
proportions of the village borrowed money from him and at one time or another
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almost everyone had borrowed money from him.
Rates of interest on money borrowed from Dariya Lai are high, 5% compound per
month. Not surprisingly, villagers sometimes find it difficult to repay such
loans and Dariya Lai is now a substantial landowner in Dharmnagri and Jhakri,
as the local land records testify. He now holds about 4 acres of land, all of
which he has purchased from farmers he previously gave loans to. The extent
of this kind of indebtedness is greater among small landholders, owning ten
bighas or less, and within that group, it is greater among Muslims than
Hindus. Among the landless, there is a greater tendency for caste support
among the Muslims than the Hindus. All of the landless Muslims I spoke to
said that they had a system among relatives for providing for major
expenditures like weddings. The system simply required that when a relative
was having a child married each of the others would contribute to the wedding
to the extent possible. In return each of the relatives so funded would
provide equivalent resources in like fashion.
e) Risk and Access to Assured Water Supplies
The conditions of agriculture have dramatically improved since the
introduction of HYV's especially since the introduction of tubewells to the
villages. It is of course the case that not everyone in the villages who has
land owns a tubewell. Tubewells are an extremely expensive investment. The
cost of installing an electric well and house is around Rsl5,000 and a d.esel
engine and boring will cost around Rs8,000. Not all peasants can afford this
outlay and the attendant interest. There is a scheme whereby small farmers
(ie holding 24 bighas or less) can borrow money from the Government bank at
discounted rates, but very few farmers availed themselves of this service,
even though almost every landowner in the village would qualify. They either
maintained that they could not afford it or that the bribe they would have to
give the extension worker to process their application would be too
expensive.
But those who do not own a well or pumpset can and do buy water from those
who do. There is a thriving market in water in the study villages. Those who
wish to buy water approach the owner of pumping gear from which the water can
be directed to their own fields by way of water channels. The usual
arrangement is the hire of pumping gear for a set number of hours arranged
beforehand with the owner. The equipment is operated by the owner with the
hirer in attendance - partly to make sure they receive the amount of water
they have paid for and partly to attend the maintenance of the nullahs (water
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channels) feeding his field. These latter are katcha (made of mud) and may
sunder, causing expensive leakage. The water also needs to be directed to the
right places at the right time and it is usually the responsibility of the
hirer to cut new channels and close off old ones when and where required.
Water is not a cheap commodity. From an electric set, where the running costs
are cheaper, water costs around Rs7-8 per hour depending on the season.
Farmers estimate an average flow of two hours per bigha for any crop in the
absence of appreciable rainfall. Water from a diesel set is more expensive -
about RslO per hour, to cover the cost of diesel and the cost of carting the
engine to the well head. In relation to risk however, it is really questions
of timing and control over the water supply which need to be taken into
account. In Dharmnagri and Jhakri, control does not seem to be as stringent
as that reported by Harriss for Tamil Nadu (1982a), where the costs of buying
in water were about one third of the harvest, if it could be bought at all.
Owners of wells and pumping sets, always water their own fields first and can
do so by virtue of their ownership of the machinery. In times of heavy demand
for water - around planting times, during the dry summer months others - must
wait for their water until owners of wells have irrigated their own fields.
This can lead to delayed planting or curtailment in the growth of standing
crops if rains are poor, with a subsequent effect on yields. There is also
some indication that those with tubewells are in a good position to sharecrop
land from those whose land can be irrigated from their wells. This does not
happen on the basis of irrigation only, but when other resources are scarce,
the land is likely to be sharecropped out to those who can irrigate it.
This of course affects the returns which those who lack their own water
supplies have from their fields, but there are positive aspects also. The
sharecropping rates under these arrangements are the same as for any other.
The crop is shared fifty-fifty with the owner of the well paying for all the
water and the cost of other inputs being shared. For the landowner sharing
out, returns may not be that much less than if he were to farm the land
himself without the inputs he would not be able to buy himself in such
circumstances.
Water then is not available to everyone equally in Dharmnagri and Jhakri.
Those who own wells and pumpsets have ready access to water while those who
do not are dependent on the former for its supply. In the study year, no one
was refused water if they could pay for it. But owners of wells and pumpsets
cannot be forced to sell water and this creates a form of
dependence.Conversely, however, it should be remembered that selling water
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provides a tidy income for those with wells. In addition, as with other
major capital assets in the villages, there is a political dimension to
water. Owners can and do strenghthen their networks by supplying services
when required.
Land Transfers as Indicators of Risk.
Cain's main indicator of risk is the volatility of the land market,
specifically what he calls distress sales of land. These he defines as sales
which are not for productive ends. Distress sales may follow a death or be
used to finance direct or conspicuous consumption, such as weddings. From the
land history data collected from heads of household Cain is able to use the
extent of social mobility - both positive and negative - to define Char
Gopalpur as a more risky environement than Maharashtra.
How do Dharmnagri and Jhakri compare with these mobility profiles? In
examining this question I will use two sources of data. The first, the local
land transfer records, describe the transfers of land made by the entire
population of both villages since 1958. Secondly, I carried out more detailed
discussions with key informants about landholding, land transfers and debt
relationships.
a) Land Records
Working with local records in North India is a painstaking business and it is
not a task to be recommended to anyone in a hurry. After gaining access to
the records, I examined the current holdings position of all owners of land
in Dharmnagri and Jhakri. Next I made an examination the Motation Dakhilkar
Register. This is a record of all sales and purchases by revenue village. The
name of the seller and buyer, the date and the price paid is also recorded.
By adding and subtracting all sales and purchases I was able to calculate
where each farmer started and finished in terms of class categories and the
extent to which he had bought or sold land. One point worth mentioning is
that the official land records are recorded in pueca bighas, of which there
are 1.66 in an acre. These have been converted to katcha bighas at the rate
of 3 katcha bighas to the pucca bigha, which gives roughly 5 katcha bighas to
the acre. The pattern of transfers yielded by the combination of the above
data is shown in the table below. The table uses the class categories
developed in the previous chapter, which it will be remembered refer to
household landholdings. Inheritance is incorporated by only recording land
which is transferred out of or into a lineage by a market transaction is
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included as a sale or a purchase of land.
Another problem which I had to resolve was the introduction of time into the
analysis. This became difficult to deal with especially when more than one
generation of landholders in any household was involved. Inheritance does not
pose a problem since one simply counts backwards from the present to the
past, excluding all transfers of land which do not involve a market
transaction. In short inheritances do not count as a land transfer. In the
later tables below where I am dealing with shifts in class categories among
the sample, inheritances are once again excluded, but shifts in class from
the previous generation would have been included if there had been any. There
were not.
Table 2
Numbers and Areas of Sales and Purchases of Land 1958-82,


























Total 125 (100) 567 (100) 47 (100) 387 (100)
Source: Motation Dakhilkar Register, tehsil Office, Bijnor,
1983.
Since 1958, there has been a net outflow of land from Dharmnagri of about 180
bighas or about 10.6% of landholdings in 1958. Over half of the land which
has been sold has been made over to the government under two compulsory
purchase schemes. The first of these was for the building of the retaining
wall for the Ganges and the second for the building of the Middle Ganges
Barrage.
The government also granted villagers about 200 bighas most of which was
reallocated from the Viras after the abolition of Zamindari. Overall then,
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the government has proved to be relativly neutral in terms of landholding for
the bulk of the population if one simply constructs a balance sheet. What it
gave to villagers in the early 1970's, it took back in the late 1970's.
Farmers were officially paid Rs8500 for each 15 bighas which the government
bought, but villagers maintained that about one third of this sum went in
various bribes to the officials who processed the transactions.
Leaving aside these government transactions, there are very few cases where
land sales or purchases have been substantial enough to cause any one farmer
to move group from his 1958 position, though it can be seen from the table
above that four of the smallest landholders lost their holdings entirely.
Those currently in the smallest landholding category have been the most
prolific sellers and buyers of land. Neither of the larger two groups show a
great deal of difference in the overall amount of land held. On average,
though, each holder in these two groups lost about 2.5 bighas. Smaller
landholders lost on average just over half a bigha each.
The position in Jhakri is easier to work out, because it is uncomplicated by
grants from and compulsory purchases by the government.
Table 3
Numbers and Areas of Sales and Purchases of Land, 1958-1982
By Current Ownership Category: Jhakri
Sales Purchases
Number Area Number Area
CLASS (%) (%) (%) (%)
in 1982 Bighas Bighas
II 13 (31) 99 (36) 16 (35) 54 (42)
III 6 (14) 39 (14) 25 (54) 54 (42)
IV 20 (48) 108 (39) 5 (11) 21 (16)
V 3 ( 7) 30 (11) — -
Total 42 (100) 276 (100) 46 (100) 129 (100)
Source: Motation Dakhilkar Register, Tehsil Office, Bijnor, 1983.
On the whole, Jhakri farmers have lost proportionately more land than their
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Dharmnagri counterparts, about 14.7% of 1958 ownership. One hundred and forty
seven bighas have left village ownership, an average net loss of about 4
bighas per farmer. Large farmers have an average loss of about 4.5 bighas and
middle farmers a small gain of about one bigha each. Farmers currently in the
small holder category have loss about seven bighas each.
Interpretation of these figures is difficult. The Motation Dakhilkar gives no
indication of why farmers sold land, only that they did. Like Dharmnagri
though, there have been relatively few cases of downward or upward mobility.
Four owners changed category in Jhakri from 1958-82, Three of these owners
are key informants and their histories will be considerd in more depth below.
The fourth was a large landowner with about 27 bighas in 1958. He is widely
known in the village to have sold land for conspicuous consumption and now
holds only 12 bighas.
From village level records, then,it is clear that the land holding structure
of the villages is much more stable than that of Char Gopalur. Since the
records say nothing about why people sold land, they tell us very little
about the environment of risk.
b) Key Informants Land Transfers
For this information, I now turn to the land survey which I conducted among
key informants in 1983. By the time I asked these men in systematic detail
about their land, I had known them for a year and a half. The information
presented here is of very good quality in that it was internally consistent,
repeated in a variety of settings and confirmed by others. I asked each key
informant to tell me about the structure of his current holding and how that
had changed since 1958, the year of consolidation in Jhakri and Dharmnagri
Bangar.
Some key informants whose forebears are dead are too young to remember that 1
t
far back, so where necessary, the survey results are fleshed out by reference
to the land records. In some cases, young men were interviewed in the
company of older village men who were able to remember what the young man's
family's landholding had been, and where necessary, this valuable information
has been included. The major shortcoming of this information, is that the
landless who are not key informants but included in the land survey are not a
random sample of the landless in the two villages. This might mean that their
histories are not representative of the landless more generally.
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In the khader area, there has been no land consolidation, and jogging the
memories of informants there was a little more difficult. Where possible I
was able to go forearmed with the relevant details from the land records as a
skeleton around which to construct the more detailed account. In these ways,
the omissions from the survey data are minimal. All those interviewed gave
details of land which they had inherited and that which they had gained and
lost. Where land had been purchased, sold or otherwise lost, informants were
asked to provide details of the circumstances and reasons for the
transaction.
In order to make the material comparable to Cain's 1981 data, I treat all
sales of land for other than directly productive investment as distress sales
and therefore a measure of the environment of risk in the two villages. In
total, the data collected from this group on land transfers amounts to 30% of
land sold and 44% of land purchased in Dharmnagri; and 48% of land sold and
47% of land purchased in Jhakri. Table 4 below shows the results from the



















II 32 - 10 42 (25) 15 29 44 (26)
III 33 3 - 36 (21) 35 - 35 (21)
IV 51 - - 51 (30) 51 - 51 (30)
V 39 - - 39 (23) 39 - 39 (23)
Total 155 3 10 168 (100) 140 29 169(100)
Source: Land and Loans Questionnaire, 1983.
By far the greatest number of transactions and area transferee for this
group involved the government. Ninety-two percent of all sales were to the
government by compulsory purchase, all of which was land bought by the
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government for the construction of the barrage across the Ganges. This was
land which had previously been given to villagers by the govemement,
redistributed under ceiling legislation. Not surprisingly then a large amount
of the area gained by the villagers also came from the government. One farmer
lost 10 bighas in a single sale due to illnesss. At the time of his illness,
his children young and were unable to give any support and he was forced to
sell the land in order to meet his medical bills. Another farmer sold three
bighas of land to finance his fourth marriage,
The only group in this part of the sample able to buy any land at all were
the large landowners. One farmer, Chet Ram, a young man with only one very
young son, owns about 30 bighas of land. He bought sixteen of these after a
long court case, fought with his father's younger brother who claimed title
to the land, though he was no longer resident in the village. Chet Ram was
eventually given title to the land, but had to pay his FYB Rsl0,000 as a
purchase price. Another buyer Ishwar, had bought 5 bighas of land at a
knockdown price from a Bengali farmer who had taken a loan from him and was
unable to repay.
The landless were given a brief glimpse of ownership by the government,
before being returned to their former position. In short, apart from
Government transactions, there have been very few transfers of land indeed
among the key informants.
The extent of movement from the 1958 position among the Dharmnagri sample is
shown in the Matrix below. This matrix is similar to that constructed by
Cain (1981). The diagonal lines from top left to bottom right includes those
villagers whose 1982 class position is the same as it was in 1958. Those to
the right of the diagonal have experienced upward mobilty by this measure
while those to the left have experienced downward mobility. The numbers in
the table are the numbers of farmers in each category Once again, inheritance
is not included in the table, that is if a man divides his land between his
sons, and these sons are in the sample, they do not move down in the
heirarchy because of this, even if their individual holdings warrant it.
The justification for this is that here I am trying to measure risk through
sales and purchases in times of distress, rather than the effect of
population of successive generations of holders within a single lineage.
I shall take this latter subject up later when discussing fertility
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Source: Motatiion Dakhilkar Register, Tehsil Office, Bijnor, 1983
The table indicates no mobilty at all in the Dharmnagri sample over the
period. The landholding movements of the Jhakri sample are a little more
vigorous over the period than the immobile Dharmnagi pattern, though as the
table shows, all transfers except two were conducted by those with most land.
Table 6
Land Transfers among the Jhakri Sample 1958-1982
(percentages of totals in brackets)
SALES PURCHASES
to cheated con prod
govt. sump ucti Total Total
tion ve Sales purchase gift Purchases
II 29 4 72 87(66) 56 - 56(93)
III 15 15(11) -
IV - 4 4( 7)
V 30 30(23) -
TOTAL 2 9 49 72 132(100) 56 4 60
The pattern in Jhakri is largely a reflection of the introduction of "Green
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Revolution" technology, especially among class II and III farmers. Of 102
bighas lost by this group, 72, were sold in order to take advantage of the
changed conditions after new varieties of seed and water lifting technology
became available for bangar farmers. Of these 72 bighas, 30 were khader land.
The proceeds of these sales were used to buy 56 bighas of bangar land bought
by this group. The remaining 42 bighas were sold to finance the installation
of three electric tubewells. Conversations with villagers during the course
of interview would also indicate that sales in Jhakri have been more for
productive re-investment than for consumption. This view is borne out by
reading between the lines of the motation dakhilkar register, where it is
obvious that the volume of transfers, as well the value of land picks up
dramatically from the mid 1960's onwards, precisely at the time when the new
agricultural technology was being introduced.
Why not take credit, one might legitimately ask? The following case offers an
explanation. Akhtar Ali and his three brothers explained to me that they
used to hold land in the low lying khader area as well as bangar land close
to the village. As the new technology became available, they explained, it
became clear to them that the khader, farther from the village and not as
responsive to the combination of new seed water and fertiliser as their
bangar land, was not worth continuing to farm. They decided to sell some the
khader land and buy a tubewell and electric pumpset with the proceeds and buy
bangar land with any remaining cash. Later the brothers decided they would
like to buy a second tubewell. They had no bangar land left to sell and took
a loan from the land bank in Bijnor to finance the purchase of this second
well.
Two sales merit special attention from a risk point of view. Firstly, Shakir,
was the owner of 30 bighas of bangar land until the marriage of his eldest
son. Before the wedding, his bullocks and draft buffalo died. To pay for the
wedding and to replace the animals, he sold 15 bighas of land. This should
alert us to the costs of children, particularly at that stage in the life
cycle when substantial amounts of resources must be spent on their marriages.
The remaining case highlights one common feature linking Dharmnagri and
Jhakri to Char Gopalur - the fragile security of women. The thirty bighas
shown to be sold by now landless households in Jhakri was in fact sold by one
household. In 1972 the male head of household died. He was survived by a
wife, Jamani, four daughters and two sons. All of the children were
unmarried. As already shown in the chapter on landholding, it is difficult
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for women to manage land on their own, given the proscriptions on their right
to plough. Jamani's sons were too young to work the land and consequently she
was unable to make a reasonable living from it. In order to marry her
children in these circumstances she sold her land off in six successive
parcels to finance the marriage of her children. The two sons remaining in
the village are among the poorest households there now. A mobility matrix,
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Three of the four villagers in the sample who started as landless in 1958
remained so throughout the period. They had been unaffected by the
distribution of land by the government. When I questioned them on this, most
said that they had not been interested in trying to gain title to ceiling
land. They considered the land to be too poor and too far away to be of any
use to them. They had preferred to pursue other forms of making a living, for
example sub-contracting a colhu, selling milk or sharecropping, though they
all agreed with hindsight that the compulsory repurchase of the land to build
the barrage could have given them a net profit of about Rs5,000.
The matrix also shows that one landless man had managed to buy his way into
the small landholder category. Suleiman is the son of a large farmer, but his
father has disinherited him on his remarriage. Suleiman's most lucrative
activity is smuggling trees, and he was able to buy a small parcel of land
with the proceeds. The household which dropped from highest to lowest
category is that of Ramzani, discussed in chapter 3, highlighting the risks
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of widowhood for women in the study villages.
Using Cain's indicators then, the villages in the present study seem to have
a benign environment of risk, with relatively little upward or downward
mobility in terms of landholding. The villages have a well developed
infrastructure, assured water supplies and fairly wide availability of
credit. Much has been done to contain the Ganges and there have been no
floods in the past twenty years or so. The land market is relatively static
in the study villages when comapred to Bangladesh, with no widespread
movements in class positions among the key informants.
In spite of this, fertility in Dhammagri and Jhakri is higher than one might
expect if the risk thesis is valid. Average completed family size is around
five children, higher than Maharashtra, which has low fertility and is the
basis of Cain's argument. Cain maintains however that where the labour value
of children is high, then their value in the risk equation may well be
outweighed by their labour value. Is this the case in Dharmnagri and Jhakri?
Leaving aside the question of the riskiness of childbearing itself for women,
the following two chapters examine the economic contribution of children to
the families of which they are part.
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Chapter 5: The Agricultural Cycle I
INTRODUCTION
The object of this chapter and the next taken together is to shed light on
the economic contribution of children to the household. If as claimed by
Mamdani (1972) all children are a net asset to all households all the time we
could reasonably expect the contribution of even fairly young children to the
agricultural process to be large. There should be little difference between
the value of sons and daughters if Mamdniii's claims are valid. If children
are a source of old age security to their parents, (Leibenstein: 1957, 1977)
we could reasonably expect sons and daughters to be working jointly with
their parents, contributing to household income well into their adult years.
This chapter describes the agricultural cycle: crops and cropping patterns;
seed types; agricultural techniques and the decisions associated with the
cycle of work throughout the year. The purpose is to set the contribution of
child labour in context before analysing it more fully in the next chapter.
The arrangements made and organisation involved in the agricultural cycle are
sometimes bewilderingly complex so what follows is inevitably a simplified
version of what occurs. I will draw out the more salient features of the
process to clarify differences in cultivation methods in the khader and the
bangar, and choice of seed. An estimate of cash returns for each crop is then
presented for the sample households, before summarising the year as a whole
taking into account class differences. The labour process of landless
labouring families in the sample, are dealt with at the end of the chapter,
where the incomes of the whole sample are summarised for the whole year.
Sources of Data and the Calculation of Labour Use and Returns to Major Crops
The data presented in the rest of this chapter are those collected from the
sample during the agricultural year begining in June 1982, with preparation
for that year's rice crop. Using a semi-structured questionnaire, I asked all
sample farmers about their inputs of labour, water and fertiliser in growing
and harvesting the three major crops rice, wheat and sugarcane. Estimates of
net yield were also made, based on the number of sacks of rice and wheat
obtained after threshing andhusking and attributing a value to the pooral
(rice stalks), and boosa (wheat straw). In all calculations, wheat and rice
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are valued at the government procurement price of Rsl52 obtainable at the
time of harvest. Seed, which is used at the rate of about 5kgs per bigha is
also calculated at this cost.
Attaching a market value to the crops has the virtue of reducing all returns
to a standard measure so that returns can be reasonably compared. John
Harriss (1982a) has pointed out that this method underestimates the value of
the crop for larger farmers with storage facilities, who can hold their crop
until later in the year when the price rises due to scarcity. However, rice
in the district where Harriss conducted his study was the main cash crop, and
it has already been pointed out above, neither wheat nor rice has that status
in Bijnor. Very little rice or wheat was sold at all, and therefore it is
reasonable to use the procurement price as a proxy for its value to growers.
It could be argued that the same is not true for landless families in the
sample who have to buy their requirements on the market rather than grow
them. I did not collect the market prices of wheat and rice throughout the
year. This problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the landless
households in the sample were paid in rice for the harvesting work which they
performed for others. Such stocks, though they lasted for some time, seldom
lasted throughout the whole year and so it should be borne in mind that the
figures presented for landless labourers may underestimate their costs a
little.
The Cost of Chemical Fertiliser
Where chemical fertilisers were used their costwere calculated at the price
paid by each grower in the msiket place. The recorded amount used is each
farmer's own estimate of use at each round of the questionnaire.
The Cost of Water
Where water is given from the farmer's own tubewell, the calculation is
somewhat more complex than when the water was bought from another since the
cost of the upkeep of the well and depreciation has to be taken into account
and apportioned to each of the three major crops over the agricultural year.
The costs are worked out in the following way. For both electric and diesel
operated engines, a depreciation allowance is calculated to cover maintenance
and replacement costs. Assuming a fifteen year operating life, this allowance
is set at Rs50 per month, or Rs600 for the year under study. In addition, for
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electric wells, the flat rate standing charge of Rsl80 per month is included
in the cost. This makes the running costs of an electric engine Rs2760 per
year. For diesel engines, the cost of fuel is calculated at Rs4 per hour of
use, based on estimates of consumption given by farmers themselves.
Initially, I decided to apportion the annual cost of water pumping equipment
evenly across the year so that for instance, sugarcane, a ten month crop
would have born 5/6ths of the total water costs across the year for electric
engines. But, since rice uses proportionately more water than wheat or cane,
I decided to more accurately reflect its cost by making it bear 3/16 of the
annual fixed cost of running water pumping equipment, with wheat taking l/8th
and cane ll/16ths. These costs are outlined in the table below.
Table 1:
Fixed Annual Water Costs For Wheat Rice and Sugar Cane 1982-83
by Type of Engine





Total Fixed 2760 600
Annual Cost
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
These fixed costs are deducted from the respective income of pumping set
owners for each crop. In addition, where water is pumped from a diesel set,
Rs4 for each hour of pumped water is deducted to cover the cost of fuel.
There is also a ready market for the sale of irrigation in the study
villages. Owners of tubewells and pumpsets simply hire the machinery to pump
water and direct this to the fields of the purchaser. Where water was
purchased by those without their own tubewell, the cost calculated is simply
the sum of the amounts paid at each watering through the growing cycle. Where
the sellers of such water are also in the sample, this shows up as income for
them. The cost of water varies. From electric sets, the cost is Rs7 per hour.
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From a diesel set the cost varies between Rs8 and RslO per hour depending on
the availability of fuel, the distance the engine has to be carted and so on.
The Cost of Labour
The cost of hired labour is included simply as the sums paid to labourers
when the transaction is a cash one. For harvesting where the payment is in
variably in kind rather than cash, the hours of hired labour are calculated
and the weight paid to the labourers subtracted from the total yield before
calculating net returns.
Where family labour is used, it is imputed at no cost. Its value therefore
shows up as an increased net yield. This could be construed as a deviation
from the standard economic practice of computing its value as its opportunity
cost. I feel justified in attributing family labour at^cost for two reasons.
The first is that in my conversations with men, it was clear that whenever
family members could hire their labour power out they did. When they worked
on the family farm the opportunity cost of their labour was indeed zero. It
could of course be argued that in the absence of family labour, labour would
have to be hired in and that family labour should therefore be computed at
this cost. It is my contention here that this form of calculation neither
mirrors the way in which farmers think of family labour, nor the way in which
labour is used in the study villages.
Secondly, the main purpose of the calculations made here is to highlight the
contribution of family labour itself. Imputing its cost at zero, means that
its contribution to household income ought to become more salient. Households
with larger numbers of children, for example, if Mamdani is correct, ought to
have lesser use of hired labour per unit of output than households with fewer
children. To impute household labour at no cost gives Mamdani's thesis a
better fighting chance.
In addition to working out the cost of labour, I also collected information
on the amount, in labour days, of labour used. This allows me to make a
calculation of the relative amounts of family and hired labour used by
production units of different size and sex composition. The value of this, in
the context of the argument surrounding the value of children is that it
allows us to see how much of a contribution children make to the productive
process.
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The Special Place of Sugarcane
While I also collected this information for sugar cane, its position as the
major cash crop for the people in my sample means that I was also able to use
several written sources of information from the formal market sector in
addition to my own enquiries in the villages themselves.
Analysis of the growing cycle is somewhat more complex than that of wheat or
rice. Cane grows in a ten month cycle and therefore I asked key informants at
various times throughout the year about cane cultivation and sales. These
questions were asked at the same time as those about wheat and rice. The
results, analysed below, are therefore based on four observations evenly
spaced throughout the growing season to keep errors of recall to a minimum.
The analysis of its disposal also represents something of an analytical
problem, partly because the cutting season lasts for about 200 days, giving
rise to the same recall problem as for the reporting of its growing. Where
growers are members of the Sugar Cane Co-operative Society, they could
usually remember more accurately when they had supplied cane. I could check
this memory against Cane Society records. Here the discrepancies are small
and known. Where discrepancies arise, the Cane Society figure for supply to
the Begawala centre is used. This figure most accurately refelects a grower's
gross cash returns from the Co-op. I spent about three months at the Sugar
Cane Society in the ledgers section collecting the necessary information
relating to supply, payment and loans for each of the growers in the base
villages.
Care must however still be exercised, because farmers who found it difficult
to meet their basic quota sometimes allowed other growers to supply on their
passes so that their basic quota and therefore income in the following year
would not be cut. It also needs to be borne in mind that some farmers had the
number of passes to which they were entitled in the season under study cut
for oversupplying on each pass early in the season. The first of these
problems was overcome by ensuring that none of the farmers in the sample had
given anyone a pass to supply cane. The second problem was overcome by
checking the actual weight of cane supplied over the whole season rather than
multiplying the number of passes by the allowed weight per pass or simply
accepting the basic quota as the supply weight.
However, no sample farmer supplied the whole of his output to the Sugar Cane
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Society, and an estimate of the amount of cane supplied to the colhus was
collected from each of the farmers at least twice during the cutting season.
Sometimes this estimate could be checked against the rough and ready supply
books which the colhu operators kept. Where this was not possible, the
figures used are the oral estimates given by the farmer.
Cane Society records also allow some idea of fertiliser use. Members of the
society were allowed to borrow variable inputs from the Society, and most
members did. The extent of their borrowings are recorded in their ledger
entries and subtracted from their passes when these are presented for
payment. Members are allowed to borrow up to 10 per cent of the value of
their basic quota with interest accruing after six months at the rate of 18
percent in the season under study.
Most members organised themselves efficiently to borrow from the Society. One
group of four brothers who farmed jointly, but held separate memberships to
the Society told me that they borrowed all their requirements in the name of
one brother, whose passes they did not present for payment until the end of
the season, having bribed the village cane worker to place all his supply
there. The advantage of this was that the loans for fertiliser were not
deducted from the first passes of the season. These were presented after the
lean months of the monsoon and used to buy clothes and other family
requirements before the onset of winter. I have not included the cost of
bribes in income calculations.
However some care is again required here in the interpretation of Society
loan figures. Officially, the loans are exclusively for sugar cane
cultivation. But farmers told me, and officials admitted, that loans
ostensibly for sugar cane production were widely used for other crops.
Farmers time the borrowing well so that it is impossible to tell which crop
the fertiliser is being used on. For this reason, it is not possible to
assume that all fertiliser borrowed from the society goes onto the cane crop.
Furthermore, both Cane Society members and those who were not members used
the bazaar as a source of fertiliser. It would be mistaken to assume that
fertiliser loan statistics from the cane Society provide an accurate
indication of the fertiliser which actually finds its way onto the growing
cane. The fertiliser use figures used in this section are therefore, like
those for wheat and rice, based on the oral estimates of farmers, collected
by semi-formal interview at the same time as information on labour use.
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The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections, each of which
deals with one of the major crops rice, wheat and sugarcane respectively.
Each main section is further subdivided into sections which deal with
cultivation methods for each crop, the factors governing the choice of seed
types and the area under each crop. The final part of each section looks at
the returns to each of the crops. A final fourth section looks at income for
the whole year among the sample.
Rice Cultivation Methods
Of the two major subsistence crops rice is the more complex to deal with.
There are two different ways in which it is grown, according to whether it is
grown in upland bangar soils where there is a more assured water supply or in
the khader where the availability of water is determined by and large by
rainfall. The cultivation methods of each of these areas are dealt with
below.
The Khader
Farmers growing rice in the khader tend to plant their rice behind the plough
onto unirrigated soil. A furrow is opened up by the plough and then the seed
are dropped by a second man into the furrow, via a funnel to a tube which
deposits the seed right at the back of the plough share. This technique is
adopted because the rice is planted in early June when the weather is at its
hottest and the seed need to retain as much soil moisture as they can. By
dropping the seed immediately behind the share, they have a chance to bed
themselves at the bottom of the furrow before any disturbed soil has a chance
to trickle back into it.
The seeds are covered over by the plough on the next round of the field and
the furrow created left empty with seed again being planted in the third
furrow. When the whole field has been planted the soil is flattened by a
bullock drawn log and the seed left to germinate. The crop may be weeded once
or twice if required, before harvesting in late September, making it a crop
of about 120 days.
The Bangar
On the upland bangar soil, all of the rice cropped was transplanted, rather
than planted behind the plough. Transplanting is a more intensive process in
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terms of both labour and other inputs at all stages than planting.
The seed must first of all be grown in a nursery. The nursery is prepared
and planted at the begining of June, around the time when khader farmers are
out planting their rice. The nursery, usually a plot of about ten square
yards, is first of all flooded with water and then the soil reduced to a
slurry by agitation with a stick or spade. The seeds, which are sometimes
soaked beforehand, are broadcast onto the water and stirred, to encourage
them to sink, so as not to be gobbled up by wading herons or cranes. The
young plants are given frequent short waterings and small doses of
nitrogenous fertilisers until they are ready for transplanting.
Transplanting usually takes place around the onset of the monsoon: a cause
for anxiety among those who do not own their own tubewell. In the season
under study, this was around the third week of June - about three weeks after
khader farmers had planted their rice behind the plough. Transplanting rice
is one of the most exciting and picturesque of agricultural operations.
Imagine water flooded fields, tubewells in full flow, the vivid green of the
young seedlings waiting to be transplanted under the sullen grey monsoon sky.
Herons wade through the peopled fields, stabbing at grubs and insects
disturbed by the bullocks straining at their yoke slurrying the topsoil with
water. But transplanting is also the most backbreaking of tasks which must
be accomplished quickly and smoothly to be successful.
A day or two before rice is due to be transplanted into a field, water is
pumped in via a tubewell. When the soil has a covering of water on it, the
soil is reduced to silt by continuously driving a bullock pulled wooden log
over the field. The young seedlings are plucked from the nursery and
transplanted into the flooded field by large groups of workers. These workers
are more often than not hired, rather than family labour, since family labour
is usually taken up by performing these other tasks associated with
preparation of the main fields for transplanting.
Having successfully transplanted their rice, farmers prefer if they can to
keep the field well covered with water partly to feed the plants but also to
keep the field as weed free as possible. This is relatively easier for those
who own tubewells than those who do not. Those who can afford it will use
urea as a fertiliser two or three times while the crop is growing, before the
crop is harvested. Harvesting of upland bangar rice took place in November
during the season under study, making it a crop of about 150 days.
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On both the khader and the bangar, larger farmers tend to use hired labour,
paid in kind, for harvesting. The rate for this work is between 6 and 8
bundles per hundred cut, depending on the availability of labour, the timing
of the harvest and the density of the standing crop. After cutting, the
labourers thresh the rice by hand, sometimes assisted by family labour if
this is avaiable. Smaller farmers tend to use more family labour to
accomplish the same tasks.
Choice of seed
These different methods of cultivation on the khader and bangar are
associated with different types of seed.
The Khader
In the khader, most farmers who grew rice planted unimproved varieties of
rice behind the plough, rather than transplant new varieties. They were
clear about their reasons for doing so and maintained that rice yields were
more consistent with older varieties in the khader than with improved
varieties (whether these were transplanted or planted behind the plough).
The khader has less assured water supplies than the bangar, and farmers
maintained that under these conditions older varieties gave more consistent
returns than newer ones. This finding is consistent with that of other
researchers (Lipton: 1979; Griffin: 1978). By far the most popular seed
types on the khader were Lai Mati and Lambia Farm. In the analysis of
returns, later in this chapter, it is shown that unimproved varieties in the
khader did give the best returns.
The Bangar
On the bangar, where farmers have more ready access to water and can more
easily afford fertiliser, the conditions are better suited to the improved
varieties developed since the "green revolution". Not everyone farming on the
bangar has a well. Indeed several such farmers were, at the begining of the
82 season, worried about the expense of watering their fields prior to
transplanting if the rains failed or came later than the optimum time for
transplanting. Water, at Rs7 to RslO per hour pumped, is em expensive
commodity for those who do not own their own tubewell. But under all normal
circumstances, the knowledge that it will be available from someone close by
with a well, and so watered will give a yield of about 750kgs per acre over
the older varieties encourages the use of improved varieties by all those
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farming on the bangar.
The importance of assured water supplies in the choice to grow improved
varieties of rice is highlighted by the fact that some farmers at least knew
about the existence of finer varieties long before they chose to grow them.
Among the Sheikhs in Jhakri, there is a long history of marriage contracts
across the Ganges into the district of Muzaffanagar, with women and men from
the villages of Soojru and Gaunri. Gaunri stands on the banks of the Upper
Ganges Canal and farmers there, with assured water supplies since the late
nieteenth century have grown improved varieties for as long as anyone can
remember. One man, Sahadat, with marriage connections in Gaunri said he
recalled talking to his in laws there in the 1950's about the improved
varieties of rice they were growing. He himself decided against trying to
grow them at that time, because their success depended upon assured water
supplies which were lacking in Jhakri. It was not until the first tubewells
were sunk by Jhakri farmers in the early 1970's that they began to grow new
varieties of rice.
The most popular variety in the season under study was "saket 4" which was
introduced to the area by the agricultural extension office in 1981.
Interestingly, some of the younger farmers in the sample had difficulty
naming this new variety and referred to the variety they had transplanted as
"that one which is going around just now". That this was "saket 4" was
confirmed by consultation with other farmers.
It would be wrong to leave the impression that the choice of rice seed is
entirely determined by technical factors of production. Some farmers say they
grow a particular kind of rice not for its yield, but for its flavour. This
is particularly true of Hansaraj. Hansaraj is a fine flavoured rice, which
is as close to Basmati rice as local farmers can grow in the plains. It has
a very low yield, about a third of an "improved variety" yet three or four
farmers insisted on growing it so that they would have a stock of fine
flavoured rice for special occasions throughout the year such as festivals
and weddings. This should alert us to the fact that for sample farmers, rice
is a subsistence crop grown not for the market, but for their for their own
consumption. The area given over to rice was not decided directly by price in
the season under study, but on the production unit's perceived need for rice,
the land available to them to grow it and the expected minimum yield.
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Returns to Rice
Table Z, below, gives an idea of the overall position regarding rice in the
period under study.
Table 2:















Bangar 50.75 19,092 376 11,200 221
Khader 86.00 8,090 94 5,091 59
Jhakri
Bangar 114 57,353 503 43,776 384
TOTAL 250.75 84,535 337 60,087 240
Source: Key informants, 1982 Kharif Season.
Table Z shows that bangar farmers made a substantially greater surplus than
khader farmers. Given the absence of assured water supplies in the khader and
the subsequent use of unimproved varieties, the difference is to be expected.
Perhaps more surprising is the difference between returns to bangar growers
in Jhakri in Dharmnagri. This is explained by the fact that almost all of
the growers in Dharmnagri were small farmers with isolated small plots of
land on the bangar. Five of the seven plots under rice in Dharmnagri Bangar
had an average size of 3.5 bighas under rice, while 15 of their 19
counterparts in Jhakri had an average plot size of double this. That yields
in Jhakri tend to be higher than in Dharmnagri probably reflects easier
access to water, and better draining soil less liable to flooding. Most of
the rice growers in the Jhakri sample owned their own well while in
Dharmnagri only one grower did.
Returns in the Khader
The overall position represented in table Zwc, as one might expect, obscures
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differences between growers in different areas. Table 3 shows the differences
in yields among farmers growing improved and unimproved varieties in the
khader.
Table 3:

































TOTAL 88.75 6732 75.85
Source: Key Informants 1982 Kharif Season.
Although the numbers in each group are small they serve to make the point
that farmers who planted older varieties made more consistent returns. This
confirms the view expressed by khader farmers that older varieties give
better returns when water supplies and drainage are less assured. This
is highlighted by the returns to the improved variety "saket 4" in the
khader, which when taken as an average are somewhat misleading. Of the two
khader farmers in the sample planting "saket 4", one made a loss, harvesting
none of the rice which he planted. He said that he had tried this as an
experiment and would not be planting it again on that particular plot of land
which was low lying and clayey, and therefore flooded easily and drained
badly. He had also planted 15 bighas of Lambia Farm and Lai Mati mixed, two
traditional varieties, which from table 3 can be seen as the most
profitable varieties on the khader in the 1982 season. The loss of an acre of
"saket 4", though important, was not crucial to the provision of rice for
that production unit.
The other grower of "saket 4" in the khader was Mahipal who had not, he said,
intended to grow rice at all. He was growing vegetables for sale and
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consumption on the two bighas on which he later transplanted rice. He told
me on numerous occassions that he intended to sell the vegetables and then
buy his Household's rice requirement from those with a surplus in the
village. The vegetables were however washed out by the monsoon before he was
able to harvest them. He ploughed in the rotting vegetable matter and
transplanted rice very quickly, making the best of the situation the rains
had left him. His returns to "saket 4" were good. I think this is because
his land is not typical of the majority in the khader. Of all the land owned
by villagers in the khader, his is among the highest and therefore among the
best draining. Drainage is also helped by its being lighter in texture than
the lower lying land farther into the khader.
If the rice he transplanted was threatened by too much rain he could simply
cut holes in the retaining walls on the field and the water would run away.
If he chose carefully he could run the water into a sugarcane field which no
one would be too worried about. Mahipal's field was also fairly near to a
ground water pool and he also knew that he could, in the event of
insufficient rain, hire the services of a water trolley from the village and
pump ground water up from the pool and direct it to his field by digging a
channel from the pool to his field. In these ways the risk of growing new
varieties of rice were somewhat less for Mahipal than they were for other
people and this is reflected in the value of his yield, which was Rs225 per
bigha. It is also worth pointing out that this was also increased by the use
of family rather than hired labour. One other farmer, Mangal, tried to grow a
new variety, Jaya Parsad, in the khader. I suspect that Mangal
transplanted Jaya in an attempt to obtain the absolute maximum possible for
their effort in adverse circumstances. Most of the land they planted up
with rice was sharecropped; in addition to which they operated a tractor; for
which a substantial serkara (5% compound per month) loan was outstanding. In
order to provide his family with enough rice to eat and keep up the
repayments on the loan they had to try for an absolute maximum return and
therefore take risks which in other circumstances he would not not have
contemplated. His venture failed because the rain was too heavy for the
young rice seedlings to survive in the heavy khader soil which he farmed.
Returns in the the Bangar
Comparison of rupee yields per bigha on the upland irrigated soil shows how
much more lucrative rice farming was there in the 1982 rice season when
compared with the khader; on the bangar, mostly improved varieties of rice
are sown, and - because the land is better drained and watered - no-one lost
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an entire crop. In short, rice growing is less risky on the bangar than the
khader. This is reflected in table 4.
Table 4:
Rupee per Bigha Yields of Rice on the Bangar by Variety
Net Net
Improved Yield Yield/
Varieties Village Bighas Rupees Bigha
Saket 4 Dn 17.75 2231 126
Saket 4 Jh 107.50 41868 389
Bugdi Jh 2 1072 536
Jaya Parsad Dn 18 4183 232
IR24 Dn 15 4806 320
Unimproved
Varieties
Hansaraj Jh 4.5 836 186
Total 164.75 54996 334
Legend: Villages: Dn = Dharmnagri
Jh = Jhakri
Source: Key Informants 1982 Kharif Season.
A comparison of the returns in the two areas indicates that the bangar is
easily more profitable on average than the khader, with all growers on the
former showing a healthy sur-plus. The least successful growers on the bangar
were small farmers growing "saket 4". These farmers did not own tubewells
and could neither afford to buy the amount of water they would have wished,
or to obtain what they did on time. The only other growers to show a return
of less than Rs200/bigha were those growing Hanaraj. But, as mentioned above,
Hansaraj was grown for its flavour, rather than its yielding properties. Most
of the growers in Jhakri own their own wells and this is reflected in higher
returns there. Only the farmer growing Jaya Parsad in Dharmnagri Bangar owned
his own well, and I suspect, as he was a reluctant informant in the early
stages of fieldwork, when material on rice was being collected, his estimate
if anything underestimates his returns.
Those in Jhakri without wells complained during interview that water was not
always easy to obtain, and was expensive. It is interesting to note that in
the three cases where rice was sharecropped in Jhakri, the land was shared
out by those with no wells to those whose wells could water the land they
were sharing in. Qadir, one Jhakri farmer who sharecropped out his land to
another, made it was clear that he had shared the land out as he did not
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expect to have enough cash during the growing cycle to afford the necessary
inputs of water and fertiliser. He said that he would not sharecrop the land
out for the wheat season as this would be cultivated during the cane
harvesting season and if he found himself short of the necessary inputs he
would cut cane and sell it to pay for them.
Wheat
Wheat like rice has a daily part in the lives of the people who are the focus
of this study. Some feeling of its importance can be realised from the fact
the the word for bread, roti, is interchangable with the word for food.
Indeed at the festival of Shivaratri among the Hindus the fast which some
people keep is only considered to be broken when bread, which is considered
real food, is eaten. Most of the wheat consumed in the village is eaten in
the form of chapatis which are flat unleavened bread cooked on a bevelled
griddle over a very smoky ooplay burning chula, finally being puffed up into
a delicious ball of hot air in the flame of the fire itself.
Some wheat is sold, where it is surplus to requirements, but very few farmers
grow any wheat with sale in mind. This was clearly borne out during the
course of questioning on the wheat crop. All growers in the sample, when
asked how much seed they had kept back for the next year's planting all said
enough to plant the area which would feed their family and a little bit
extra, lest the seed should be bad or the crop weak. Wheat, like rice, is a
subsistence crop.
Cultivation Methods
Unlike rice, there are no fundamental differences in the way which wheat is
cultivated on the khader or the bangar. Consequently, this section is not
sub-divided to take differences into account in the manner of the section on
rice above.
Preparation for planting the wheat crop begins sometime in August and
continues right through till December. The date by which preparation begins
is influenced by the crop which wheat follows in the rotation. Where it
follows rice, the preparation is likely to begin in September for farmers who
are going to plant in the khader. By virtue of planting rice early, they
will have harvested early, allowing for early wheat preparation. In
rotations where wheat follows rice on the bangar then the likliehood is that
the preparation will not begin until the middle or end of November.
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Where wheat follows cane, the starting date for preparation is likely to be
somewhere in November for both khader and bangar, as this is the earliest
date by which ratoun cane will be cut. Preparation is likely to begin
earliest when wheat is being planted on land which was previously under a
short summer crop or a fallow, both of which would follow the cutting of a
ratoun harvest of cane late in the previous season (April) or a fallow after
the previous wheat crop.
In any case the preparation is likely to consist of a number of preparatory
ploughings and perhaps some watering, where the field being prepared can be
irrigated from a privately operated tubewell. The frequency of these
ploughings is largely determined by the grower's access to ploughing
equipment and how late he starts his preparation. It will be shown later in
this chapter that growers who have only recently started to operate land in
their own right are unlikely to have a plough. In these cases, the cost of
hiring a tractor for ploughing is limiting. These examples are all in
Dharmnagri, but there were also two cases in Jhakri where landless men took
small plots of wheat on a sharecropping arrangement.
Preparatory watering is only done once, and that exclusively by growers who
own tubewells. The water is given just a few days before planting and then
the soil then planked over to hold moisture in the soil to help the early
germination of the wheat seed after planting.
Where the intention is to plant sugar cane after the wheat has been
harvested, the preparatory ploughings may be interspersed with a dressing of
manure (kuri ka khad). The manure is made by tipping household rubbish
into a purpose dug kuri (pit) throughout the year. This is augmented by
manure from household animals which is collected by household women and
dumped there during the monsoon when it is too wet for the women to make
ooplay (dung cakes for cooking) from manure.
Planting itself is done behind the plough without the use of seed drills.
Those who can afford it will also use a mixture of Nitrogen, Phosphorous and
Potassium called daya to assist in germination. The commonest reason given
for the non-use of fertiliser was the lack of cash or the inability to raise
sufficient credit to buy it.
Planting is the exclusive preserve of men. The preference is to use family
labour, to do the planting, but where this is not possible, either because
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other men are doing other work, or there are not enough men to plant, a
hired labourer or two will be used to assist in the planting but this is
very rare. None of the farmers on the khader used irrigation at all during
their growing cycle and there was very little weeding indeed. This is
reflected in the figures for labour costs. As one might expect, larger
farmers do spend more money on fertiliser, though this does not have the
effect of substantially increasing their yields.
Harvesting takes place around April. Larger farmers tend to use mostly
hired labour, which is paid in kind. The rate for this work during the 83
harvest period varied between 5 and 8 bundles per hundred cut, depending on
the availabilty of labour and the lateness of the harvest and sometimes on
the density of the standing crop with more being paid for sparser crops.
After cutting, the wheat is threshed mechanically, either by tractor or
diesel driven engines. This is usually done on a percentage threshed basis
with the hirer providing the labour. The percentage demanded, and given, in
83 was between 11 and 15 per cent depending on the availabilty of threshers.
Needless to say those who owned threshers were the people who ended up with
most grain in their stores in 1983 - either because they were large farmers
and/or because they were able to hire their threshers out to other farmers
and reap a percentage of the threshed grain.
Some farmers who own threshing equipment, also have to hire threshing
equipment from others. This is because they do not own a diesel engine and
there was not enough electricity to thresh their crop as quickly as they
wanted to do it, since they also have an eye on coming preparation for the
next crop to be planted, as well as wanting to thresh their crop before the
weather breaks and ruins it.
Choice of Seed
The choice of which seed to plant does not seem to have any particular
significance for most farmers in the way that it does for rice, this is
because the new varieties of wheat seed are not so critically dependent on
the volume and timing of water supplies as their rice counterparts. Nor does
the new wheat seed require to be planted in an entirely different way as is
the case with improved varieties of rice. In addition, wheat is grown over
the winter when there is likely to be a more timely and beneficial supply of
rain than in the monsoon.
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All farmers in the sample grew either 1553 or RR21 which were the varieties
currently on offer from the agricultural extension service. Some farmers
grew both varieties, and there are some indications that there was a general
trend towards 1553, mostly because the field life of RR21 was coming to an
end.
Returns to Wheat
Yields on average for the whole sample would seem to be slightly
above the average for wheat in north India of 12 - 13 quintals a
hectare(I,C.A.R.: 1982). Table 5 gives the overall pattern of area and
yields for wheat during the 1982-83 season.
Table 5:




































TOTAL 343 73,201 213 49,264 144
Source: Key Informants 1982 Rabi Season.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the above table is that as was the case
with rice, the irrigated bangar lands show a much greater return to their
owners than the non irrigated khader soils. Apart from the obvious reason
that a controlled water supply has a great effect on outurn, the reasons for
this difference are manifold. However very few growers considered the
season under study to be a good one for wheat. This was largely because
there had been heavy rainfall while last year's harvest had been waiting
ouside to be threshed. The wheat had become wet, and the grains therefore
provided poor seed. Those with the highest yields are growers who managed to
find an alternative supply of seed; from wheat which had been cut and stored
before it had been affected by the rain. These were often large farmers who
were able to obtain seed from similarly placed relatives in other parts of
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the district not so badly affected in the previous season by rain.
The problem for growers in the khader land was not a shortage of water, but
rather too much water at the wrong times. There was heavy rainfall during
the early stages of the crop's growth and this had caused much of the
standing young shoots to be washed away, especially on the sandy soil
nearest the Ganges. The low average yield of farmers in the khader does not
really reflect low yields across the board there, but rather reflects the
riskiness of farming on the khader. To illustrate: the best yield in the
khader was Rs 224 per bigha. This was gained by Udayan. His crop was not
weeded; neither did it have very much fertiliser applied - 25kgs on 12
bighas in a single dressing. He maintained that the crop, which he thought
poor enough, had escaped substantial rain damage.
The worst yield on the khader was a loss of Rs 27 per bigha sustained by
Shankar who had spent substantially more on the cultivation of the crop.
His cash losses would not have been so great though had he been at a later
stage in the life cycle. He had only just inherited his land before the
wheat season began and had no plough or team and had to resort to expensive
hired tractor preparation of the soil and hired plough to plant. He also
had a job and therefore was less able to pay his crop proper attention.
In addition it would seem that this difference between irrigated and non-
irrigated land is not much affected by class. For example, the wealthiest
khader farmers, have lesser net returns per bigha, around Rs92, than small
farmers on the irrigated bangar, around Rs 200.
In general, farmers growing irrigated wheat had better returns than those
growing without assured and controlled water supplies. Sample farmers
growing wheat in both Dharmnagri and Jhakri Bangar had better returns than
their khader counterparts.
Sugar Cane
"We people are very happy when planting sugarcane, it is our cash
crop. Wheat and rice provide eating, but sugarcane provides money."
(Mansur)
Sugar Cane as the major cash crop of the area under study, deserves a special
analysis so that the place which it occupies in the lives of the sample may
be more readily understood. As one might expect, the growing and disposal of
the cane crop ties village people into a wider cash nexus and a set of
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relationships over which they have relatively little control. Understanding
something of the market for sugar cane is essential for understanding the
main focus of these chapters, the pattern of labour use and the income which
the crop produces. I will begin this analysis of sugarcane therefore with a
brief description of this market.
Sugar Cane - a Dual Market
The point of departure for this description of the market for cane is that
the market is composed of three analytically distinct sectors. Farmers may
sell their cane to the local Sugar Cane Co-operative Society, or to one of
the four colhus or crushers around the study villages, or to private
khandsaris, which crush cane into sugar as a final product. However there are
no khandsaris in close proximity to the study villages and in the 1982-83
season no grower supplied cane to khandsaris. When prices are high the
journey to khandsaris in the town of Kiratpur (about 15 kilometres away) is
well worth the effort, as prices can be as much as Rsl5 a quintal (lOOkgs.)
higher there than at the local crushers. In the season under study, then, all
farmers supplied cane either to the government mill, via the Sugar Cane Co¬
operative Society or the local colhus. The analysis in this chapter will,
therefore, be confined to these two buyers of cane and I will deal with each
in turn.
The Sugar Cane Co-operative Society
The Government-owned unit of the Uttar Pradesh State Sugar Corporation is the
largest single buyer of sugar cane in Bijnor District. The unit consists of a
mill with a crushing capacity of some 1100 tonnes of cane a day. In a
crushing season of 202 days in the 1981-82 season, the mill crushed about 820
tonnes of cane each working day. Before 1979, the mill was privately owned
but had recurring problems in paying farmers for the cane they supplied and
was eventually taken over by the government.
Farmers do not have direct access to the mill. To be able to supply cane
there, they must take membership of the local Sugar Cane Co-operative
Society. Membership of the society is obtained by purchasing Rs20 worth of
shares. This entitles members to supply cane to the mill and to borrow
variable inputs according to society rules. It is worth highlighting two
points here. The first is that the advantage of supplying sugarcane to the
mill in the 1982-83 season is that the price which the mill paid, fixed at
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the begining of the season, was always higher than that paid by the local
crushers. The second is that members cannot usually supply all of their
sugarcane to the mill. The right to supply is governed by society rules.
In the first year of membership, a farmer is allowed to supply the average
weight of supply for his village of residence for the area he has under cane.
After two years membership, a supply entitlement, the basic quota, is
calculated as the moving average of the previous two years supply. It is this
amount which the farmer is allowed to supply in any given season. Farmers may
increase this amount by purchasing a bond for an extra amount which he wishes
to supply. If he fails to meet the weight he has agreed to supply, the price
paid for the bond is forfeited.
The mill's cane crushing season, which varies from year to year depending on
demand and supply factors, is divided into supply fortnights. The entitlement
of each member to supply cane in any fortnight is calculated so as to create
an even flow of supply for each member over the whole crushing season, and to
provide a steady supply of cane to the mill.
A set of dated passes is then made up allowing each member to supply
particular weights during particular fortnights. To allow time for cutting,
passes are then supplied to the farmer three or four days before the cane is
required at the mill, by the village cane worker (gurrna gram sevak), each of
whom is responsible for about 1200 acres of cane. The catchment area forthe
mill in 1981-82, the season before fieldwork began, was about 51,000 acres.
Dharmnagri and Jhakri farmers, because the villages are more than ten
kilometres from the mill gate, are allowed to supply their cane to the
Government weighing station at Begawala a village about a kilometre away. The
farmer presents the cane and pass at the weighbridge. The full buggy is
weighed, the cane unloaded, and then the empty buggy is weighed. The supply
weight is then calculated as the difference between these two weights. The
price paid by the mill for cane in the 82-83 season was Rs21.60 per lOOkgs
(quintal). From this a levy of 60 paise per quintal was deducted to cover
transport from weighing station to the mill.
After weighing, the farmer has his pass authenticated and retains it. The
mill pays for cane in arrears and the gunna gram sevak (village level cane-
worker also brings news of the dates for which the society is paying for cane
supplied. Any member having a pass to be paid presents it at the society
office in Bijnor for cash payment.
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The price paid by the mill for sugar cane is fixed by the State Government at
the begining of each season. The price is based on that estimated by the the
Agricultural Prices Commission (A.P.C.) in Delhi as the one which will clear
the market. But in 1982-83, the A.P.C. recommended that the price should be
set at Rsl4-15 per quintal. The difference is accounted for by the Uttar
Pradesh State Government setting a higher price in the hope of currying
political favours among the growers.
The Indian Government finds itself in an impossible situation in relation to
sugar. Sugar is an immensely popular commodity in India. Walk through the
streets of any busy town and you cannot go far without coming upon the stall
of a sweet vendor piled high with perfect pyramiids of barfi and ladu, laden
with bowls of rasguley steeping in sugar syrup and heavy with the smell of
frying jalebis. You cannot stay long in a village without being offered a
plate of gur (raw sugar) to go with your heavily sweetened tea. Sweets have a
symbolic part to play in India. Mouths have to be sweetened in economic,
political and ritual life too. The government is therefore under pressure to
provide sugar cheaply and at the same time provide a good price for sugar
cane. Consequently, the market for sugar cane is an unstable one in which
price fluctuations can be extreme.
The high price at which the mill has to buy cane caused severe cash flow
problems over the years up to 1982-83. Some farmers claimed not to have been
paid any money for the cane they supplied during the previous season. One man
claimed to be owed somewhere in the region of Rsl4,000 at the begining of the
1982-83 season. Another farmer, Mansur remembered, with some affection, the
period of the Janata government between 1977-79 when sugar cane farmers
benefited from high prices. At a time when the mill was paying Rsl3-26, per
lOOkgs, the colhus and khandsaris were paying up to Rs65.
"farmers walked around with their pockets so full of notes that
they were falling out on the street behind him as he walked. The
prices at the crushers were high and when the mill passes came we
just stuck them in the thatch and forgot about them. Prices at the
crushers in Kiratpur were Rs65 a quintal and here in the village
they were as high as Rs50 a quintal. Now they are Rs8,10 or 12.
Then we could build brick houses, now we are back to mud huts"
(Mansur)
In the 1982-83 season, the mill crushed cane right through to May. but the
society ledgers show that no payments were made for cane supplied after March
by the time my fieldwork ended in July 1983.
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The Village Sugar Cane Crushers.
The crushers or colhus are the second sector of the market for sugar cane. In
the immediate vicinity of Dharmnagri and Jhakri there are four colhus each of
which is located on the land of a farmer owning an electric well and engine
house.
Colhus consist of three large bowls in line, each of which is about two feet
across. The outer rims are level with the ground around. Underneath is a
large fire-chamber which is fed through a hole in the wall from a pit at one
end. At the other end of the chamber, there is a chimney, to draw the flames
across and underneath the bowls. The sugar cane is crushed by a set of
upright rollers set at right angles to the first bowl. The juice extracted by
crushing is channeled into one of two reservoirs.
The juice is then run from the reservoir into the first bowl. As it comes to
boiling point, it has the impurities skimmed from the top with a large
slotted ladle. Thus cleaned, it is ladled into the second pan. The first pan
is filled up from the reservoir and boiled. If the gur which the process
produces is for sale in Bijnor, it will have chemicals added in the second
pan to improve its appearance. It will also be clarified with tree bark. The
boiling amber liquid is then ladled from the second into the third pan where
it is reduced to a saucy consistency before being ladled onto a round
concrete cooling tray and formed into balls of gur called gindaurey.
Alternatively it may be formed into a single slab known as andarki and used
for reprocessing into sugar.
The three bowls and all the crushing gear at all four colhus belong to the
Block Development Office (B.D.O.) at Chandak, some 20 kilometres away. All
four colhus were rented from the B.D.O. by the men whose land they stood on.
In the 1982-83 season, the official rent for each colhu was Rs2,600. Each
colhu was situated at the electric well house of the hirer. The upright
crushing gear was attached to the electric motor by a drive belt and the cane
crushed in this way.
However, none of the four owners who rented from the B.D.O. operated the
colhus themselves. Each colhu was sublet to a group of partners (tikidars)
who operated them for the whole crushing season. Each group of tikidars hired
the machinery, colhu and electric pump for a flat rate of Rs5,600 from the
owner of the well. The tikidars could then use the electric motor to drive
the crushing gear (except when the owner needed the motor to pump water to
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his fields. The electricity supply was not constant. In addition therefore,
each group of tikidars jointly owned their own diesel engine which they used
to drive the crushing gear when the electricity supply was cut.
Tikidars bought sugar cane from local farmers at a price which reflected the
rate for gur in the market at Bijnor where they sold their product every
Wednesday and Friday. As Mansur suggested this price had been very much
higher in previous seasons than the price offered at the government owned
mill in Bijnor. In the 1982-83 season, this was not the case. The price
offered by the colhus never rose above Rsl5 per quintal. For most of the
season, the price was between eight and ten rupees per quintal. Members of
the Sugar Cane Co-operative only supplied to the colhus that which they could
not supply to the mill . Farmers who were not members of the Co-operative
sold all their cane to the colhus.
Cultivation Methods
The cane which is cut in November is not that which is planted the previous
Spring. To simplify this description I will describe a notional plot of land
planted with cane in may 1981. This Cane will be cut at earliest in March
1982, a full ten months after it is planted. It is then known as nauluck. The
roots will be left in the ground, a procedure known as ratouning. From these
roots, a second crop will grow, the harvest of which will begin in November
1982, eight months after it has been ratouned. The cane is then known as
paidey. On the upland bangar soils, cane may stay in the ground for three or
four years, while in the khader, the maximum time is three seasons. Otherwise
there are no great differences between the two areas in the way in which the
crop is cultivated.
Cultivation Methods
Cane planting itself is an intensive operation in terms of both labour and
other inputs. All growers manage to overcome this - either by using children,
or by a system of exchange of labour and other inputs- like ploughs and
draught animals. Arrangements for the latter are straightforward enough, with
a days labour of man or plough being exchanged for the same at a later date.
Among the sample about 180 labour days were so exchanged during the planting
of sugar cane in 1982-83.
Of all the agricultural operations performed during the year this seems to be
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the one most consistently enjoyed by most people. Sugar cane produces wealth,
and is only planted on any particular field about once every three or four
yea allowing for rotations and ratoun crops. It is as well then to make a
festival of it. I was invited to plant cane more often than I was to 'help'
with any other agricultural operation. I was being asked to take part in a
celebration, and it was important to people that I attended. It was like
being invited to a wedding, one did not refuse without offending someone.
Imagine the field on the day of planting. An air of resilient calm reigns,
occassionally broken by peals of laughter or the shouts of plough drivers as
they spur their teams on. All who participate are keen that it goes smoothly,
each planter is aware that the skill with which the cane is planted will
affect the yield of the crop for at least two years to come.
Great care is taken to lay the cut cane - used as seed, and known as kenchi -
end to end so as not to waste any space on the field. Sometimes the cane was
planted behind two ploughs, the first wooden-shared plough opening up the
furrow and a second steel-bladed plough deepening the same furrow. To ensure
it was planted straight, the prepared cane seed was dropped into the furrow
between two parallel pieces of wood (pattey) attached to the foot of the rear
of the plough board. The first plough would turn over a blank furrow on the
next round, and the whole process would begin again with cane being planted
in every third furrow, until the whole plot was planted.
The planter was fed cane seed by someone, usually a boy, who loaded them into
a basket from a man cutting full length canes into seed lengths in the middle
of the field. Sometimes the cane was dipped in a mercury based! solutionto
protect the young seed from borers while it was germinating. Except where
farmers could not afford it, a mixture of Nitrogen, Phosphorous and
Potassium, at the rate of about 5 kilos, to the bigha, was sprinkled in on
top of the planted seed to assist in germination, before the furrow was
covered over.
This is not the only way to plant cane. On yet another occassion when there
was only one plough, three furrows were opened up on the left hand side of
the field and while the plough went to open another three furrows on the
right hand side of the field, twenty of us - men and children - planted the
left hand furrows which the plough then covered over while we planted the
right hand side of the field. One man took overall responsibility for the
pattern of planting, telling us which furrows to plant and which to leave
blank.
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After planting, the cultivation of sugarcane depends on whether one looks at
newly planted first season cane (nauluck), or cane which has been ratouned
and left to grow for a second or subsequent season (paidey). After planting
nauluck is intensively dug for the first few months of growing, to loosen up
the soil and prevent weeds taking hold. These diggings are interspersed by
frequent waterings and applications of nitrogen on the bangar but not on the
khader, where in the absence of assured water supplies, farmers use nitrogen
much more sparingly. On average in the khader, about 10 kilos of nitrogen are
applied from planting to harvest, on the bangar the dosage can be as high as
50kgs.
For both the khader and the bangar, paidey is much less intensively
cultivated. After ratouning, the trash from the cut crop is either left on
the field or burnt on the field, both activities are to prevent weeds from
growing. In the khader, the ratoun crop is treated almost entirely as a gift
crop, while on the bangar it may be weeded and fertilised but much less
intensively than nauluck.
Nauluck is harvested from about 10 months to a year after it is planted,
while paidey may be harvested from about eight months after ratouning. The
begining of the sugar cane harvest co-incides with the preparation and
planting of wheat. Because of this family labour tends to be preoccupied with
wheat and consequently, a great deal of work is available cutting sugar cane.
Most of this is not performed for cash however, but for the cut sugar cane's
foliage which is a valued source of winter fodder. Men and sometimes children
cut cane for others and take foliage in payment. Wherever possible though,
farmers prefer to cut their own cane, because the success of next years
ratoun crop depends partly on the skill with which this year's crop is cut.
When women cut cane, which is seldom, it is usually on their own family
fields. At the begining of the season, the foilage has the same value, weight
for weight as the cane itself, though its value declines with the onset of
spring as other sources of fodder become available. It is interesting to note
that for Tamil Nadu, Harriss (1982a) suggests that sugar cane is not grown
because it would replace fodder crops. This is not the case in Bijnor, where
cane provides an important source of fodder.
Choice of Seed
All of the varieties of sugar cane grown in the villages have been introduced
by the government backed agricultural extension service. However from the
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available choice, farmers showed marked preferences for one variety or
another depending on where their land was situated.
The Khader
In the low lying area there is a preference for the variety B.O. 70 over
other types. Farmers explain that B.O.70 has a thicker bark than other
varieties and is therefore more resistant to the rodents and wild animals
which are more abundant in the wilder khader area. One or two farmers also
suggested that because of the thickness of the bark, B.O. 70 weighed more
heavily than other varieties for the same amount of work. This observation is
corroborated by the government mill which announced that it would no longer
accept B.O. 70 for crushing after the 1982-83 season as it weighed too
heavily for the amount of juice it yielded. Of the other two varieties
available, 1148 and 1158, khader farmers said they preferred 1158. The latter
has a stouter bark than the former and under khader conditions they maintain
that their animals prefer its leaves as fodder to those of 1148.
The Bangar
On the upland soil, sample farmers unanimously preferred to grow 1158. They
maintaned that with assured water supplies and some nitrogenous fertiliser,
it grew more prolifically than either B.O.70 or 1148. Some growers
maintained that 1148 was a better quality cane than 1158 but because of the
thinness of its bark and other qualities, did not give them the weight they
required. These farmers grew 1158 for the market but some 1148 for turning
into sugar for their own use. However, some maitained that at the end of the
day it did not matter too much about which cane you grew as long as you had
it weighed quickly after cutting before it started to dry outand therefore
weigh more lightly.
Returns to Sugar Cane Returns among the sample in the bangar are about the
U.P. average of about 40 to 50 tonnes per hectare(I.C.A.R.: 1982,p988).
Yields on the khader however as lower than this. Two forms of explanation are
possible for this. Firstly, khader land is poorer and farmers are not able to
farm commercially (the I.C.A.R. estimates based on commercial farming).
Secondly, the khader has more paidey than naulak. While the latter gives
higher yields it may not be straightforwardly more lucrative than the former
because it requires greater care and more inputs. Farmers tend to treat their
ratoun (paidey) as a gift crop and therefore do not farm it very intensively.
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Consequently, khader farmers, with a greater proportion of their land under
paidey, use less fertiliser. Neither were they likely to irrigate their cane,
whereas all bangar growers did. This affects yields as is clearly illustrated
in yields as table 6 shows.
Table 6:





















100 46,535 465 39,510
180 55,300 307 38,381




371TOTAL 566 257,064 454 209,872
Source: Key Informants: 1982-83 Sugarcane Season.
The pattern which emerges for sugarcane is one of better returns
for farmers growing their crops on the irrigated soils of the bangar.
However, all of this difference is not solely attributable to the more
favourable growing conditions on the bangar. In fact much of the difference
is attributable to the better access of the richer farmers to the Sugar Cane
Co-operative Society. More particularly, the difference is to be explained
by the greater number of passes per bigha which larger farmers were able to
obtain under society rules of supply than their poorer counterparts. It
should be remembered that in 1982-83, the year under study, the price which
the society paid for the supply of cane was always greater than that paid by
the local cane crushers. This difference in number of passes to supply cane
per bigha is shown in table 7 below.
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Table 7:
Rupee Yield pier Bigha from the Sugarcane Crop by Number of Passes
to Supply Sugarcane to the Co-operative Society
Passes








Source: Bijnor Sugarcane Co-operative Society, Cane Development
Survey Register 1981-82.
The group with most passes in the table above is identical in its composition
to the group holding more than 20 bighas of land with one notable exception,
Mansur's household, which holds more than 20 bighas of land but only 14
passes to supply cane to the society. This shortfall is explainable in terms
of the history of their supply and its effect on their basic quota. During
the years when the price of cane was high at the local crushers, they let
their supply to the mill drop right back. This affected their basic quota
and they were still trying to pull back their supply to the society to its
previous level. The cost of sticking the society's passes in the thatch
during those years is a lower overall return when the price ratio between the
society and the local crushers is reversed.
Hie Agricultural Year Summarised
Before presenting a summary of returns for the sample for the whole year two
final features of the economic activity must be mentioned. The first of
these is the range of crops which are either interplanted with the main crops
or on small plots of land on their own. Into the first category falls
mustard which is interplanted with wheat, the oil from which is used as a
cooking medium and the cake fed to cattle. Other crops in this category are
millet and maize both of which are interplanted with sugarcane and used as
fodder crops. The value of these crops is calculated at the market value at
the time of harvest. It is worth pointing out that I do not have a value for
hemp which is planted on the edges of the sugarcane crop. The bark of this
crop is used to make rope and the wood as cooking fuel.
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Crops planted out on their own included in the other crops category of the
table below include lentils and sweet potatoes. These crops too are valued at
the market price at the time of their harvest. The estimates of returns on
these crops I feel is not as valid as those for the major crops. This I think
reflects the marginal nature to household income. This is reflected too in
the value which they have in the overall income of the sample, accounting for
less than 2% of total income over the whole year.
The other category of work included in the table below which has not yet been
discussed is the work associated with cattle. Much of this work is done by
women and this is a subject to which I shall return in subsequent chapters.
In the meantime it needs to be more generally noted that animal husbandry
forms a substantial part of the work and income of sample households and the
range of husbanding methods is wide and varied.
Perhaps the most significant difference is that richer households tend to
supplement the feed of their draught animals, particularly in ploughing
seasons when the animals are called upon to perform many hours of ploughing
per day. The animals of the rich have a more varied diet of green fodder
too, since their owners often put small plots of land under clover or maize
or provide summer feed. Green fodder for the animals in winter is less
varied and consists mostly of sugar cane tops, supplemented by wheatstraw for
bulk. Supplements when they are given, include barley, lentils, mustard cake
and oil.
The animals of the poor tend not to experience such varied culinary delights.
Their main fodder all year round is grass, cut from the open spaces of the
khader. Some households have their animals grazed, for which they pay about
5kgs of grain per animal per month.
Providing fodder for animals is a labour intensive business. It must be cut,
headloaded to the stall, chopped and put out for the animals to eat. This
gives rise to some interesting divisions of labour to which I shall return in
the next chapter. In the meantime, the costs of inputs are represented as
far as possible in the table below at their market cost. Where milk is
obtained in return, this too is valued at the market rate.
Taking all these factors into account, the table below summarises the income
of the sample household over the whole year studied. The data is presented
according to the class categories developed in chapter 3.
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Table 8:
Summary of Annual Rupee Income from all Activities by Class
II III IV V1 TOTAL
Source of
Income
RICE 18,059 39,395 2,069 564 60,087
WHEAT 9,391 31,643 7,930 300 49,264
SUGARCANE 89,972 107,392 5,998 6,530 209,892
OTHER
CROPS
2,350 5,400 360 - 8,110
CATTLE 6,400 14,900 5,400 8,100 34,800
LABOUR
OUT 3,260 19,798 8,463 38,273 69,794
TOTAL 129,432 218,528 30,220 53,767 431,947
NO. OF
BIGHAS 121 259 58 0 4383
NET INCOME
PER BIGHA
1070 844 521 n/a 8632
Source: Key Informants Agricultural Questionnaires, 1982-83.
Notes: 1. Although class V informants are landless, two men had
some crop income as they had sharecropping
arrangments on small plots of land.
2. This figure excludes the income of class V informants.
3. fciflKas used \<\ tk\S tabic are. pucca biotas ©■? voKich 1t\ece/ <*re-
\'|»b To
The table shows that richer informants have greater returns per bigha than
their poorer counterparts over the whole year. Class II farmers make a fifth
more per bigha than class III farmers and almost twice as much per bigha than
class IV farmers.
At this stage however, we are not able to make direct comaprisons between the
landed and landless households. To do this these we must breathe further
meaning into the income figures by analysing the number of people which it
must support in the different classes, More importantly perhaps in terms of
the main argument of the thesis, we must ask what contribution children make
to the production of this income for the households to which they belong. It
is to this subject which I turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: The Agricultural Cycle II
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I look more closely at patterns of labour use throughout the
year among sample households. My main interest is in the contribution of
pce.ch icfions
children to family output. Firstly I outline some of the„made by the various
strands of the economics of fertility literature predict in relation to
children. Secondly I outline a household typology which will help in picking
through the effects of household structure on labour use. Thirdly I examine
patterns of labour use in each of the three major crops, before summarising
labour use for the whole year. Finally I return to examine the literature in
the light of this examination of labour use data.
Predictions from the Literature
As we have already seen in the introductory chapter, the literature on the
economic value of children is wide and varied but in this chapter, I want to
concentrate specifically on their contribution to production. The central
guiding questions here are: under what circumstances, and in what ways and to
what extent is the labour power of children of direct benefit to their
parents? In this context what predictions would some of the major
contributions to the debate lead us to make?
In this respect the "New Home Economics" approach is not very helpful. I have
already pointed out that this theory was developed specifically in relation
to the developed nations andthe main role of children according to Becker is
as a source of psychic income, as a consumption good. Mamdani (1972) suggests
just the opposite. For his study village in the Punjab, all except the
Brahmins could gain by adopting a high fertility strategy. The economic
changes there he suggests mean that both sons and daughters make substantial
contributions to family income from an early age, regardless of the class
position of the household.
Others distinguish between children of different sexes and ages. Cain (1978),
Nag et al (1981) and Leibenstein (1977) all suggest that the economic
contribution of children increases as they grow older. It is fairly clear in
these approaches that daughters are seen as consumers rather than producers.
Leibenstein (1977), suggests for example, that sons in most developing
countries become net producers by the time they are 12 and compensate for
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their own and the consumption of one sister by the time they reach the age of
22.
Vlassof (1979) in his study of a rural area near Bombay suggests that low
adult productivity and alternative sources of labour to children mean that
for the villagers in his study, children make little or no economic
contribution to the household until age 16. In these circumstances, parents
are more aware of the costs rather than the benefits of children. Parents
want their sons to be better educated and migrate to city jobs rather than
stay at home, a risky strategy in the lack of assured employment. Vlassof's
work then would suggest a small contribution by young children, increasing
with age, but coming through wages from migratory labour rather than
production for the family farm or casual agricultural labour.
A criticism of this type of cross sectional analysis, and an extension of
Leibenstein's argument outlined above is that it ignores the long term. The
greatest benefits from children are to be had when poreots are too old to
work for themselves and look to their children to provide support for them in
their old age. Leibenstein (1957, 1975) suggests that in countries where
institutionalised forms of social security are not well developed this is a
major incentive for fertility. This argument is analytically distinct from
that made by Cain (1981) and examined in Chapter 4. Lindert (1980)
suggests that while this old age security argument is attractive, the
empirical evidence to support it is extremely limited. Nugent (1985) in a
review of the literature on the old age security motive for fertility
suggests that the realisation of such support is not necessary for it provide
a motive for fertility and concludes that further work is necessary before a
verdict on this motive can be returned. He does suggest, though, that access
to productive resources is an important factor in old age security. There is
it
no direct test of this thesis in this chapter, though we shall return toAin
Chapter 9. If, however, the data presented below show a substantial number of
child labour hours in households where no adult labour is used thenflis might
be indicative of the operation of old age security through children.
Before turning to an examination of the data, I should like to point out that
running at a tangent to this main argument is the debate over the nature of
the mode of production in Indian agriculture. This debate over the nature of
development in India is a long standing one and tricky to negotiate. I do not
intend a full blown analysis of it here, but it has some useful features
which help to formulate thoughts on the long term nature of the effects of
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fertilty. The debate has its origins in Russia in the early twentieth
century. Lenin argued on the basis of the Zemstvo statistics that
differentiation of the peasantry, a necessary stage in the development of
capitalism, was taking place. Others, led by Chayanov argued that the
statistics did not show this at all, but exemplified cyclical movements
consequent upon peasant inheritance. Chayanov argued that the cross-section
data used were bound to show differentiation because at any one time peasant
households would be at different stages in the life cycle associated with the
operation and division of property. For Chayanov, the peasant household is at
its poorest when its head has just inherited from the previous generation and
has young children who are too small to contribute by their labour to the
household product. They are consumers, rather than workers.
The debate in India, summarised by Thorner (1985), centres around these two
positions. One group postulating the superiority of large scale units and the
other suggesting that small scale farms are more productive. The policy
implications of these two positions are quite different. The former group
suggest that since there are returns to scale in farming, farms ought to be
collectivised (Harriss: 1982a). The latter suggest (eg Lipton: 1974; 1977)
that since an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity exists,
both efficiency and social justice can be served by splitting up larger farms
and redistributing land in smaller parcels. I shall by the end of this
chapter also be in a position to make a comment on this debate.
Sources of Data
The data presented in this chapter are from the same source as that presented
in the previous chapter. However, to take into account household life cycles,
and their effect on the resources which households have at their disposal, it
is necessary to develop categories which make sense of household
organisation. I intend to develop four categories of family based on their
jointness or separateness in consumption and production. These categories are
not intended to be an exhaustive typology of all possible combinations that
one could find in India or indeed Bijnor district if one looked hard enough.
Rather they are intended as working definitions of types which will help
facilitate the analysis of the the combined effects of class and family life
cycle stage on a family's ability to reproduce itself more or less
adequately.
116
Type One: This structure consists of a single cooking hearth (chula) where
two or more generations of consanguinial kin operate a system of joint
consumption and production. It consists of a mother and /or father their
married sons and their wives and their grandchildren. All food for these
people will normally be cooked jointly. In local parlance they will form one
cooking hearth. Production work will primarily be the shared responsibility
of father and his married sons. The proceeds of production will not be
divided into equal portions since joint consumption obviates the need for
this. Care must be taken to distinguish this from households where survivng
parents live with one or other of their sons after division among sonshas
taken place. For example Bhagwana, the Rajput household head has his father
staying with him, while his brother has begun to operate his own household
production seperately. These households are not included in this category.
Other households present more of a problem. For example Qm Prakash, Pratap
and Punni are three Dhimar brothers represents a case of partial division.
Their mother is still alive and living with three sons who farm jointly but
have seperate consumption, the mother living in the chula of of of these
three. They have another three brothers each of whom operates independently.
None of these households is included in this category, which is exclusively
for households in which no division in either consumption or production has
taken place.
Type Two: consists of a group of chulas where there is separate consumption
but joint production among two or more generations of consanguinial kin.
Production work is carried out on the basis of equal work for equal shares.
Each male participant will receive an equal share of the joint product which
will then be stored separately and consumed separately by each of the
individual chulas of which each man involved in the joint and shared
production is usually head. Care must again be taken to distinguish between
those households where the parental generation consumes separately and those
where they do not. For example, Mangal a Sahni eats with Hariya, his eldest
step-son in a joint chula, while other brothers, joint with the first in
production ate in seperate chulas, but worked together. All of these are
included in this category. Similarly, Imam Uddin is separate in consumption
from Bashir, his eldest son, but is joint with his younger unmarried sons.
This is reflected in the way in which shares of produce are divided.
Bashirreceives only one quarter of what they produce jointly.
Type Three: This consists of clusters of chulas where there is seperate
consumption but joint production among two or more sets of consanguinial kin
of a single generation. In practice this is exclusively sets of brothers.
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This is similar in struture to type two with the absence of the parental
generation.
Type four: These are households in which production and consumption of each
chula in a consanguinial set is seperate. This is possibly the earliest stage
in the life cycle. A man has separated from his brothers or father but has
not yet had any of his sons or daughters married as they are too young. The
household consists then of himself his wife and their unmarried children. It
is interesting to note that there are no single male households in either
village. This is probably because, as others have noted (Cain 1981) that
domestic work is probably too much for a man to handle on his own. Such a
life would not be chosen and only entered into in the direst of
circumstances.
This scheme is not as clear cut as it seems as there are cases in which
smaller units in a larger haveli (a group of chulas of any type) follow one
type while the overall economic configuration to which they belong is of
another type. For example, father and son may eat at the same hearth but have
their overall production relationship defined by the father's relationship
with his own brothers which may fall into type 3 say (joint production but
seperate consumption). For example, Maruf, has a type one relationship with
his son Khalil in their own chula, but the overall situation of that chula is
defined by Maruf 's relationship to his brothers which is joint production
and separate consumption - a type 3 relationship.I will use this household
typology towards the end of the chapter when discussing the effect of
household composition on labour use and income.
Labour Use in Rice
The pattern of labour use is shown in table 1. The table is organised to show
the time, in labour days, spent on the cultivation and processing of the rice
crop. Cultivation includes any activity performed on the crop during the
planting, growing and harvesting of rice.
Two points must be made in explanation. First, processing, as the table
is
shows,Alargely the work of adult family women, is not merely a jargon word
for cooking. In fact, time spent cooking food is not included in these
figures at all and will be dealt with in the next chapter. Before it gets
anywhere near the cooking pot, rice has to be cleaned and stored and it is
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this work which is included in table 1.
For a few weeks before the harvest of rice (or wheat) women whose families
are to harvest the crop will start to make repairs to their stores called
kotis. These stores are katcha cupboards which the women build themselves.
Mud is gathered from the drainage channels (nuddies) by the side of the road
and the koti repaired. If a new one is to be built, the walls are built up a
few inches at a time, lest the wet mud walls should fall in under their own
weight.
Women are justly proud of their kotis. When complete they are covered in
white mud and may have mirrors impressed into their walls, or figures (hoys)
sculpted in relief, to ward off the evil eye. Having built the koti, the
women clean the rice of chaff and debris and store it inside the koti. It is
this work and ancillary tasks which are represented by the processing figures
in table 1, presented overleaf.
Secondly, the definition of child in this table, and throughout the chapter
is based on a biological definition rather than one of age alone. Thus a child
IS c\ person of any age, married or unmarried, living with their parents and
engaged in joint production and/or consumption. This has the merit of
allowing us to see the benefit of the labour of all children to parents,
including those who are married but continue to contribute to joint
production with their parental household. This solves the problem of what
Cain (1982) calls myopia - the tendency to look at only short term benefits
from unmarried children - induced by western concepts of childhood. Among
the sample, some adult children continue to work jointly with their parents.
This labour is recorded below as child labour, since parents are benefiting
directly from the labour of their children.
119
Table 1:
Overall Pattern of Labour Use in Labour Days in Rice
by Village and Soil Type
Village and Soil Type
DHAKMNAGRI JHAKRI
KHADER BANGAR BANGAR ONLY
Type of
Labour Total Average Total Average Total . Average





Adult Male 206 2.4 58 1.1 528 4.0 792 2.9
Adult Female 139 1.6 53 1.1 31 0.2 223 0.8
Child Male 34 0.4 137 2.7 141 1.1 312 1.2
Child Female 21 0.2 11 0.2 4 • 36 0.1




Adult Female 74 0.9 21 0.4 115 1.0 210 0.8
Child Male NONE
Child Female NONE
HIRED _ _ _ _ _ _
TOTAL 534 6.3 854 17.0 1423 10.7 2811 10.4
Source: Key Informants 1982 Kharif Season
Looking first at overall labour use, the table shows that bangar farmers are
the most intensive users of labour. This is because rice on the bangar is
transplanted. Transplanting tends to be done by large squads of hired labour
and this is reflected' in the greater use of hired labour in that area over
the khader.
Adult Male Family Labour is more intensively used in Jhakri than it is in
either the khader or the bangar in Dharmnagri. There are two main reasons for
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this. Firstly, comparing the two Bangars, the difference can largely be
explained by the more extensive use of tractors on the bangar in Dharmnagri
than in Jhakri. All but 20 bighas of Dharamnagri bangar land were given their
preparatory ploughings by tractor. One grower ploughed his twenty bighas
using his own tractor. The remaining 17.5 bighas of rice land in Dharmnagri
bangar ploughed by tractor belongs in equal parts to five brothers. These men
had recently partitioned their land, and none of them owned a plough. All of
their ploughing was therefore done by hiring. This has the effect of reducing
the number of labour days used, but increasing the cost of each day.
In Jhakri by contrast, all of the preparatory ploughing was performed by
adult male family labour. Ploughing in Jhakri is seen as work "for your own
men" and does not seem to be so much affected by the life cycle in the same
way as preparation in Dharmnagri. In Dharmnagri if you own no plough, or have
not enough time to plough, you are more likely to hire the services of a
plough and team and have it driven by its owner. Production units in Jhakri
tended to have more adult members and be at a later stage in their life cycle
and own their own ploughs.
Secondly most growers in Jhakri, and all of those growing more than five
bighas of rice, have their own tubewells and a large proportion of adult male
family labour can be explained by the time men spend tending the flow of
water. Farmers with their own electric wells tend to use more water than
those without. Water from an electric well is not metered and the charge for
electricity is a flat rate of Rsl80/month for a 7.5hp engine (all of those in
the village.) Watering like ploughing is seen as a job for your own men and
is only performed by male family labour.
Comparing the khader with the bangar, one might reasonably ask, given the
labour intensity of transplanting operations, why the difference in labour
use per bigha is not even greater than it is. The balance between labour use
in the two areas is somewhat restored by the greater incidence of weeding
operations in the khader, where the ground is not as well covered by water to
prevent their growth.
A feature of the data requiring more fundamental explanation than the
differences outlined above, are the uses of adult family female labour. In
Dharmnagri khader this seems to be quite substantial and in fact women are
recorded as performing more labour days in the cultivation than in the
processing of the finished crop. In fact if one adds together the women's
cultivation work and their crop processing for the khader area, they are
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recorded as performing more work on the rice crop than men.
Among the richest households, women are recorded as performing very little
work in the fields. Two Rajput households grow rice on the bangar and they
also have high status which they maintain in part by ensuring that their
women do not work in the fields. This pattern of the reproduction of
household status is outlined by Papanek (1979) and developed by Sharma
(1986). The work of these Rajput women is performed in the confines of the
household courtyard or ooplay patch. It should not be assumed that these
women have a leisurely existence. More wealth means more assets, like cows
which must be milked. This usually involves women in richer houeholds
performing tasks which their poorer counterparts may not have to perform. For
example, tasks associated with having a greater number of milk animals
includes milking, making ghee, feeding animals and sometimes fodder chopping.
The third wealthy production unit in Dharmnagri growing rice on the bangar is
a Dhimar household. It uses little labour in the cultivation of its rice on
the bangar. The number of labour days involved is so small partly because a
hired tractor was used to perform preparatory operations and partly because
their water is bought and therefore uses less family labour than irrigation
water which comes from comes from a family owned tubewell. The other
households seem to be both quantatively and qualitatively different from
these two units in their use of labour. This can be best explained by their
class position. They have limited access to resources like water or ploughs
but have greater numbers of children. These human resources are used more
extensively in rice than those in wealthy households.
The data also illustrate the point that choices in production are more
complex than assumptions about "best production functions" so often used in
economic analyses allow. The Rajput household mentioned above for example,
has three adult male members yet uses fewer adult male family days per bigha
than one of the poorer Dhimar households which has only one adult male
member. This difference is largely explainable in class terms. The Rajput
household owns a substantial amount of land, about a hundred bighas, operates
a tractor, tubewells, and is the only unit in either village to employ any
permanent labour.
Jag Ram the head of a Dhimar household, on the other hand owns and operates
only a small amount of land. Their bangar holding is 1.75 bighas and all of
this went under rice. They own no well and do not have a plough either. This
unit is the most labour intensive of all bangar growers in the sample and
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makes extensive use of its large number of children. Of the 50 or so days
spent in their rice crop 22 were done by their own children. However, Jag Ram
is also the most prolific hirer of child labour in the sample. They use their
own children intensively but also hire children more intensively than anyone
else in the sample too!
Children account for about 12% of all labour performed in the rice crop. Most
of this is the labour of sons, with daughters accounting for just over 1%.
Sons perform relatively little labour in the khader, 34 days, about 6% of the
total there. Among bangar growers, their contribution is greater. In
Dharmnagri, they contribute 137 days, about 16% of the total, while in Jhakri
their contribution is 147 days, 10% of the total.In all three areas, their
contribution is markedly less than that of hired labour which performed 44%
of all work in the rice crop.As a first approximation, then it is reasonable
to say that sons do perform some labour, but we shall examine this in more
detail towards the end of this chapter after we have looked at the other
major crops and sources of work.
Labour Use in Wheat
In this section I present a similar analysis to that for rice above for the
other major staple crop, wheat. Table 2 presents the overall pattern of
labour use for wheat among the sample.
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Table 2:
Overall Pattern of Labour Use in Labour Days
in Wheat by Village and Soil Type
Type and Village and Soil Type
Use of
Labour DHARMNAGRI JHAKRI
KHADER BANGAR BANGAR ONLY
















Adult Female 9 t - - - - 9 •
Child Male 149 1.1 50 0.9 176 1.1 375 1.1
Child Female 8 • 5 0.1 7 • 20 •
HIRED 281 2.1 239 4.2 369 2.4 889 2.6
PROCESSING
FAMILY
Adult Male 26 0.2 - - - - 26 0.2
Adult Female 35 0.3 12 0.2 51 0.3 98 0.3
Child Male NONE
Child Female 30 0.2 - - 27 0.2 57 0.2
HIRED NONE
TOTAL 811 6.1 406 7.1 982 6.4 2199 6.4
Source: Key Informants 1982 Rabi Season.
As for rice, there is a greater use of family labour per bigha in Jhakri than
Dharmnagri. Growers on Dharmnnagri bangar use the greatest amount of labour
per bigha 7.1, with most of this being hired labour. Khader growers use a
substantially lesser amount of labour than either of the bangar areas. This
difference is accountable in terms of the lesser use of labour because
farmers in the khader neither irrigate nor use as much fertiliser as those on
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the bangar. The differences between the two areas are substantially less than
for rice. This is to be expected, since the cultivation methods for wheat are
similar in both areas.
In terms of my main thesis, as for rice, hired labour plays a more major role
than child labour. Hired labour accounts for 40% of total labour used in
wheat, while that of children accounts for only 18%. However, 18% is a
reasonable proportion and we shall return to examine this contribution
towards the end of the chapter.
The data also suggest that daughters are following in their mother's
footsteps with most of their labour being spent in processing rather than
cultivation. The division of labour cultivation and processing is also clear
from the tables. As was the case for rice, almost all processing is done by
adult women in the family.
In the case of wheat, though, less of the cultivation work is done by women.
Only nine labour days were spent in the cultivation of wheat by adult women
in the sample. This fits generally with the thesis surrounding men's and
women's roles in plough and hoe agriculture (Goody: 1973; Boserup: 1980),
wheat being a more plough-intensive crop than rice. However, a substantial
amount of the labour hired to perform harvesting is female. These women do
not however belong to the villages, nor did many women from the village
perform harvesting operations for pay during the year under study.
Labour Use In Sugar Cane




Overall Pattern of Labour Use in Sugar Cane,
in Labour Days by Village and Soil Type
Type and Village and Soil Type
Use of DHAEMNAGRI JHAKRI
Labour KHADER BANGAR BANGAR ONLY














Adult Female 184 1.0 - - - - 184 0.3
Child Male 294 1.6 - - 775 2.7 1069 1.9
Child Female 81 0.5 - - 47 0.2 128 0.2
HIRED 899 5.0 435 4.3 597 2.1 1931 3.4
TOTAL 2222 12.3 478 4.7 2323 8.1 5023 8.8
PROCESSING: Note that, since the cane crop is sold in its raw
state, no processing labour is countable.
Source: Key Informants 1982-83 Sugarcane Season.
The table shows that khader farming is more labour intensive than the bangar,
lower returns not withstanding. Only one sample household in Dharmnagri - the
Rajputs - grew cane on the bangar and they own a tractor. This accounts for
the relatively small amount of labour which they used. All of their
preparation was done by tractor, and they used no child labour.
Comparing Dharmnagri khader with Jhakri bangar there do seem to be
differences in the amount of child labour used. In the khader, the labour of
children accounts for about 17% of total labour. Once again, most of this,
about 13%, is performed by sons. On the bangar, children account fo 35% of
all labour days, 33% of which is performed by sons. Dharmnagri daughters and
their mothers also perform more labour than their Jhakri counterparts. Jhakri
women are not involved in the cultivation of sugar cane at all. Dharmnagri
farmers use more hired labour than those in Jhakri. Over the whole sample,
informants use about twice as much hired labour as they do the labour of
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their children.
Still, in all, 1197 child labour days were invested in the sugar cane crop.
While this may be regarded as a substantial amount, the distribution of
working children through the sample bears some analysis. Of the total child
labour days used by the sample in sugar cane, 981, about 82%, came from 8
households. These 8 households are all type 1 or type 2 households. That is
they are households at the more joint end of the scale. Furthermore, all
eight had landholding patterns which are characterised by the fact that the
eldest male still holds the land in his own name and his sons farm it
jointly. In short, these are grown children, sometimes with young children of
their own, who still produce jointly with their parents, working what is
usually land held in their father's name. I shall return to this aspect of
child labour when class is introduced into the analysis.
The more general pattern is one where small amounts of child labour are used,
but these are a very small proportion of total labour used. For example, four
of the 8 households mentioned above are Dharmnagri households. Among them
they account for 75% of all child labour used by sample households in
Dharmnagri. In Jhakri, the four remaining households from the 8 above account
for 86% of all child labour used by sample households in Jhakri.
Labour Use Over the Whole Year-
There is one major aspect of economic activity which I have not considered
yet; the amount of work, outside of the three major crops already covered,
which members of sample households perform for some form of remuneration
whether direct or indirect. The variety of work in which sample household
members are involved is very wide indeed but can be roughly divided into four
types. The first type is crops other than the major ones outlined above.
These are included in the table below under other. They are a relatively
small source of income. The second type is wage labour. In this category,
informants are involved in many activities from casual day labour through to
seasonal work in the building of the barrage.
The third type is much more lucrative and involves the ownership of some form
of productive property which is rented, usually with the owners attendant
labour. Such activities include the hiring of a tractor for ploughing or
threshing wheat for other villagers and the sale of water for irrigation from
a tubewell. The fourth type of labour is that associated with animal
127
husbandry. These four types of work, as one would expect, given the basis of
their definitions, divide the sample into its poorer and richer halves. The
table below summarises the information contained in the tables above and also
includes labour expended on these other tasks.
Table 4:
Overall Pattern of Labour Use, in Labour Days
by Labour Type and Task
Labour Type
ADULT ADULT CHILD CHILD %AGE
TASK FAMILY FAMILY FAMILY FAMILY OF ALL
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE HIRED TOTAL LABOUR
RICE 792 433 312 36 1238 2811 16
WHEAT 751 107 375 77 889 2199 12
SUGAR
CANE
1711 184 1069 128 1931 5023 28
OTHER
CROPS
95 - - - - 95 0.5
CATTLE 1355 1375 131 95 - 2956 16.5
LABOUR
OUT 1950 938 1282 730 - 4900 27
TOTAL 6654 3037 3169 1066 4058 17984 100
% OF
TOTAL
LABOUR 37 17 18 6 22 100
DAYS
Source: Key Informants 1982-83 Agricultural Cycle.
Over the whole year, then, the labour of children accounts for about a
quarter of all labour performed by the sample. 18% of this is performed by
sons and only 6% by daughters. The total for children is almost matched by
that for hired labour.
Women perform 18% of all labour and make a very substantial contribution to
animal husbandry. The table also suggests that women and children perform a
substantial amount of wage labour. However almost all of this is accounted
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for by the husbanding of animals whose milk is for sale. I have included them
in the labour totals to highlight the fact that this milk is for sale and not
for home consumption. It represents a major proportion of the income of two
landless households in Jhakri, where the women and children are engaged full
time in milk production. The two women Wasila and Zubeida, are responsible
for the organisation of this production, while their husbands, Wajid and
Zakir, are more involved in the running of a sugar cane crusher during the
cane season and more casual day labour during the off season.
It should be remembered that children have been defined as offspring of any
age contributing to family production. So far I have given no indication of
the ages of these children. Are they young unmarried children, or sons who
stay in their parents households after marriage? Are the contributions of
children evenly or unevenly distributed across class categories? These
questions and others are highlighted by the table below which examines the
use of the various kinds of labour by class and household type.
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Table 5:
Labour Days per Capita per Year and Net Annual Income in Rupees
by Class and Household Type
C L A S S AN D LA B 0 U R TYPE
ADULT ADULT CHILD CHILD
FAMILY FAMILY FAMILY FAMILY ALL TOTAL INCOME PI
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE HIRED INCOME CAPITA
TD-i THPPG ——Days Illl^/CCo
FAMILY
TYPE CLASS II
TYPE 1 88.5 47.5 143 0 25 19784 1521
TYPE 2 97 34 108 0 16 15586 1199
TYPE 3 - - - - - - -
TYPE 4 115.5 46.5 0 0 61 96738 6449
TOTAL 132108 3222
CLASS III
TYPE 1 55 27.5 151 1 12 3318 332
TYPE 2 131 27 93 0 28 75621 1177
TYPE 3 126 47 4.5 10 10 115939 1449
TYPE 4 274 95 66 0 3 11973 544
TOTAL 206851 1293
CLASS IV
TYPE 1 - - - - - - -
TYPE 2 84 52.5 25 25.5 22.5 3606 601
TYPE 3 - - - - - - -
TYPE 4 224 58 4 1 23 9314 665
TOTAL 12920 538
CLASS V
TYPE 1 - - - - - - -
TYPE 2 - - - - - - -
TYPE 3 - - - - - - -
TYPE 4 142 172 125 83 2 15786 493
TOTAL 15786 493
Source: Key Informants 1982-83 Agricultural Cycle
The table bears out the argument made above in relation to adult sons
remaining in joint production and consumption with their fathers. Type 1, the
most extended type of household in the sample, becomes less prevalent as we
move down through land ownership from richest to poorest. This relationship
is also true for the whole structure of kinship in the study villages, by the
time we reach the poorest in the sample}there all households are nuclear.
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Comparing incomes per capita down through the table, we can also see that
there is a rough positive association between class and income per capita.
This relationship breaks down somewhat in class 3.The discontinuity can be
explained by the fact the type three household in that group smuggled trees
and wood as an occupation. Not surprisingly, this is more lucrative than
farming, but I was unable to make an accurate assesment of the costs
involved. The type two household in that category owns a tractor and is able
to make a sizeable amount of money from its operation. The tractor and
thresher owned by the family in part accounts for the degree of jointness
which that household still participates in.
In no case does labour seem to be a limiting physical factor in production.
The maximum number of days worked by any category in the table is 172 in the
year. This is the average of women in the poorest households. Sons make the
greatest contribution in the most joint households. In all of these
households, the labour of sons is generally that of grown children who remain
in joint production with their fathers after their own marriages.
These figures highlight the fact that the term children itself is not an
absolute term. Most of the child labour hours taken up by these four Jhakri
households are from grown men who still have not inherited land from their
father. As Cain correctly points out (1979, 1983), we must take a long term
view when defining children for the purpose of calculating their worth to
their parents. Cain's data (1977) indicate that young Bangladeshi men are
doing a full days work for their parents by the time they are 18 years old.
That 18 year old men in Dharmnagri and Jhakri do a full days work would also
seem to be true. What seems to be different is that by and large they do the
work for them selves and not for their parents. Joint work across the
generations is a feature of local economic life which does not seem to last
very far beyond adolescence unless the head of household can persuade his
sons to stay, by holding on to the family property for as long as possible.
All eight of the households mentioned above have this feature in common - a
head of household with clear exclusive rights to the productive property by
which the family earns its living.
The argument here then is the same as those made for for wheat and rice
earlier and similar to that made by Cain (1982): young children do relatively
little labour for their parents, it is only when they are nearly full grown
that sons become economically useful to their parents. In most cases, they
are out of the parental home a few years after that, except where title to
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their share of family property may depend on their staying. In other words
richer households benefit more from the labour of their sons than poorer ones
since they can entice them to remain joint by the promise of inhertitance. In
landless households (class V) less systematic data would suggest that parents
are as likely to be living apart from their sons as with them. In either case
retirement for the parental generation in this category is unlikely. Where
parents live in a separate chula from their sons the degree of support they
are likely to receive is less than if they lived jointly.
Within class categories there seems to be no direct relationship between
income and family type. The reason for this is the distribution of resources
within these groups. For example the class II type 4 households are the
Rajputs Bhagwana and Ashok. They have by far the greatest amount of land
among the sample as well as a tractor, tubewells and two permanent labourers.
They also have a substantial number of young children, yet they have the
greatest per capita income. This is because of the resources which they own
and highlights the fact that it is productive resources rather than children
per se which determine a household's ability to generate income. In terms of
Chayanov's categorisation we would expect this household to be not as well
off as its other class II counterparts. This is not the case and would seem
to suggest that differences in wealth are more important in differentiating
between households than stage in the life cycle on its own. Further proof of
this can be found in class V. All the households here are nuclear and the
children in them under the age of thirteen years. Most of their labour is
tending milk animals with the milk being for sale. In spite of the
application of child labour, the income of this group is the lowest in the
sample.
Conclusions
At the end of this chapter, what conclusions can be drawn in relation to the
contribution of children as labour to the household? The data presented above
suggest that Mamdani is wrong to suggest that sons and daughters contribute
equally to household economy. Among sample households, daughters contribute
little while the contribution of sons varies positively with class. It is of
course possible that a difference in the economic environment between Bijnor
and the Punjab could be the explanation for this. I feel however, that this
is highly unlikely. Many of the changes which Mamdani outlines as responsible
for the increase in the value of child labour in the Punjab also have taken
place in Bijnor, but these have not led to a substantial economic
contribution by daughters. Indeed, it is difficult to see how, in a system of
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marriage which normally requires daughters to move out of their parental home
on marriage could allow this.
Neither is Mamdani correct in suggesting that children contribute equally
across all classes. The data presented above show that richer households use
more child labour than poorer households. At least part of the explanation
for this is that richer households remain more extended for longer periods to
take advantage of household labour. The table below highlights this point.
It shows the percentage contribution of children to total labour days
according to how one defines children. The first definition is that used
throughout this chapter - a biological and social definition - regardless of
age. The second definition is based on age - children viewed as people less
than eighteen years of age. The table refers only to sons. Since daughters
are married and out of the parental household by age eighteen, this change in
definition makes no difference to their percentage contribution.
Table 6:
Percentage Contribution of Sons to Total Labour Days by
Definition of Son and Class
DEFINITION PERCENTAGE OF LABOUR DAYS BY SONS
OF SON CLASS
II III IV V Total
Offspring
of Any Age 26 18 45 18
Aged Less
Than 18yrs. 0.5 8 4 5 7
Source: Key Informants 1982-83 Agricultural Cycle.
The main point of the table is that most of the child labour in classes II
and III is that performed by sons who are aged eighteen and over, adults who
remain in joint production with their parents. There is no difference in the
percentage contribution of sons in classes IV and V according to age. The
sons in these households are all aged less than eighteen.
This I feel is an interesting conclusion in the light of those studies
outlined at the begining of the chapter suggesting that children were of
benefit to their parents in the long run. The data here suggest that while
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this is true for richer households, it may not be the case for the poorest
households. The poorest households are those which benefit the most from
child labour in the short run. For example Wajid, the landless Sheikh's
children, make a substantial contribution through tending milk animals. Wajid
expects that when his sons are married, they will set up house seperately and
work for themselves. This probably means that their contribution to their
parental household will be minimal. It is not possible to say with any
certainty whether they will provide some sort of security for Wajid in his
old age, but their expected, seperate residence and economic interest,
together with lack of resources, perhaps makes this less likely.
For the present at least it appears that richer parents can expect more long
term support from their sons, while poorer parents seem to be benefiting from
their children now. A reasonable proposition here would be to take up the
middle ground between Leibenstein (1977), who suggests children are important
forms of security and Vlassof and Vlassof (1980) who suggest that they are
not and conclude that a combination of wealth and one or two sons would
provide a fair measure of security for parents.
There is no evidence from the sample that education and/or migration with
remittances is a strategy among sample households. None of the income or the
labour described above is generated in this way. If permanent employment
outside the village could be assured, this probably would be a more common
strategy. One of the most well off men in Jhakri for example has a seasonal
job in the cane society which he was able to gain by being literate when few
around him were. Three young men from the villages are under taking commerce
courses in Bijnor, but are unsure about the future. Jobs are very scarce
indeed and only the most sanguine entreprenuer would follow this as a major
strategy.
In relation to the mode of production debate, the data suggest that the
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity does not exist among
the sample. Those with the greatest access to land and productive resources
are those with the greatest per capita incomes. We also saw in the previous
chapter that, for single crops and across the year as a whole, larger farmers
had the best returns per bigha. This is not of course a rigorous test of the
Lipton's propositon, but it does suggest that the argument relating small
farm size with greater productivity does not apply here. Harriss (1982a) may
be correct in advocating co-operative farming, enjoying economies of scale,
with redistributive effects in consumption.
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The data presented here give some indication of the work which children
undertake. It tells us nothing about whether key informants decided to have
children so that they could do this work. Fertility intentions and decision
making occur within the household and in the next chapter I wish to describe
and analyse the context within which the household is situated and of which
it forms a part.
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Chapter 7: The Structure of Kinship and Marriage
"The household is not a collectivity of mutually reciprocal
interests."
(Whi^head 1981, pi 10)
"Although the women's movement has focused attention on wife abuse,
sexual dual standards, the invisibility of housework and the
experience of financial dependency, the stress is still on the
unit/the unity of the couple".
(Leonard and Delphy: 1984; p.xii)
In this chapter I take a closer look at the structure of kinship and marriage
in the base villages. Understanding kinship and its implications for the
people involved is essential to an understanding of the dynamics of
fertility. The focus of attention shall be upon post-marriage residence
patterns and their relationship to fertility.
I will firstly review some literature which allows a framework for the effect
of kinship structures upon women and upon fertility to be understood. After
indicating the main sources of data, I will outline how marriage and kinship
structures affect men and women, through an examination of post-marital
residence patterns, as a key to understanding the relative positions of men
and women in the study villages. Finally, possible effects of these patterns
on fertility are examined.
It ought to be made clear at this point, that this type of approach
fundamentally undermines that of the "new home economics" school. The
economic theory of fertility does not allow us to examine female autonomy
very easily. This is because, for most purposes, the household, with a common
budget and pooled resources is assumed to be the basic unit of analysis in
which conflicts of interest do not manifest themselves. The economic theory
takes no account of the structure of kinship and marriage or the wider
economy and society in which the former are embedded and how this affects the
relative power of individual members of household.
The impetus for the focus on female autonomy here comes from the work of
feminist writers, who in their efforts to explain the position of women in
society have concentrated on that of women in the household and how this is
related to the wider economy and society (Barker and Allen: 1976, 1978; Young
et al: 1981). Earlier works characterised by a socialist as well as a
feminist approach tended to stress commonalities among women and gave a
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central place to the understanding of conflicts of interest among men and
women, particularly under capitalisim and capitalist development (Millet:
1971; Oakley: 1972; Boserup: 1971). Key concepts at that early stage in the
development of the argument about the position of women were the "public
sphere": instrumental, wage earning and largely inhabited by men; and the
"private sphere": caring, reproductive and largely inhabited by women. A key
text, moving the conceptualisation of the role of women away from these
mechanistic categories is Seccombe (1974), who argued that the household
cannot be viewed as private and distinct from the public sphere because the
contribution of women's reproductive work both affects and is affected by the
wider economy.
This idea has been taken a stage further by Whitehead (1981). She argues that
the household embodies social relations of exchange between its members.
These social relations require to be the subject of investigation and not
assumption as in classical economic theory. Whitehead summarises these
relationships in her notion of 'the conjugal contract', defined as:
"the terms on which husbands and wives exchange goods,
incomes and services including labour within the
household"
(Whitehead: 1981; p88)
Around the the same time scholars of women's position realised that the
socialist transformation of society did not necessarily of itself improve the
position of women and began to analyse other factors, in addition to class,
to help explain the position of women (Croll: 1981). These other factors
cluster around women's roles as reproducers. Following Edholm, Harris and
Young (1978), reproduction is not only understood to mean biological
reproduction, but also the reproduction of the labour force and the social
system of which such relations form a part. Thus while the term includes
chilbearing, it also includes the many tasks associated with the raising of
children into adults, capable of making a contribution to social, economic
and cultural life.
The central idea that conflicts of interest between men and women are
essential to an understanding of the gendered nature of society, while still
accorded great importance has now given way to analysis of those aspects of
social structure which divide women (Caplan and Bujra: 1978; Beneria: 1982;
Whitehead: 1984). The emphasis has shifted from attempts to explain the
position of women in general to explaining the position and experience of
particular women. Class position still plays an important part in this
analysis but other factors held to be equally important are the structure of
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the household, age and personal biography.
Whitehead (1984), for example, has argued that because they are differently
situated in relation to those variables which affect their life chances,
"women cannot and do not form a homogenous group." (1984: plO). She argues
that women who have direct access to economic resources and are surrounded by
other women in similar positions to themselves have greater autonomy and vice
versa.
A similar approach has recently been adopted with specific relation to
fertility. Todaro and Fapohunda (1987) in an examination of South Nigerian
data suggest that three forms of implicit contract within the family: that
between children and parents; that between spouses and the extended family;
and that between spouses; will have a bearing on fertility intentions. They
suggest that among other factors, the relative access of each marriage
partner to scarce economic resources, the relative value placed upon goods
and services which each partner produces, the relative ease with which
alternative sources for these can be found by either partner, socialised
expectation and normative sanctions surrounding marriage roles and the extent
of conjugal caring are important in determining the relative power of
partners in decision making processes, including those surrounding fertility.
Female autonomy is a subject of crucial significance to women themselves,
since it affects their ability to influence matters which directly concern
them. Beyond this some demographers have suggested that female autonomy is a
good predictor of changes in fertility and child mortality. Dyson and Moore
(1983), for example, have suggested that in North India where female autonomy
is low the "demographic regime" consists of high fertility and mortality.
Conversely, in South India where autonomy is relatively somewhat higher
fertility and child mortality are lower.
In terms of these indicators, women in the study villages have low autonomy.
As Chapter Two showed, fertility and mortality rates are high and there is an
adverse sex ratio for females. Chapter Three showed that women's access to
land is extremely limited, while Chapter 6 showed that women in Dharmnagri
and Jhakri do not, by and large work for wages. Literacy rates for women are
low - 10%, as is the age at marriage. The pervasive nature of these factors
affecting women's autonomy in the study village does not allow them to be
used to differentiate among women in relation to autonomy and fertility. I do
not intend to pursue them in any depth in this chapter. Dyson and Moore
attempt to add a further dimension to this understanding by consideration of
138
marriage distance - the distance a woman moves from her natal home on
marriage - as an indicator of autonomy and the main argument below will
examine this more closely.
Sources of Data
The sources of data used in this chapter are threefold. The first source of
data are the responses of women sampled by the Social Organisation of
Childbearing Project to a set of questions regarding their own social
networks. As well as information on the structure of their marital household,
the women were also asked about the geographical distance between their
marital and natal villages, the frequency of visits to the latter and their
experience of the differences between the two.
The second set of data is a similar set of questions asked by me of their
husbands, that is the men in my own sample. Specific use is made of
information about the timing, circumstances and frequency of visits made by
these men to their sasural (ie their wife's natal home). I also asked men
what the advantages and disadvantages of different marriage distances are and
their own experience of these.
The third source of data is somewhat less systematic in that it consists of
more or less opportunistic discussions with men about present levels of dowry
and how levels of dowry have changed over the past twenty years or so.
Sometimes these discussions took place during wedding festivities themselves
when the dowry provided was put on display for all to see. More usually
however, conversation about dowry was instigated by me in the general course
of conversation.
The Structure of Marriage and Kinship - General Norms.
The general pattern of marriage and kinship in North India is well
documented, and the study villages fit generally with what has become known
as the "Northern Pattern" (Dyson and Moore: 1983) where the rules of marriage
are broadly those of patrilocal marriage for women within a system of
patrilineal descent. However, the extent of adherence to this pattern should
not be overdrawn, since the rules vary for Hindus and Muslims. Therefore, in
this section I shall outline Hindu "norms" Muslim "norms" before going on to
discuss in the next section how these rules are played out in Dharmnagri and
Jhakri. It is not my intention to be exhaustive here, but merely to give a
thumbnail sketch of "norms" so that we may better understand their practice
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in the study villages and set the ensuing discussion of marriage distance in
context.
Hindu Norms: For Hindus, the normal form of marriage is arranged marriage
with patrilocal residence and patrilineal descent. Marriages are caste
endogamous, but four-gotra exogamous (that is a person may not marry any of
the offspring of four grandparents). Village exogamy also operates among
Hindus and according to Dumont (1986) and Hershman (1981) is charactersied by
non-reciprocity. In short this means that a caste may not take brides from
villages into which they have already married brides. This arises out of the
inferiority of bride-givers to bride-takers.
The act of giving a bride is characterised by the gift of a virgin or kanya
dan. In this respect, brides are accompanied by a dowry, and kanya dan may
also be associated with the seclusion of women, the segregation of the sexes
and the practice of purdah.
Muslim Norms: For Muslims, the normal form of marriage is also patrilocal
with patrilineal descent, caste endogamy and kanya dan and the associated
purdah practices. There are, however, two major differences. The first is
that marriages are allowed between sets of first cousins and the second is
that village endogamous marriage is allowed.
These are the barest skeletons upon which marriage practices in the study
villages are founded. To breathe life and diversity into these abstractions,
let us take a look at the organisation of kinship in the study villages.
The Structure of Marriage and Kinship in Dharmnagri and Jhakri.
Kanya dan - The gift of a Virgin: Marriage is characterised for the bride's
family by kanya dan. Ideologically, this is seen as an act of religious merit
and part of life-cycle duty for both men and women. Materially, it would be
very difficult to marry a daughter conventionally under prevailing
circumstances in Bijnor, were it widely known or believed that her virginity
was not intact. Consequently, from before the onset of puberty, daughters are
taught to be modest in their habits and as they approach puberty, and the age
at which their marriage negotiations will begin, they become more secluded
and adopt some of the outward signs of purdah. It is not unusual to see
eleven year old girls withdraw from play with their younger siblings and
start to wear a shawl which covers their hair and the upper part of their
body.
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The notion of kanya dan is a wide ranging one and is not only related to
sexual experience. Essentially it means that a girl's parents must not be
seen to derive any material gain from their daughter either before or after
her marriage. Ishwar, a Hindu of Sahni caste, told me for instance that he
would not eat bread if his daughter cooked it since he would consider this an
infringement of his daughter's virginity. Suleiman, a Muslim Sheikh said that
he did not allow his eight-year-old daughter to milk family cows as the milk
was produced for sale and if his daughter milked the cows, he would be living
from her earnings. Sunil a young Dhimar told me that once, his wife Santosh,
had been working in the fields during a visit home to see her parents. He
himself went and discovered that this was true and had berated his father-in-
law for living off the earnings of his daughter.
Further, the definition of kanya dan is likely to vary according to class and
ethnic group. Some of the poorer Sahni and Chamar households either used
their unmarried daughters to labour in their own fields, or sent them out to
perform wage labour. Among the Muslims, the proscription on outside work
seems to be more strict than among any of the Hindu castes except possibly
the highest. Even so, one or two Muslim households used the labour of girls
to help with the sugar cane planting.
Daughters are not taught the same skills as their brothers, but those which
are deemed to be suitable to their role as a wife and mother. At the same
time as her brother is learning to sow, plough, plant reap and cultivate, she
will be taught to sew, cook,clean, milk animals, make ooplay, and be given
some responsibilty for childcare. A girl is likely to be taken out of school
before her brother if she ever entered it in the first place. Female literacy
rates in the village are very low at ten per cent.
Dowry: I have already suggested in Chapter Three that dowry should not be
seen as a form of productive property. Productive property in the study
villages generally passes from father to sons in equal amounts. Yet for
almost all people, dowry plays an important part in the conclusion of a
successful marriage and for villagers is an integral part of kanya dan
Dowry has existed in this part of India for a very long time. There is,
however, evidence from the study villages to suggest that the amount and
variety of goods which is expected to be given with a daughter has
increased dramatically over the past twenty years or so. Older men and women
remembered a time when dowry consisted of a small number of suits for the
141
bride, a few pots and pans and a spade.
The items now considered by village men to be an essential part of any dowry
make for a lengthy and expensive shopping list. It is usual for the dowries
of wealthier Hindu and Muslim brides to contain up to 51 suits of clothes, as
many brass plates, a bed, quilts, a mattress, a radio, a watch, a bicycle,
and perhaps electrical items like a table fan as well as a gift to the Temple
or Mosque. These categories of items are the same for the dowries of the
poorest brides, the difference being in the quality and quantity of items
given. Among the Hindus a cash sum is also given.
The groom's family must also spend money. Usually this means buying some
jewellery and perhaps some clothes for the new bride to wear. In addition
both families will have to spend a considerable amount in feasting their
neighbours. Among the Muslims, this usually means feasting the whole village.
Among the Hidnus, usually all caste-members resident in the village. For the
wealthy, the marriage of a son or daughter probably costs in the region of
Rs20,000. Even for the poorest, the cost is likely to be reckoned in
thousands rather than hundreds of rupees. As reported by Sharma (1980) a
wedding is likely to cost about a year's income.
Why has this increase taken place? The first and perhaps most surprising
point to note is that the increase in dowry is not associated with any change
in women's work, leading to a perception of its greater or lesser value.
Unlike the Punjab (Sen: 1982) there seem to have been no changes in the work
which women do, for example to make them greater or lesser wage earners than
before. Women's work in the study villages is that which is documented as
giving women low autonomy and status - non-wage work related to women's roles
in reproduction, with no control over productive resources (Sen: 1982;
Whitehead: 1984; Sharma: 1980; Harriss: 1981;). I spoke with several men
about this possibility, and their answers while not informative in an
objective sense are heuristic. Yasin sums up the collective attitude of men
to the idea that women's work is more valuable these days:
"Women have always been useless"(sic)
The most common explanation for the increase in dowry was that the surplus
from agriculture had gone up and that some of this was being spent on
increased dowry to ensure a wealthier match for daughters. It would seem that
the earlier Hindu pattern of substantial dowry among the highest castes
became a possiblity for many for the first time.
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Mahipal, a Hindu of the Sahni caste maintains that he was the second man in
the village to receive a watch, a cycle and a radio in his dowry. The first
man to receive these items was the eldest son of Bharat Singh, a wealthy
Sahni landowner. He was married in 1965, about two years after the
introduction of new technology associated with the "green revolution" was
introdued to Uttar Pradesh in the Intensive Agricultural Development
Programme (Frankel: 1981).
The increase in dowry then seems not to be associated with any elevation or
decline in the status of women in the study villages. However, concentrating
on levels of dowry does not give the complete picture. Control over dowry is
also important. I have already shown in chapter three that control over a
woman's jewellery is more likely to be in the hands of her marital kin than
her^self. A woman herself has relatively little control over the disposal of
her dowry. In practice if not in principle, a woman's dowry belongs to her
affinal kin and not to her or her agnates. She is more likely to have control
over the dowries of her own daughters-in-law later in her life cycle than she
is to have control over her own.
Post-Marriage Residence Patterns and Fertility
The rest of this chapter concentrates on post-marriage residence patterns
among village women and their possible relationships to fertility.
Patrilocality: The post marriage residence pattern in Dharmnagri and Jhakri
is patrilocal. But is it simplistic to assume that patrilocal means the same
thing for all women in this study? Women from different ethnic groups and
classes were married at different distances from their natal villages. Do
they varying distances have any bearing on the autonomy of women and
consequently upon levels of fertility?
In this respect Dyson and Moore (1983) have argued that marriage distance,
defined as the distance between a woman's natal and marital villages is a
good guide to autonomy, if it is used as a proxy for kinship structures. The
main thrust of Dyson and Mooore's paper is to associate different kinship
structures, through differential female autonomy to the different demographic
regimes of north and south India. In the south, shorter distances allow a
woman to maintain more substantial contacts with her natal kin than in the
north. This is associated with lower fertility and lower child mortality in
143
the south than the north where marriage distances are further.
By conventional indicators of autonomy - property inheritance, level of
education, extent of wage labour, the existence of purdah and dowry have low
autonomy. What can an analysis of marriage distance add to this
understanding?
Table 1 below outlines the pattern of marriage distance in the base villages
and among the sample. The distances used in the table were selected to be
socially significant. If the effect of marriage distance is through contact
with natal kin, then the ease with which a woman can make visits is of
importance. Women, during the course of fieldwork were asked for the name of
their natal village. This was then located on a map. In the tabulation,
distances under 5 kms. suggest that a woman can make the round trip on foot
in a day, whereas distances over lOkms would require transport. The distances
are not quite as clear cut as this explanation might suggest. The distance a
woman can walk in a day might be affected by the season or the number of
small children she might have to take with her. For longer distances, the









5kms. 5-9kms. 10+kms. N
PERCENTAGES
All All All All
Women Sample Women Sample Women Sample Women Smple
MUSLIM
Landed 47 100 25 0 28 0 (61) (14)
Landless 6 0 6 0 88 100 (16) ( 4)
HINDU
Landed 6 0 6 0 88 100 (107) (17)
Landless 30 0 0 0 70 100 (58) ( 2)
Number of
Women (44) (14) (23) (0) (175) (22) (242)1 (37)
Source: Village Census 1982.
The overall pattern suggested is that women in landed Muslim households
generally marry closer than poorer Muslims. Hindus including Harijans
generally marry more distantly than Muslims, though there is a tendency for
landless Hindus to marry closer than their landed counterparts. Thus we might
expect, using Dyson and Moore's formulation, that landed Muslim women and
landless Hindu women have more autonomy than other groups.
Among the sample the pattern is more clear cut, though of course the numbers
are smaller. All landed Muslims in the sample marry close while landless
Muslims marry further away. For the Hindu sample the pattern is more clearly
one of further marriage for all groups. An idea of what men and women in the
sample think of their own marriage distance can be gained by looking at their
responses to the networks questions. The opinions of men and women on
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marriage distance and their experience of it take us beyond spatial distance
and into social distance.
Preferred Distance
This section outlines the distances which men and then women prefer between
their natal and marital villages.
Men: Both Hindu and Muslim men, suggested that it was not good for their
wife's natal village (ie the man's sasural) to be too far away. They
suggested that if this were so it would be expensive for them to go there as
so they would not be able to go often. Almost all men suggested that if your
sasural was too far away then news of any illness, death or happy event
(dukh-dukh) would not be able to reach you easily and this was not good.
Jabruddin, a Sheikh informant put it like this:
"...if there is a death in some woman's natal home in
Islampur Das [a village about 2kms. from Jhakri] then no
matter what time of night it was someone would come and
ask the woman to go home. If it was in Muzaffanagr [the
neighbouring district] then they sent someone to tell
you. The people in the woman's natal home would also be
worried and would be looking down the road to see if she
was coming as well as looking after a very sick person."
This for men, however, is not the only consideration. It must be balanced
against the possibility that a woman's parents will hear of "every little
worry" which their daughter has in her sasural. This could lead to fights and
disagreemnts between families and be a cause of concern to a girl's parents,
who should not interfere in domestic disputes in their daughter's sasural.
Sunil, a Dhimar whose sasural was about 20kms from Dharmnagri said:
"...the disadvantage of living near to your sasural is
that you would probably get into some kind of trouble
with your wife's parents. They would get to hear of
every little thing and if they thought that anything
untoward was happening then they would be over
immediately for a fight"
I asked what he meant by anything untoward.
"....if the girl was having worries like being beaten
or ill and not being well treated."
Men also suggested that women could ask to go home for any little thing if
their natal village was close by, whereas if it were further away they were
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less likely to do this. Frequent visiting and the possibilty of trouble with
in-laws were for some men connected. Vikram, a landless Harijan expressed
this view.
"It is better to be married far away from your sasural
than nearer it. If you are close to it you could fetch
and send news quickly. This is good, if someone is sick
or there is a happy event. This is outweighed by the
fact that if your sasural was too close and your
children went off there everyday by themselves or your
wife went every second day, then her parents would hear
everything. They would complain that she was never away
from their house and the relationship would go bad. It
is useless to get married too close".
For both Hindu and Muslim men then the prefered distance is one which is
close enough to have news travel quickly, but far enough away to maintain day
to day living separate from interference from their wives' agnatic kin. This
would suggest that for men it is important that their wives contacts with
natal kin is kept at a controllable level so that she may effectively be kept
under the tutelage of her affinal kin.
Women: Surprisingly, in the light of Dyson and Moore's analysis, sample women
also prefer to have some distance between their natal and marital villages.
Their reasons for this tend to be that firstly if their parents are too close
to their sasural, they will get to hear more of her everyday existence and
where this is difficult, it will cause them concern. It will also put her
parents in a difficult position since they are not expected to interfere in
the affairs of their daughter after she is married and living in her sasural.
One Muslim woman put it like this:
"There is no benefit in it [a close marriage]. There is
more fighting and when my mother and father hear about
it their hearts become soured too because they worry
about every fight after hearing about it."
The other reason which women gave highlights the way in which women's various
roles are fragmentary and cause friction and difficulty for them. This
relates to the sexual nature of the role of wife and mother, exemplified by
childbirth, and the asexual nature of her role as sister and daughter. Almost
all women maintained that they should not in normal circumstances be in the
presence of their parents when pregnant or giving birth, as this was a
matter of great shame. Viramvati, the wife of a landless Jatab said:
"I would not like to visit my parents when I am
pregnant I would feel far too much shame in front of my
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father."
This view seems much less widely held among the Muslims, who are perhaps more
used to the idea because of the possibility of village endogamy. Overall
though women would rather not confront their parents with their pregnancy if
possible. Among women as well as men then there is a preference for some
distance between natal and marital villages.
These preferences by men and women for some distance between marital and
natal villages are well highlighted by two situations in which, by contrast
to prevailing patrilocal patterns women live in their natal villages after
marriage. The first of these is gaon-ki-gaon marriage (village endogamy) and
the second that of the ghar-jemai (living-in son-in-law).
Gaon-ki-Gaon Marriage: Marriage within the village is only relevant for
Muslims and while there are very few of these marriages they give some
insight into informants' views of appropriate contact between marital and
natal kin. As we have seen above, both women and men saw some advantages in
close marriages but Muslim men and women alike were largely opposed to the
idea of gaon-ki-gaon marriage. Women were opposed because they could not
retreat to their parents' house for a visit without the possibility of being
called back by their affines. They also found it difficult to maintain the
distinction between their male natal kin and male affines in avoidance
behaviour. For example, when pregnant she cannot conceal her condition from
her agnates. In addition her parents will be affected by news of any
difficulties she may have in her affinal home, which marriage at some
distance would protect against. Marriage at no distance then carries more
problems than benefits for women.
For men the problems are seen from a different angle. The distress of their
wife's parents is seen as a potential threat to their control over a wife
while she is in her sasural. Secondly, their wife's closeness to her natal
home may mean that she wants to go there more often than she would if
masrried at some distance. Thirdly, as wife-takers, they are entitled when
they visit their wife's sasural to special treatment. All male informants
suggested that if you were married too close to your wife's natal home then
the novelty value of your visits and the quality of the treatment you would
therefore receive would decline more rapidly for a near marriage than a more
distant one. This is especially the case if your wife comes from the same
village. For example I was asking Jabruddin about his networks. We were
joined on the bhaitak (male sitting room) by Ismail whose wife is from
Jabruddin's haveli. When I asked about the difference between gaon-ki-gaon
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and other marriages he answered like this:
"Look at Ismail! He is now sitting at his sasural. He
is wearing his old shirt and dhoti. He has been sitting
here since nine o'clock this morning and no-one thought
anything of it...he has not even been given a cup of
tea. He comes more or less everyday and it is nothing
special or different"
Ghar-Jemai: Both men and women think that the situation where a man goes and
lives in his wife's natal village is not desirable. Men considered this to be
a weak position to be avoided at almost all costs since it would leave them
open to the criticism of living from his wife's family. Ghar-Jemais are often
the butt of jokes and ridicule because of this. One informant, Mahipal had
gone with his wife to work on her father's land since she was an only
surviving child and they were short of labour. He had come back after three
years, saying this about his experience.
"I came back after three years because people do not
like it when a man stays at his sasural. People swore
at me all the time calling me sala and bahinchut. You
can never get away from this if you live where your wife
was born. People fight with you at the least
opportunity. It takes all your honour away."
The words used to curse Mahipal, sala and bahinchut have particular
significance in this context. The literal translation of sala is wife's
brother, but carries the connotation of "sleeping with" his sister,
undermining his ability to protect her honour. The literal translation of
bahinchut is "sisterfucker" which carries implications of incest.
These findings are not what one might expect if Dyson and Moore's argument
were to be accepted in its entirety. That some distance is preferable to no
distance suggests that the distinction between marital and natal villages is
important for both men and women and we shall return to this below. In the
meantime it is plausible to argue that the frequency and ease with which
visits can be paid to a woman's natal village (her mainka) has some bearing
on her autonomy. It is necessary to assume here that this type of contact is
desirable for women and that they would pay as many visits as possible to
their natal villages. This point of view is borne out by the opinions of
informants. Women distinguish between their natal village where they are
surrounded by those who love them, have no responsibilities and can therefore
rest, and their sasural where they must do their affines bidding and have the
responsibility for the work of the household. What then affects the frequency
of such visits by men and women and what does this tell us about their
relative positions?
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Factors Affecting Visiting Patterns
The following factors affect the frequency and timing of visits by both men
and women to a woman's natal village: distance, and the economic position of
the household. In addition to these common factors a woman's ability to
maintain contact with her natal kin is affected by their inability to visit
her, the demographic compositon of her household, her requirement to be
granted permission to go by her affines and the availability of a suitable
male chaperone to take her. I shall deal with each of these in turn below.
Factors Affecting Both Men and Women
Distance: The distance between mainka and sasural has a direct effect on the
ability of men and women to visit as it costs money in fares to go. This is a
particularly salient point for men married at longer distances, when
especially among the poor, fares can be prohibitive. One informant, Udayan,
whose wife's village is 50kms from Dharmnagri stated this point very clearly:
"I do not have the money to go twice a year. If I had
the money I would go more often. It costs Rs20 for each
of us each time we go. I could get a suit of clothes
for that!"
This is reflected in the fact that his wife at the time of fieldwork had not
been to visit her natal home for eighteen months. She said that she would
like to go more often, but cannot because of shortage of money.
Others married less distantly acknowledged that cost was a factor but that it
would not prevent them from going, though it would make each visit more
expensive.
Muslim women who are married within easy walking distance of their natal
village ditinguish between going to meet their parents and going to stay.
Such women hurry through their days work and go to visit their parents for a
few hours later in the day before returning to their sasural in the early
evening.These visits do not necessarily involve a male chaperone and women
sometimes go on their own, with their children, or with other women from the
same natal village making the same kind of trip. Many of the Hindu and Muslim
male informants also made similar trips when their sasurals were within easy
walking distance. Though these visits are not a daily occurence, many of the
men joked that they visited their sasural forty or fifty times a year.
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Going to stay is a more formal occassion. Both Hindu and Muslim women married
more distantly rarely go to visit on their own. They are either 'called' by
their agnates at the time of a festival, birth wedding or death; or
accomap.amed by their husbands. Their visits entail staying in their natal
villages for some time, and usually involve some expense such as fares and
gifts for affines and partly because of this are not very frequent.
The Economic Position of the Household: This factor is obviously tied to that
above. In addition though it affects the ability to visit through its effect
on the workloads which men and women must bear. For men this means making
visits at agriculturally slack times of the year. In richer householdsit also
means that someone must be found to look after animals. This is a problem for
women in richer households too. These women are responsible for the husbandry
of milk animals and they must find a suitable replacement to do this work if
they are to be allowed a visit to their mainka. One or two poorer Hindu
informants also went to their sasural to work at times when they could make
some extra money there. Vir, for example, a landless Jatab, went to work on a
market garden in his wife's natal village for a few months. Others
transplanted rice or worked on colhus in their sasurals, but this happened in
only a few cases.
Factors Additionally Affecting Women's Contact With Her Natal Kin
The Requirement to Seek Permission: All women and men in the sample agreed
that a woman can never go to her mainka without permission. Women's visits to
her natal village are then mediated through her marital kin, who can, and
sometimes do refuse her permission to go. For most male informants, this
ability to control their wife's movements lies at the very heart of their
relationship with her. Naresh, a Jatab, sums up the view which all male
informants held on the possibility of their wives going to their natal
villages without asking:
"She can never go without my permission and sometimes
when I, or my mother or father say she should go, then
she has to go. She can never go without asking. If she
did then the regime of her sasural would be finished. It
would be completely without honour after we had made the
relationship formal and spent all that money on the
wedding and on looking after her since she had been
married. It had cost us a lot of money, and she had
disobeyed us? It could never happen!"
Most women also say that they cannot go without asking their husband's
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permission. Kamla, a Dhimar Woman whose natal home is about 30kms. away said
that she goes home about twice a year and would like to go more often,
but
"Without my husband's permission what can I do?"
Like Naresh, Maya, the wife of Mahipal, stressed that going without
permission would throw the validity of the marriage into question:
"I cannot go without asking my husband. If I did he
would not come and fetch me back. He could also beat me
if someone did come to fetch me"
Permission to go and the length of time for which a woman can go, as I have
outlined above are affected by her workload in the sasural. This varies with
the seasons in the same way as men's work, but additionally women's work
tends to comprise of many tasks which must be completed everyday to be
successful. All women cook and clean and look after the needs of small
children. Besides this the workloads of poorer women, in the absence of
regular wage opportunities for women, tend to be lower than for their richer
counterparts. These richer women will have milk animals to service, crops to
clean and store at harvest times.
The presence of milk animals has daily implications for the work which a
woman must do and can therefore affect her ability to go visiting. Women are
also responsible for making fuel from dung. Making and stacking dung cakes
(ooplay) takes women about 2-3 hours a day during the dry seasons, while
during the monsoon, when it is too wet to make ooplay women are responsible
for collecting the dung and tipping it into the household midden.
Kamla, part of whose responsibilities includes looking after the household's
milk animals cited this as one of the reasons she is not able to visit her
parents more often.
"....There are animals here who will do that work when
I go?"
The responsibility for cooking is often cited by women and men as a reason
why women are refused permission to leave their sasural for a visit to their
mainka. Pusha wife of Vijay Pal, a Dhimar put it like this:
"I want to go more often. I am not unhappy in
Dharmnagri but I have to cook.
The Demographic Composition of the Affinal Home.
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The effect of such workloads on visiting patterns for women would be less
restricting if a woman could find suitable substitues to perform her work for
her while she was away. Since potential substitutes are likely to be found
within the woman's household we must consider its demographic composition
through the life-cycle. Particularly important here are the number small
children and the presence or absence of her mother-in-law.
The person most likely to stand in for a woman while she visits her mainka is
her mother-in-law. Men very rarely take over their wife's work while she is
away, and as her natal kin very seldom visit her when she is there, so they
are very unlikely to do her work when she is away.
In the early years of her marriage a woman often shares the same cooking-
hearth as her mother-in-law. This relationship is not an equal one. A mother-
in-law expects to control the workload of daughter-in-law (bahu) as well as
her mobility, while the bahu, in realising her responsibilities suggests that
it is not acceptable for a bahu to rest while her sas works.
Chulas in which two brothers and their wives work jointly in both consumption
and production are rare and quarrels between bahus over workloads, are often
given as reasons, by women themselves for chulas seperating. In these
cirumstances, women cannot call easily on their brothers' wives to take care
of their workload while they visit their mainka. Thus a woman living with her
sas can expect to have her mobility controlled by the latter, while a woman
living on her own is restrained by being solely responsible for the workload
of her chula.
The other demographic factor affecting her mobility is the stage which she is
at in her own childbearing career. Early in her marriage she can expect to
spend more time at her mainka, but after she has children the number and
duration of her stays are likely to decline. When her own daughters are old
enough to take some of her workload, or indeed when she becomes a mother-in-
law herself, she may have more time to go, but by then her own parents may be
dead, and her contacts with her natal kin will have been eroded by years of
responsibility in her sasural. An example here will help to highlight some of
these constraints.
Qudsia is a Muslim woman married into Jhakri from another village which is
only 2kms. away. She has three small children and is the only adult woman in
her household. Her sas and her husband's two brothers' wives all live in
153
separate chulas. Her household owns land and animals. The women do not share
work although the brothers farm jointly. Her brother visits her occassionally
but never her father or her mother. She herself had not been to her natal
village for two years.
Her husband on the other hand goes there often. He had been the day before he
was interviewed by me and was going the day after. He said he often went as
he had business to conduct with them like buying seed or arranging for
fertiliser to be bought from the sugar cane society. These differences in the
visiting patterns of Qudsia and her husband serve as a poignant indicator of
the way in which a woman can have her mobility restricted by her affines.
What does this power consist of?
The Regime of the Sasural.
We have already seen: in the husband's ability to refuse his wife permission
to visit her mainka; and in the mother-in-law's expectation that she will be
able to control her bahus; that relationships between women and their affines
are heirarcichal. This heirarchy also extends to the woman's agnates.
The superiority of bride-takers over bride-givers noted by other researchers
(Sharma: 1980; Dumont: 1955;) is a strong source of support for such control
in the study villages. Villagers - both men and women - firmly believe that a
woman's place after marriage is in her sasural. Her parents must not and do
not interfere except in the very direst of circumstances. Mahipal, who
intended to marry his eldest daughter the following year hinted at this in
the following quote:
" the boys people are always more important than
the girl's people. They have your daughter in their
hands. Because of this you have to make sure that the
relationship you make is a good one as you only have one
chance. I am responsible for marrying my daughter out
into a family where she will get good food and clothes
and be well treated."
This difference is highlighted by two factors. Firstly, women are not often
visited in their sasural by natal kinfolk, especially not their mother or
sister. Secondly, a woman's husband expects to receive very good treatment
when he goes to his sasural and that her affines expect her to bring gifts
back when she visits her parents. The implications of these two factors are
outlined in turn below.
154
Visits to her Sasural by her Natal Kin.
The lack of visits which women receive in their sasural from their natal kin
emphasises the erosion of the ties a woman has with her agnates. Her married
sisters are likely to be constrained by the same factors as they themselves
are, while unmarried sisters will not be allowed to go visiting by
themselves. Considerations of hypergamy mean that a man is likely to leave
visits to his daughter in the hands of his brother. Some informants said that
is was especially bad for mothers to visit a daughter in her sasural.
Santosh, a Hindu woman suggested this was because
"My mother never comes because it looks bad for a
mother to eat her daughter's food. Even when I was ill
she did not come. If she came people would swear at her
and chase her away without even a drink of water. My
father should not really come too often either only
when necessary, like for sickness or to take me home
when no- one else can. Mother's especially are not
supposed to take anything from their daughter's once
they have been given away."
Some informants, especially among the Hindus, suggested that if a wife's
father came then he would have to pay his way at her marital home. Ashok, a
wealthy Rajput had this to say about visiting his married daughter in her
sasural....
" I have never been to visit her in her sasural. If she
needs to be called then I will send my son. It does not
look good if I go myself and eat my daughter's food. If
I did I would have to pay for it. I would give at least
ten rupees."
I asked Mahipal whether his father-in-law would have to give a gift if he
came to visit his daughter. He sums up the general point I am trying to make
here:
"Of course he will have to give! Haven't you seen here
yet that it is the girl's people who are givers and the
boy's people who are takers?"
In this vein, Caldwell et al (1982) have argued for south India that men also
receive preferential "loans" from their wives' parents. There is some
evidence to suggest that this is also the case in Dharmnagri at least. For
example, Vir was able to persuade his father-in-law to buy him a new bicycle
to go to work at the barrage. Sunil also borrowed several amounts of money
from his father-in-law during our visits and also received, like other men,
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presents of livestock.
Visits by Men to their Wives' Natal Villages.
All male informants agreed that the treatment you recieved from yourwife's
natal kin was better if you were married at some distance and could not go
quite as often. If men married at some distance went to their sasural, they
expected to be feasted and sometimes also to have gifts of cloth and perhaps
grain. For men married closer to their own natal village, who visit more
often this is not so. Both groups however stressed that they expected to be
treated with respect when visiting their wife's sasural
All men said that they would try to send their wives home twice a year. Among
the Muslims, this tended to be once at the wheat harvest (Serai) and once
after the rice harvest (Samni). Among the Hindus it tends to be at the
festivals of Tijo and Raksha Bhandan. At the end of these visits, or at other
visits where women had stayed in their mainka for some time, or were visiting
for the first time after a spell of not visiting, men tended to go and
collect their wives, who would return with gifts for her affines from her
agnates. The extent of these gifts vary with class, the length of time since
the previous visit and whether any special event had happened in her sasural
since then, such as a birth. For example, Nirmala, wife of Naresh a
sharecropping Jatab returned home for a visit, the first since the birth of
her daughter. She stayed for six days, at the end of which her husband went
to fetch her. On her return brought with her a shirt and sari for herself,
clothes for their three children, five kilos of flour and the return fare.
Qadir, one of the poorer Sheikh farmers in Jhakri said that his wife was
called to her natal home by her agnates twice a year at the harvests. At the
wheat harvest she would be given wheat and flour, usually about ten kilos of
each, and the same at the rice harvest. If the harvests were good then she
would also be given some cloth for herself and the children. Vir, a landless
Jatab, said that his wife, Vimla, had just been called to go to her mainka
for Tijo. Her brother had come to take her. He said that when this happened
then she would bring back two or three kilos of grain, cloth for a shirt, or
perhaps for the children if they could afford the latter, which was not every
time.
These extra expenses incurred on special visits restrict rather than enhance
the frequency with which a woman is allowed to visit her natal home. In
conjunction with the superiority of bride-givers over takers, they ensure
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that visits are strictly controlled and that women's future interests lie
with their affines, not with her agnates.
Marriage Distance and Fertility.
In summing up then, it is clear that a woman's contact with her natal kin is
affected by many factors of which the geographical distance between her
natal and affinal homes is only one. A woman's visits to her natal home are
affected by the ability of her affines to refuse permission, the economic
position of her household, the availability of suitable people to do her work
while she is gone, and the demographic composition of her household as well
as the view that a married woman's place is in her sasural. A woman's husband
is more likely to be able to visit her natal home and often does so without
her. When he goes, he is treated with respect, fed well and rested before
being sent home with gifts.
A woman can expect no such treatment. She has responsibilities in her sasural
and should abide by the instructions of her affines. The regime of the
sasural overides considerations of distance as the discussion of gaon-ki-gaon
marriage showed.
The data on fertility from the study villages is not of sufficient numbers to
tnake a watertight demographic argument on the same scale as Dyson and
Moore's, but it is worth making a few points about it. First of all we have
seen that Muslim women marry nearer than Hindu women, yet we have already
seen in Chapter three that there is no great difference between the three
ethnic groups in terms of mean number of children ever born (Muslims 5.21;
Hindus 4.91; Harijans 5.28).
Table 1, suggested that richer Muslims married geographically closer than the
other two groups, yet these figures suggest they have the highest fertility.
Caste Hindus as a group rank next in closeness. However, the poorer Muslims,
though they tend to marry geographically more distant, marry more closely
geneologically. This suggests that in the study villages, marriage distance
does not act as a very good indicator of autonomy, because it does not
reflect kinship structure very closely. Kinship structures and female
autonomy in Dharmnagri and Jhakri would seem more to be is controlled through
marriage practices by a woman's affinal kin. The possibility of lasting and
more than fleeting contact with loving sisters and mothers is gradually worn
away by the day to day responsibilities which a woman adopts and the controls
to which she is subjected in her affinal home. At the end of this long
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process, a woman is no longer a daughter but a mother-in-law.
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Chapter 8: Women's Work
"While members of any given community may believe that their
particular division of labour between the sexes is the 'natural' one
other communities may have completely different ways of
dividing the burden of work among the sexes and they too may find
their ways just as 'natural'.
(Boserup: 1970, pl5).
"I cannot plough I am a woman."
Somi, a Dhimar woman.
"Women's work is dirty and men don't usually do it."
Kishin, a Chamar man.
The last chapter examined the structure of kinship and marriage and its
effect on women's autonomy. In this chapter I want to look at the sexual
division of labour within this kinship system. I do not want to use the term
work in the narrow sense of labour in the fields or labour for wages. We have
already, in chapter six, seen that this is a limited way in which to try and
understand the tasks for which women are primarily responsible. In fact,
understanding work only in this narrow sense considerably underestimates the
work which women do and therefore fails to understand the nature of women's
subordination (Epstein:1981, Beneria: 1982, Dixon: 1982).
Rather, following the authors cited at the begining of the last chapter, I
include any activity which contributes to the reproduction of the social
system to which that activity itself belongs. Using this understanding of
work, the contribution of village women to social and economic life becomes
clearer. It also highlights the reasons why the work which women do does not
give them more autonomy.
How is this related to fertility? Todaro and Fapohunda have suggested that
fertility decision-malting is "essentially determined by who allocates
economic resources within the household" (1987: pl2). I have already
suggested that women's autonomy is limited by the structure of kinship and
marriage in which they are embedded. They are isolated from their natal kin,
from control over productive property and under the tutelage of their affinal
kin. It is possible that a woman's ability to influence household decisions,
including those about her own fertility, may be enhanced by her ability to
earn income. In this chapter a closer look is taken at the influence which
women have over the major resources of their households. How much influence
does a woman have over what her household grows in the fields, whether they
buy and sell land or animals? The central question asked in this chapter is
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what effect does women's work in the study villages have on their autonomy?
Sources of Data
The major sources of data in this chapter are semi-structured interviews with
women about the work which they do and whether they have any control over
decision-making processes in their marital households. This information was
collected by female research assistants from women in the Social Organisation
of Childbearing Project sample. This data is used in two ways. Firstly it is
used to deliniate the tasks for which women in general are responsible.
Secondly, it is used to highlight variations in the workloads of women
according to key variables.
Data collected by me from men in the sample are also used in this chapter. As
part of the networks questionnaire used in the last chapter, I asked men who
would perform their wife's work if she was ever away from her sasural. This
data provides an interesting insight into hopw men see themselves in relation
to women's work, and is used to highlight major points.
The rest of the chapter is divided up as follows. Firstly, I discuss the
sexual division of labour between men and women and how this has changed over
time with the introduction of new technology. Secondly, I move from a
discussion of the work of women in general to the explanation of what
particular women do. The major discussion is variations in women's work
according to the class position of their households, ethnicity, the structure
of the household, life-cycle and personal biography. Finally I want to
examine the implications which the division of labour has for the power of
women within the household by an examination of their role in decision-making
affecting major resources within the household.
The Sexual Division of Labour
The division of labour between men and women is not merely the way in which
households at various stages in the life-cycle deal with the practical
problems of production and reproduction. It also has implications for the
distribution of resources which the various tasks undertaken by its members,
men and women, boys and girls, produces. Whitehead's concept of the conjugal
contract again proves useful here. It higlights the fact that an exchange of
values is implicit in the arrangment which exist in the household. Following
Leonard and Delphy (1984), one might add that the sexual division of labour
creates a hierarchy of status on which the various activities performed by
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men and women are placed. In terms of this hierarchy, which tasks are thought
of as women's tasks in the study villages?
This is not an easy task to accomplish. While trying to obtain an answer to
this question in Dharmnagri it became clear that people's responses were shot
through with understandings of what women should do rather than what they
actually did. While some responses are not helpful in determining the finer
divisions of labour between men and women, they at least help in defining a
starting point.
Following local categories for women's work leads us to two categories. The
first of these is ghar ka kam 'housework' and bahaar ka kaam, 'outside
work'. To these categories it is useful to add a third category that of
interstitial work, where the tasks involve a woman going between her home and
the outside. A cautionary word is perhaps apt at this point. It is not
helpful to interpret these categories as one would for a sample of women in a
developed country. As we shall see below, these categories refer to where the
work is done, rather than what actually is done there. I also wish to point
out that there is no discussion of what others (e.g. Sharma: 1986) have
identified as household service work - for example marriage negotiations and
the maintenance of kin contacts. I have no systematic data on this subject
since it was not central to the present study. Notions of 'housework' in the
study villages are somewhat wider than those in the west. In the light of
other studies (Sharma: 1980; Beneria: 1982; Jain and Banerjee: 1985) it is
perhaps hardly surpising that women in this part of the world have a heavy
burden of reproductive duties in their households. In the study villages
these include cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, childcare, the cleaning and
processing of crops, making fuel, animal husbandry and sometimes working on
the fields. These are discussed below.
Ghar ka Kaam
This is work which women do at home.
Cooking
Women are entirely responsible for the preparation and cooking of food in the
household. This usually involves the preparation of two main meals a day -
one in mid-morning and one late afternoon - in additon to any snacks or
special festive fare which may be produced. The staple food at these two
meals is usually rice in the morning and bread in the evening. These are
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usually accompanied by a dish of lentils, usually urad or masur, or a
vegetable curry. Among the muslims a meat dish may be prepared regularly on
Wednesdays as the butcher visits the local market at Begawala about a mile
away.
Cooking and preparing food can take a long time. Lentils and rice must be
picked over to remove foreign matter and spices ground by hand before the
cooking commences. Furthermore rice must be husked and wheat ground before
they can be cooked. Both these tasks require women to take sizeable amounts
of both staples to the local village mill regularly for processing. After the
food has been eaten, women are also responsible for cleaning the soiled
dishes - a task accomplished with cold water and a scouring with ash or sand.
Household Cleaning and Maintenance
Household cleaning is a daily activity which requires women to sweep the
floors of both the living quarters and the courtyard outside as well as
cleaning out the stalls of domestic animals. In addition to sweeping, women
carry out small household repairs. Most commonly this involves regular
resmearing of katcha walls with fresh mud or resealing mud floors with fresh
gobri (a mixture of dung and water). Women are also responsible for washing
and repairing the clothes of household members. In some households, where
there is a sewing machine, women may also make clothes.
Crop Processing
In landed households, women are also responsible for the processing and
storage of the household's staple food crops of wheat and rice. Women build
the household grain store of mud. Once built these fine structures, often
decorated with mirrors and figures to ward off the evil-eye, last for many
years. The store must however be repaired at least every year with fresh mud
if it is to remain pest-proof. Headloads of mud are brought up from the
gulleys by the road side for this purpose. During the study period, many
women worked for as long as two weeks on the repair of their grain stores.
Interstitial Work




The fuel most commonly used for cooking is also made by women. This fuel is
called ooplay (cakes formed from gobar - a mixture of animal dung, and
straw). To make ooplay, a woman must first of all collect the gobar from the
stalls of household cattle. She then headloads it in a basket to the ooplay
patch. Here she combines it with straw and water and then forms it into large
dinner size plates. These are then stood in the sun for several days and
turned till they are baked dry. After drying they are stored in large conical
stacks and covered over with thatch and topped out with a terracotta pot to
keep them dry until required for cooking. Ooplay are not made in the monsoon
as they would be destroyed by rain before they had a chance to dry. During
the monsoon, the gobar is dumped in the kuri (household midden) where it left
to mulch down before use as organic fertiliser on the sugar cane crop. It
thus has considerable value as a direct agricultural input, but this not
acknowledged locally.
Taking Food to the Fields
In addition to cooking the food women may also have to take food to their
menfolk in the fields. This is not a task which women will necessariliy have
to do every day. It largely depends upon the intensity of the work which
their husband's are doing. Women are more likely to have to do this during
busy agricultural periods when their menfolk do not want to be away from the
fields for the time it takes to eat.
Childcare
Perhaps women's most ubiquitous responsibilty is childcare. This is
particularly consuming if a woman has a few very small children, when in
additon to her other work, the new mother must breastfeed her infant and
clean the baby's soiled clothes. Care of sick children is also a women's
responsibility and may involve a time-consuming trip and wait at the local
dispensary. The load of childcare is sometimes alleviated by a woman's older
children. It is not unusual to see an older girl at play with a younger
sibling on her hip.
Animal Husbandry
This is a task which can be less clearly allocated to women than those
mentioned above. The first point of note is that men tend to care for the
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houehold's draft animals in the public space of the bhaitak (male sitting
room) while women take care of the milk animals in the relative privacy of
the sehn (household courtyard). Animal husbandry gives rise to a daily round
of activities which are particularly intense in the early morning and
evening. Among wealthier households, women usually milk animals where the
milk is to be used for domestic consumption. It is only in poor households,
with no land that women in the childbearing age groups have this task. The
exception to this rule is one woman from a landed household in Jhakri outside
the childbearing age group who also sells milk.
Milk animals are milked morning and night, while both draft and milk animals
are stall-fed at both those times. Stall-fed animals are fed a mixture of
grasses, sometimes specially grown, and in the winter sugar cane tops.
Once it has been brought home, fodder is chopped by three main methods in the
study villages. It may be chopped by diesel-driven chopper, animal-driven
chopper or hand-driven chopper. Where fodder chopping is at all mechanised it
is done by men. Women are never to be seen chopping fodder by diesel engine
or animal-driven chopper. This is men's work. Where chopping is done by men,
women will still be responsible for headloading fodder from the bhaitak to
the sehn and for feeding it to the milk animals.
Bahar ka Kaam
This refers to work performed outside the boundaries of the household.
Fodder Collection
The extent to which women collect fodder and bring it home varies according
to season, class and the avaiability of alternative sources of labour. In the
busy agricultural seasons, when male family labour is likely to be tied up in
agricultural work, women are more likely to have responsibilty for cutting
fodder and bringing it home. This is sometimes done on the return trip having
taken food to the men in the fields. The women of poorer household may also
cut sugar cane for others during the winter and take cane foliage as payment
to use as fodder. This is however usually done by men. It is also the case
that men may bring cane tops home after their days work during the cutting
season. When it arrives at the household, all of this fodder must be chopped
up to make it edible for animals in the various ways outlined above.
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Work in the Fields
The women most likey to work in family fields are those of poorer Hindu
households where there is no alternative source of labour. Women in landless
households may also work in the fields, for example to chop sugar cane for
tops to use as fodder (cf chapter 6).
Where women work in the fields, their activities are mostly confined to
weeding. Women are also hired as labourers at rice and wheat harvesting
times, but all of these women are hired into the village from outside. None
of the sample women worked in the fields as wage labourers during the course
of the fieldwork period. Additionally, it was not expected, by and large,
that women in the childbearing age group would do so. No Muslim women worked
as wage labourers. Those women from Dharmnagri who did were largely young
unmarried girls or older women outside the childbearing age range, though as
we shall see below one or two women from poorer Hindu households did work in
their own fields, especially when alternative family labour was short.
The Seed and the Field - Men and Women
If we can place all of the tasks which men and women might do along a
oontinum, then the ends of the spectrum are clear enough. At one end, only
men plough. This is a fairly common feature of North Indian agricultural and
has been reported in other studies. Dube (1982) has outlined how it fits in
with commonly held beliefs of sexuality, particularly the notion of the seed
and the field. The main characteristic of this view is that the field,
symbolising woman, is passive and inherently unproductive. Only by ploughing
and the casting of seed by men does it bear fruit, crops in the case of land:
children in the case of women. It is more difficult to obtain an explanation
of why women do not plough from village men themselves. This highlights the
extent to which ploughing as man's work is embedded in local culture. When
asked why women do not plough men cannot provide any explanation. It is
considered natural.
This is a view which is deeply held by women too. I spoke to a Hindu woman,
Santosh, about this. She had been complaining about her husband, Sunil's
gregariousness generally, and his inabilities as a farmer in particular. The
immediate cause of her anger was that her husband was prepared to sharecrop
some of his land out in return for only a third share, while the going rate
was a half share.
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Santosh: "He is useless, he cannot think or operate a plough."
Me: "Why don't you run the farm and plough?"
Santosh: "I cannot plough, I am a woman"
Me: "Why not?"
Santosh: "I am a woman and women don't plough."
Me. "Why not?"
Santosh: "If women plough then the earth they turn over will be
sour and the crops will not grow there."
Me: "I have heard that women plough and sow in Muzaffarnagar
district."
Santosh: "That may be so but I am a local and simple girl and I can
only tell you what is in my heart. Women here do not plough."
This is important. Ploughing among village people is strongly associated with
being a farmer and reaching manhood. Skill with a plough is the mark of a
man. It is also associated with the power which having land bestows and is
an integral part of the definition of being a farmer. The operation of the
plough is a sure sign of control over land at the level of both practice and
ideology.
At the other end of the spectrum - the most domestic of jobs, dealing with
'shit', is hardly ever done by men. 'Shitwork' may be taken both in the
literal sense - for a great deal of women's time in the study villages is
spent working with animal-dung - and as a metaphor for the caring work which
women do. Working with dung is not something to which men readily admit
In one interview I asked Riasat whether he dealt with the animal dung when:
Me: "What do you do about the dung when your wife is away visiting
her mother for a while?"
Riasat had hardly started to answer when Majid burst in laughing:
"He collects it himself in a basket . He scoops it up with his
hands and then pops it into the basket on his head . Then the shit
runs throught the weave in the basket and down over his facie"
Majid was slapping his knees and roaring with laughter.
Riasat hastily denied this account:
"No, no, brother! Dung is women's work."
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Attempts to find out if men ever did any "domestic" work were always met with
great hilarity. This was especially true if I asked a man in the company of
others. Men do sometimes cook when absolutely necessary, for example, if
their wife is away paying a visit to her natal home for a day or longer and
even then if there is no other woman in the chula to cook. Even in such
circumstances men are sometimes still reluctant to take "domestic" work like
cooking on. In May 1983 for example, I was visited almost every night at
supper time by Riasat while his wife was away visiting her parents. Riasat
hoped to obtain some handsome cloth as gift from his in-laws after such a
long visit by his wife. In the meantime, he was alleviating his cooking
problem by eating some of the food which was cooked for me every night!
Women most often said that the reason they did not visit their natal home
more often was because their husband's would have roti ki perishani - they
would have to cook for themselves or have someone else, whose responsibility
it was not, to cook for them. Men were sometimes reluctant to let their wives
visit their natal home because they said there would be no one to do her work
while she was away.
A Historical Perspective
The study villages are also different in some important historical respects
from other areas where research on women has been done (Saradamoni:1982).
Thus it is one thing to delineate what the existing division of labour among
sample women in the study villages is and quite another to say how this has
been affected by the major changes which have occured there in the past
twenty years. Women's work also varies historically. This is a difficult
issue to get to grips with in a thesis like this. There were limits of time
and mobility and nor were resources such that an extensive historical aspect
could have been built into the research design. I was at full stretch trying
to gather what I could about the present. I have land records on the recent
past. But primary historical material on women's work at any level, never
mind the level of the village, is notoriously conspicuous on the sub
continent, as elsewhere, by its absence. It is indeed well hidden from
history.
However, I did manage to glean some impression of what women did in the past
by casual conversation with villagers. Care is required though as this
account is probably not subtle enough to catch the major differences which
would have existed among women in the past as they do in the present
according to the criteria outlined above. It is worth noting at the outset of
167
this historical excursion that changes in the recent past have been changes
in magnitude rather than changes which have altered the power which women
gain from the work which they do.
The major changes which have taken place in the last twenty years or so are
those related to the "green revolution". This has altered both the cropping
pattern and intensity of cropping in the study villages as well as
introducing irrigation technology into the study villages for the first time.
The major effect which this has had on women's work within the study villages
is that it has increased the amount and changed the timing of crop processing
and cleaning which women have to do. It of course follows that this is likely
in the absence of hiring to increase the intensity of work of higher rather
than lower class women (the latter have no land and therefore no crops to
process). The amount of work which each woman has to do depends on the yield
from her household's fields, the number and type of crops grown and and the
presence of other women in the household who are able to share the task of
processing and storing. All accounts suggest that there is more of this kind
of work now than there was in the past.
This has been partly offset by the introduction about fifteen years ago of an
electric milling machine into the village. Before this women had to grind
wheat daily and hand mill rice for domestic consumption. This was more likely
to be the task of younger than older women, and would be delegated from sas
to bahu. Every household in the village now has all its wheat and rice ground
or husked by electric machine. It is cheap and quick and complaints about
cheating not withstanding, no woman ground wheat or milled rice by hand.
Another major change which preceded the introduction of the "green
revolution" technology was the bringing of khader grass lands into
cultivation. This process was started as early as 1932 and probably
intensified with "green revolution" technology as the potential for profit
increased under the new regime. The consequence of this on women's work comes
through the decreased availability of firewood. Before the intensification of
khader cultivation, women used to go and collect wood for cooking fuel there.
As it became more scarce a switch occured from wood to more intensive use of
dung as fuel. The greater part of fuel production now is not foraging for or
collecting wood, but making and storing ooplay.
Women's work in animal husbandry has also increased, especially the
collection of fodder. I think this comes from the intensification of men's
work during the agricultural cycle, because of watering and fertilising more
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on each crop as well as the increased number of crops each year. Abdul an
elderly Muslim man, suggested that his mother did not even know where the
family fields were because she never had to go there. Younger women took the
food out to the men and the men brought the fodder in from the fields to the
house.
This historical excursion could be extended, but the point to be made is that
there has been no change either away from or towards a division of labour
which gives women control over productive resources or that which they
produce. This is not surprising in the light of other studies (Croll: 1981;
Sharma: 1980; Whitehead: 1981; Sen: 1982). Women in these study villages have
not lost control over productive resources, as they have in areas in South
India (Jain and Banarjee: 1985) because they never had control in the first
place.
Where we start from then, in trying to understand the present sexual division
of labour in the study villages, is from the fact that women in these
villages have never in living memory been in control of productive resources.
Control over these has always been firmly in the hands of men. The balance of
tasks has changed, but the power of women relative to men has remained low.
There is a system of hierarchical arrangements between younger and older
affinaly related women whose interests are fragmented by the nature of the
patrilocal, patrilineal family. But women of all ages also have an interest
in the family to which they belong, for village women, there is no
alternative.
This should alert us to the fact that the division of labour is not only a
list of tasks which are performed by men and by women. It is also a way in
which entitlement to resources, within the structural arrangements analysed
in the last chapter are allocated. In Whitehead's terms (1981) the conjugal
contract is thrust upon women in Bijnor, they have no alternative but to
accept it and indeed as outlined above have interests in accepting it. The
structure of kinship and marriage in Bijnor legitimises the existing division
of labour in which the work men do is judged to be sufficiently more
important than that which women do to allow the former control over all
resources.
I do not want to deny the material basis of relations between men and women.
Clearly legitimacy is directly related to patriliny and patrilocal marriage.
But how does men's work come to be seen as giving them legitimate control
over the resources which the household to which they belong produces?
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The Work of Specific Women
The work which specific women do, rather than what women in general do is
affected by several factors, each of which I will deal with here in turn.
This is not a procedure with which I am completely happy because these
features do not affect a woman's experience or position in isolation from
each other. Their cumulative and conflicting effects are felt and experienced
together. I intend to make up for this analytical simplicity towards the end
of this section by considering some case studies to elucidate how these
factors operate together. The following subsections outlines how the work of
specific women varies according to the structure of their household; class;
ethnicity; age, the life cycle and personal biography.
Household Structure
The new bride in Dharmnagri is a social being with little or no autonomy. If
she is the first woman to marry into a household then she will normally share
work with her mother-in-law. The sharing out of work is not a democratic
process. The former may expect to be allocated work on the latter's
instruction. More common though is the expectation that a woman has come to
her marital village to work. Asghari, the only daughter-in-law in a class II
household of two brothers put it aptly:
"it does not feel good for the bahu if the sas does the work, that
is why the bahu herself does the work."
It is unusual, however, for a group of affinally related women to work
together over a long period of time. As the table below shows, only a




Number of Women Working Jointly and Separately from Other
Women among Sample Households
Religion NUMBER OF WOMEN
ALL JOINT SEPARATE
HINDU 19 3 16
MUSLIM 18 5 13
TOTAL 37 8 29
Source: Key Informants 1983.
The most commonly given reason for women starting to work separately is that
women cannot work together without fighting. There is little evidence to
support this contention, but it is a strong ideology among the women.
Generally it would seem that in the long term each woman is made to be
resonsible for her own nuclear family. One mother-in-law said of her
daughter-in-law:
"I made her go separate because there was another daughter-in-law
being married in and I did not want there to be any fighting between
them".
Others suggested that they had separated the work of household women because
one of them was seen not to be pulling her weight. One landless Harijan
widow, speaking of her decision to separate the work of her daughter-in-law
from her own said.
"[She] used sometimes to cook her own food separately while I used
to cook for them all and when she began to refuse to cook for them
all I made her go separate, for being on your own gives you an idea
of how money is earned. I used to say to her that since her father-
in-law was dead, I would do the outside work and she should cook,
but she refused to cook or do the housework, so I made her go
separate."
The exception to the separation of women's work within the household is that
one daughter-in-law will continue to have her mother-in-law stay and work in
her own chula or perhaps come back into it after some time apart. For
example a mother-in-law may elect on the marriage of a second son to make the
first daughter-in-law separate, but decide to live with the second. Thus
depending on the timing of her husband's younger brother's marriage a woman
can expect to find herself in a chula where she is responsible for all of the
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tasks outlined above. For example, Nirmala, an elder daughter-in-law now
lives separately from her mother-in-law and husband's younger brother's wife.
She cooks, washes and cleans for her own husband and children, but, works
jointly with her sas in the making of ooplay from draft animals.
Fatima, the youngest bahu married into a Muslim household, works jointly with
her sas and has a similar workload to Nirmala:
"..I do all of the work, sweep, wash up, grind spices, cook, lift
the dung and make ooplay, give water to the buffaloes and oxen, all
I do is work all day."
Pushpa on the other hand shares household work with her Husband's elder
brother's wife and her sas. Her workload is somewhat lighter:
"I just cook and wash up. I don't lift dung or make ooplay yet.
My sas and jethani [HeBW] do that. Muni [her HeBW] also milks the
animals. I just cook and wash the dishes."
Class
As we have already seen in chapter 3, women very rarely own land in the study
villages. My interest in class here then is not related to access to
productive resources from which a woman may earn an independent source of
income. Rather I want to focus on how the class position of the household to
which a woman belongs affects the work which she must do.
The most important effect of class on women's work is that women from class
II households are more likely only to work in and around their house than
poorer counterparts. Only one of four class II women in the sample went to
collect fodder from the fields, for example, while two-thirds of other women
in households with animals did this.
Neither are women in the richer households likely to work in their own fields
or the fields of others as labourers. This is partly because if labour is
short, it is more likely to be hired. This is somewhat affected by the
life-cycle. Women in the childbearing age-ranges do not by and large work in
the fields. Outside these years some Hindu women did work in their own
family fields in weeding operations. For example, in one of the Hindu sample
households in class III, the mother-in-law spent about five or six days
weeding wheat during the study year.
Another important effect of class is that women in richer households are more
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likely to have a greater amount of work relating to animal husbandry as their
households own a greater number of both milk and draft animals. This is
compounded by the fact that household men in richer households also have a
greater amount of work to do in the fields. There are four aspects to working
with animals for women: feeding them, milking, chopping fodder and collecting
fodder from the fields.
Almost eighty-percent of sample women said that they fed household animals.
In most cases these were both milk and draft, except where these different
types of animals were stalled seperately. Milking animals tends also to be
the work of women. Where fodder is chopped by hand cranked machine, all
sample women are involved in this operation for their households. In some
class II and III households, the chopping of fodder is acheived by either an
animal or machine powered thresher. In these cases, it is the household men
who will operate the chopper and women will be responsible for taking the
chopped fodder from the bhaitak where it is chopped and feeding to it to the
milk animals in their compound. As we have already seen in chapter 4, richer
households stay joint in production for longer and this has the effect of
lightening the fodder chopping load for women in these households as there
are more men around to chop it.
The collection of fodder from household fields is obviously not a task which
the landless can undertake. Women in class II households never do this.
Those in class III households may sometimes when taking food to men in the
fields, bring back a headload of fodder which they cut from their own fields.
Qudsia a class III woman said when asked if she did any work in the fields:
"I just bring fodder and take food out there. I do not cut cane
tops [for fodder] only clover"
Cutting cane for others and taking the tops for fodder is by and large the
work of men, but some class IV and V women also do this sometimes. Sabra's
household in class IV has an unusually large number of animals for a class IV
household, from which they sell milk. She cuts clover and sometimes cane for
fodder:
"I cut clover from the land which we have taken on sharecropping. I
sometimes cut cane, but usually this is done by my husband."
Cutting fodder and taking it home then is largely men's work, but women in
all but class II sometimes cut it from their own fields and women from
classes IV and V additionally sometimes cut it from wild grass or the cane
fields of others.
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It is also the case that richer women have more work associated with the
processing of the staple crops rice and wheat than women in poorer
households. Apart from the cleaning of the cut crop, women whose households
have land are also responsible for the storage of the crop. This involves
the building and maintenace of a mud grain store - a koti.
Ethnicity
A major difference between Muslim and Hindu women is that the former are
never defined as working in the fields. This may partly be the effects of
class, since the Muslim sample households tend as a group to belong to
classes II and III. However, this is not the whole explanation of differences
between the two groups of women. In Muslim class IV households, women were
just as secluded as their richer counterparts. In landless Muslim households
women did not do any independent wage labour in the fields.
It is difficult to know how much significance to attach to these
observations. The two class V women in the Muslim sample also had unusual
personal biographies. One was married into Jhakri from 400 miles away after
leaving her first husband, while the latter was married to a ghar jemai
(marrying-in husband)and therefore living in her natal village. In the first
case there seems to be no prima facie case why this woman did not perform
wage labour, except that she is a Muslim woman. In the second, Muni
undoubtedly did more work outside than other Muslim women. She cut cane for
fodder and sometimes helped her husband stoke the cane crusher's fires when
he was employed there during the winter months. But she did not go and work
for wages anywhere.
Among the Hindus by contrast, women from class III and IV households were
sometimes involved in labouring in their own household's fields. This is
especially true for households where little alternative family labour was
available. Low caste low class Hindu women in the childbearing years,
however, did not work as wage labourers. Women wage labourers in Dharmnagri
are poor women outside the childbearing age group
Some Hindu women are then recruited to work on their own household land. But
such recruitment is by no means indiscriminate. For example two Hindu sample
women said that they worked on their own family fields. The factor which they
both have in common is the loss of a household member and its attendant
effect on household income. Chandresh for example, is the only woman in a
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class III Chamar household. Her mother-in-law had died and this had an effect
on the work she had to do.
"if my sas were still alive I would have less work to do. Now I
have to leave my [infant] son behind and go and work in the fields.
I do all the work in the fields, I help to plant, weed and thresh
and I collect grass [for fodder]."
One other Hindu sample woman, Urmila from a class IV Sahni household reported
working alongside the rest of her household in the fields after her father-
in-law died.
"..my sasur died in the middle of the rice harvest. He had done
some cutting before his death and after his death, my husband, his
sisters and me too did the rest. I have planted wheat behind my
husband working on the
plough."
Life Cycle, Age and Personal Biography
These are the key variables, which cement all the others together, when
trying to understand women's work in the study villages. They help to
explain differences in conjuction with other variables when phenomena seem
not to be explicable by a single variable on its own. Women's experience
cannot be related with reference to a single variable, but rather all of
these factors must be brought into play before we can fully understand the
nature of the workload which individual women must perform for adequate
reproduction to occur within the context of their own chula.
In the early years of her marriage a woman's workload is an increasing one.
She starts work, ideally in a household where joint production and
consumption exist. Work will be allocated to her by her sas. If there are
several women in a joint household work tasks will be shared. Women
themselves say that they are ready to take much of the responsibility for
performing the work which requires to be done in their hearth as it does not
look good for the bahu to be sitting while her sas is working. Gazala,
described her early married years like this:
"I cooked the roti from the time I was married and my mother-in-law
lifted the dung and made the ooplay...a year after this I started to
lift dung and make ooplay too."
Her workload will increase in the middle years of her reproductive cycle. She
is likely to have children for whom she is wholly responsible in addition to
her other work. She is likely to separate from her sas and will be solely
responsible for the work of her chula as well as looking after her children.
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Visits to her natal village may well be curtailed during this period also.
As her children grow up her workload may lighten if she has daughters as they
will begin to help with her work in preparation for marriage. If she has only
sons then her burden of work will not be lightened until they are married and
her bahus are safely installed with her in their sasural. Finally her bahus
will go alagh ( live and work in separate chulas), all but one who will
remain in the sas's hearth to look after her in her old age or perhaps she
will rejoin the hearth of a daughter-in-law who earlier went separate.
It can be seen that this ideal transition of a woman through her life cycle
is not based on the passage of time alone. It partly depends on the number
and sex of children a woman has. This will affect her workload in her
earlier years as a married woman. It also greatly affects her experience in
later years. For example, if a woman has only daughters, she may have help
with her workload before they are married. They will all eventually be
married out, and if she has no sons she will have no bahus coming in on whom
she could rely for help with her workload and over whom she would have
control. Having children particularly sons is crucial to the status and
position of women. It would of course be possible for one of her daughters to
bring a husband in. The status of ghar jemai is not one which is considered
desirable by villagers. It rarely occurs, and is only considered as a last
resort. The fundamental contradiction for sample women in the study villages
is that the household is both the locus of women's subordination and their
interest. Given that no real alternatiuve exists for them, it is is in their
interests to develop what power they can within the household. This means
having children. The question remains, what control do women have over
decisions surrounding their own fertility.
A few case studies illustrate more aptly how the various factors outlined
above affect a woman's workload, before I finally move in this chapter to
consider whether the contribution which women make through their labour to
the household gives them any say in decision-making over the distribution and
use of household resources.
Maya w/o Mahipal, Hindu Sahni, Class III
Maya's husband owns 10.75 bighas of khader land. She was married about
fifteen years ago and has had six children - five girls and a boy. She
belongs to the Sahni caste - a low, but clean caste Hindu group who were
traditionally vegetable growers. She herself is an only surviving child. Her
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parents had had three other children; two girls and a boy who had all died in
childhood.Because Maya's mother and father are on their own, Maya's eldest
daughter, aged 11, lives with them to help with domestic chores and animals.
Her second daughter also went to live with them during the fieldwork period.
Maya lamented that she had wanted this girl to stay with her to help with
the work. The girl however preferred to stay with her maternal grandparents
as that household was richer, owning some 40 bighas of land, and therefore
she could eat better food there. The remaining four children are all aged
under six and are therefore no great help to their mother and father as yet.
Maya said that she did all her chula's work on her own. She prepares food and
cooks, washes up, takes wheat to the chaki (electric mill) to have it ground,
looks after the children, does the washing and cleaning. In addition to this
she takes her husband's food to the fields when he is working there. Because
the children who live at home are small, she must also work in the fields
alongside Mahipal, doing weeding and digging mostly. They cannot afford to
hire labourers as a matter of course for cultivation operations. She will
also collect fodder and cut it on her jethani's (Husband's elder brother's
wife) hand machine if he is not at home, though she says she only has to do
this morning and evening!
Being the only woman in her chula severely restricts her mobility and though
she would like to go more often to her parent's house she cannot as there is
no one to fill in for her. When she does go her sas does her work, it is
never done by her jethani or dorani (Husband's younger brother's wife). While
she was still sajhe she could go more often as tasks were shared by other
household women. She said that she hardly ever goes now because of this.
On household decision making Maya said:
"My husband certainly takes my advice for any work which is to be
done. If he does not like my advice he does not pay any attention
to it."
Pushpa w/o Punni, Hindu, Dhimar, Class III
Pushpa is a young woman , less than twenty years old at the begining of the
fieldwork period. She is a Hindu woman from the Dhimar caste, lowish but
clean. Her husband has title to about eight bighas of land, but farms jointly
with two brothers each of whom has a similar amount of land.
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Although married into a household with a similar land profile as Maya, Pushpa
was at a much earlier stage in the life cycle. She had been married only
about two years before the begining of the fieldwork period and was heavily
pregnant with her first child when interviewed. When she was married, her
husband was joint with two of his elder brothers. The men shared the farm
work and all three brothers with their wives and children and Pushpa sas ate
at a single hearth. In short, their household is joint in both consumption
and production.
Married to the youngest of the three brothers, she is the latest addition to
her marital household. She said that the only work for which she was
responsible was the cooking and dish washing. The animal husbandry and the
making of ooplay are shared by her sas and jethani. None of the women, Pushpa
maintained, worked in the fields: all of this work was done by the men. This
includes collecting fodder from the jungle. She had not been doing much work
since about the seventh month of her pregnancy, but maintained that cooking
and cleaning was her normal work and nothing else.
Pushpa then would seem in an easier position than Maya in some respects. She
has no children to look after as yet. She is also sharing a chula with her
sas and jethani, which means that there are women around to share the jobs
which the household requires women to do. There are also three men in the
household to do the farming work and so the women are not required to go to
the fields.
However, relationships between women in the joint chula are hierarchical and
therefore not as supportive as say friendships between unrelated women of the
same age might be. (Whitehead:1981) This is a haveli in which there was a
great deal of quarreling among the women.
Pushpa's role in decision making is similar to Maya's
"Generally the men decide as they wish and sometimes they ask my
advice. If it seems O.K. they listen, if not they just do as they
please."
Asghari w/o Ahmad, Muslim, Sheikh, Class II
Asghari is married into a wealthy Sheikh household, owning 36 bighas of prime
bangar land. Her natal village is Chandpuri, about 2 kilometres from Jhakri.
She had been married about two years when fieldwork began and had one child,
a daughter. Her husband is one of two brothers and when she was married they
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were all joint with her sas and sasur, as they still were during the
fieldwork period.
When asked about her work, Asghari said that she cooked, cleaned dishes swept
and cleaned the house, lifts gobar and makes ooplay. She also goes to her
family's fields to cut fodder and chops it with the men. She said that her
sas did some of this work too.
On the division of labour between herself and her sas, she said that no one
decided it should be like this. She herself thought that it did not look good
for her sas to be working if she herself was not and so she took on the work
herself. Her sas also had sole responsibility for a buffalo which provided
milk for sale to a dealer from Bijnor.
Asghari was never involved in any cultivation work. She was never asked for
her opinion on what should be grown in the fields. These decisions were made
by her sasur and his sons, the final decision resting with the sasur. Neither
did she have the responsibility to trade grain from the household reserves
with petty traders. This was the preserve of her sas.
Umrao w/o Usman, Muslim, Teli, Class V.
Jhakri is Umrao's natal village. Her sasural is in the adjoining district of
Muzaffarnagar. She had been married when she was only nine years old, with her
gauna (first cohabitation)taking place seven years later, after puberty.
She had started her married life in her sasural being joint with her husband,
sauteli-sas (step-mother-in-law) and sasur and her husband's sister. She had
been unhappy in her sasural, and said that she had been treated very badly by
her sauteli-sas. She had been given 5kgs. of silver by her sasural on her
marriage but this had all been stolen by her sauteli-sas and there had been a
fight and she and her husband had moved back to her natal village of .Jhakri.
Umrao has a long and checkered maternity history. She has had nine children,
only four of whom are still alive. First she had a girl and then two boys and
two girls who died, a girl who is still alive and then a boy who died, and
then another two boys who are still alive.
Her husband owns no land. During the cane season he works as a fire-stoker at
one of the local cane crushers. He does whatever work he can during the time
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when the cane crushers are closed. Their existence, as Umrao's maternity
history suggests, is a tenuous one, and it seems that there has hardly been a
year since she was married when there has not been a life-threatening event
or illness. Her husband also complained that it was more difficult to obtain
work these days as farmers were either doing more of their own cultivation,
or gave you work on a per-acre basis which grossly underestimated the amount
of work which you would have to do and therefore the pay you would receive.
When asked about the work she did Umrao said that she did all the cooking,
cleaning, looked after the children, and collected fodder for their buffalo
and made ooplay. She also did some goat herding. They hoped to raise goats
and sell them to buy milk buffaloes. This plan was always interupted by some
emergency or another in which they would have to sell the goats in order to
survive. She also said that during the cane season, she helped her husband at
the colhu. The children helped with collecting fodder for the goats.
Conclusion
What can we learn about women's work from these brief accounts of the work
responsibilities of four women? First, and this fits well with the general
argument, there seems to be a set of reproductive tasks which centre around
the home. All of these women are entirely responsible for: childcare,
cooking, cleaning, regardless of differences in their positions. However,
what they do on top of this, or to what extent they are responsible for the
domestic tasks themselves does vary according to the indicators mentioned
above.
Pushpa for instance is the youngest bahu in her extended household and is
therefore not responsible for tasks like lifting gobar or making ooplay and
collecting fodder which are the responsibility of her sas and jethani. Like
Asghari, the presence of her sas limits the extent to which she can spend
resources, or indeed even make decisions about how resources are collected or
spent.
Maya is the only adult woman in her household and because her own parents are
short of labour and richer than her marital household, she has had to send
her eldest daughter there and has no one around the house to help her, though
other women in the village with daughters the same age as hers can and do
have help from their daughters every day as a matter of course. Her caste and
the absence of family labour in combination with relative poverty means that
she also has to go and labour in the fields along with her husband.
180
There are other women in the village who do not. For example, a wealthy
Rajput household in Dharmnagri has as little labour in it as Maya's chula,
but the women there belong to a wealthy and high caste household, where
shortages of labour at peak times are met by hiring rather than drawing
family labour into operation in the fields.
Asghari is at an early stage in her life cycle - like Pushpa - but she has
more responsibility for chopping fodder because she is the only bahu. This in
combination with the fact that the household has a lot of land but chops
fodder by hand-turned machine means she has the responsibilty for this work.
It was not uncommon to see Asghari and her sas chopping fodder while her
husband and his younger brother ate or rested on a charpai.
Umrao is the poorest of these four women. She is past the childbearing age-
group and lives in her natal village. She is, therefore, arguably relatively
free from the rigours of seclusion which the other women are not. She has no
sas or sasur living with her, or indeed even in Jhakri, nor does she have any
contact with them. She does have some help with her work from her eldest
daughter, but she can expect this to end when her daughter is married and
goes away to her own sasural. Yet because of the general restriction on
Muslim women of doing wage labour in the fields she does not earn any money.
Hindu women in similar positions, however are able to work for wages. For
example, Kishin Singh, an elderly Chamar and his wife work both, from time to
time work as wage labour. Gomti a Hindu widow works as a wage labourer to
earn her living. Young unmarried Hindu girls work as wage labour also, but
Umrao's girls do not. She goes to help her husband at the colhu but they
receive no extra money for this, it makes his work load easier.
Decision Making
Sample women, then, are responsible for a very wide range of tasks all of
which must be acheived successfully for their households to be well run on a
daily basis. One might reasonably expect that this would allow them a say
in how household resources are generated or dispensed with. To investigate
this issue sample women were specifically asked what part if any they played
in decisions regarding which crops to plant or whether to buy and sell
animals or land. This gives rise to a crude classification into those women
whose advice was sought and taken and those whose advice was not. It ought to
be borne in mind that this is a crude measure of the contribution of women to
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decisions and covers only one area of competence.^either does it consider the
role of women in fertility decision-making which will be considered in
chapter 10. Bearing this in mind, the answers women gave are summarised in
the table below.
Table 2:
Number of Women Involved in Household Decision Making among
Sample Women by Ethnic Group
NUMBER OF WOMEN
INVOLVED NOT INVOLVED TOTAL
RELIGION
Hindu 3 13 16^
Muslim 1 17 18
Total 4 30 34
Note: 1. Data were not collected from three Hindu women on this
topic.
Source: Key Informants 1983.
Very few women were involved at all in decisions relating to the way in which
household income and resources were generated or disposed of. Maqsudi
perhaps sums up the general picture best of all with the following astute
comment:
"My father-in-law and my husband make decisions nobody asks
women about anything ... we are only here to do the 'housework'."
Even in the few cases where Hindu women work in the fields, this seems to
have no effect on the power which a woman has to influence decisions.
Urmila, who as we saw above did work in the fields, had this to say:
"..that [decision-making] is the work of men, if they do ask, they
do as they please even then."
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About half of the women suggested that their husband's asked them what they
should do, but if they did not like the advice, they went ahead and did what
they pleased. One or two women gave this as a reason for not attempting to
even offer advice. Nirmala for example:
"My husband will do what he wants, even if I do not agree, and he
will not listen even if I want to prevent him, so that is why I do
not even offer advice."
Among the Muslims an interesting variation is that some women suggested age
as an added factor legitimising the power to make decisions. Najma for
example lives in a joint household with her husband and parents-in-law:
"my sasur is the oldest, he makes all the decisions and does not ask
me about anything."
Some Muslim women also suggested that they could spend or barter small
amounts of household grain for goods on offer from travelling salesmen, such
as vegetables or glass bangles, but that only their menfolk could decide to
buy or sell large amounts:
"if it is a question of selling a lot of grain, them men alone sell
it. I only sell grain to pay for needs around the house. Men sell
sugar cane so they pocket the money."
One or two women also said that sometimes they managed to obtain decisions
they were in favour of, but only when they happened to co-incide with what
their husband wanted anyway. Ruxana and her husband had together agreed to
buy a milk buffalo:
"For a long time we both wanted to buy a buffalo. We both made
the decision. Decisions generally get made if they are what my
husband wants. I may make suggestions on some matters, but he does
what he wants."
Women in the study villages are then responsible for all the work which
sustains and reproduces the material conditions of life outside production
and wage labour. It has been argued that though women in general are
responsible for this work in its entirety, this tells us little about the
work which individual women do. This varies according to class, the life
cycle, ethnic group and personal biography. Young unmarried women may be
involved in wage labour as are a few women beyond the childbearing years.
Some Hindu women also work in the cultivation of crops on their own family's
land though this work is restricted to the relatively low status tasks like
weeding and harvesting, not ploughing watering or fertilising. Most
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importantly this work does not increase the power they have over the produce
which comes from the fields. This remains in the hands of men, except at the
margins of consumption, when some women can exchange household produce for
daily needs of vegetables or other foodstuffs. Even when women work in
production then, this does not give them control over the product of their
labour, the land from which it is produced belongs to men and control rests
firmly with them.
The sexual division of labour in the study villages makes demands of women in
a very particular way. They are deeply embedded in the family as the
receivers of and processors of food and other materials required to sustain
life. They are never seen as producers, even when directly involved in
production. Their work away from cultivation and wage labour is seen as
natural and not thought of as work at all. Women as a group are
indispensable, but individual women are not thought of in this way. However,
because all of the work for which women are primarily responsible can be
relatedto their role as biological reproducers, it can easily be categorised
as non-work.
These two chapters have argued then that the structure of kinship and
marriage and the sexual division of labour associated with this operates in
the study villages to effectively isolate women from land and other
productive resources which might give them some autonomy. The 'conjugal
contract' in the study villages makes women dependent on their affines. They
have no resources with which to bargain for better positions. The household
is then both the locus of women's subordination and a considerable arena of
interest for them. There are no viable alternatives to marriage. Any autonomy
a woman gains must be within the confines of marriage and the affinal
household. As the final section above showed, however, the degree of autonomy
which women have in the study villages is very low indeed. In short the
structure of kinship and marriage and the sexual division of labour in the
study villages have a negative effect on women's autonomy. In the final two
chapters, I shall explore the consequences of this in relation to fertility
decision making.
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Chapter 9: Men and Fertility
An Unlimited Desire for Children of Either Sex?
In the next two chapters I want to analyse some questions of crucial
significance in relation to fertility. In the next chapter I will compare the
views of men and women on fertility. This chapter will examine the views and
intentions of sample men on fertility.
Firstly, the question of whether men want an unlimited number of children is
addressed by an examination of desirable family size and whether sample men
say they want any more children. Secondly, I examine whether sample men view
their sons and daughters as being of the same value. Thirdly, the effects of
class, ethnicity and mortality on fertility are examined. Finally, the views
of sample men on contraception are discussed.
Sources of Data
The data on which the following discussion is based come from two main
sources. The major source is a series of semi-structured interviews with men
on their networks and their family building intentions. The questions on
fertility were basically aimed at encouraging two topics of conversation. Did
the sample men think they had enough children, if so why and what did they
intend to do about having no more? If their family was too small, why and how
many more children would they have and what would they adopt as a family
planning method when their family had reached the size they wanted?
In addition I asked men whether they thought the government was right when it
said that two children were enough and that boys and girls were the same. The
discussions which I had with men on these issues form the basis of of this
chapter.
The second source of data used in this chapter is that obtained by female
research assistants from maternity histories. These maternity histories were
collected from all ever-married women in the two villages. This village-wide
data is used to examine some of the issues around fertility and child
mortality which are raised by the sample data.
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Desirable Family Size and Sex Composition
Table 1 summarises the overall pattern of fertility and fertility desire
among sample men.
Table 1:
Overall Pattern of Fertility Desires by Number of Current Live
































TOTAL 37 62 57 119 1.7 1.5 3.2
Source: Key Informants 1983.
The table shows that thirty-five percent of sample men feel that they already
have enough children and want no more. Those who want no more children have
on average about four live children, with two sons and just under two
daughters. Those wanting more children are at earlier parities on avarage.
They have 2.8 children with 1.5 sons and 1.3 daughters.
All except three men said that they did not want to have an unlimited number
of children, or had never thought about how many children they would have. In
other words, almost all of the men in my sample had some notion of the size
and composition of children they would like to have, even if they wanted to
have more. The most commonly given reason for wanting to limit the number of
children was that the men felt they would not be able to provide basic food
clothing and shelter for their children if they had too many. Shankar, for
example: Hindu, Chamar, parity 1 son, Class IV:
"I do not want to have more than three children. I only have a
little land and if I have more children than this, I will not be
able to feed, clothe and educate them. My sons will be poor enough
if there are only two of them - never mind any more than that"
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Some expressed the effect of having many children in such poor conditions a
little more graphically.
Naresh: Chamar parity 1 son, 1 daughter, Class III
"Three children, two boys and a girl would be best. Lots more than
this would be no good. If you have lots of children you never feel
under control. Some would be fighting and some sick, some would be
peeing and shitting all over the common courtyard. That was useless.
The smaller your family, the easier, the bigger, the more
difficult."
Desirable Sex Composition
The sex ratio of live children is slightly in favour of boys. This should not
however be taken as a sign that preference for sons is slight. It is rather
the result of the age and sex composition of living children. Mahipal for
example has four daughters and two sons. When I asked if he wanted more
children he said that he already had more than enough children. The problem
for Mahipal is that he wanted two sons. He did not want six children. His
expressed preference was for two boys and a girl. He had however been father
to four girls, a boy, a girl and a boy in that order.
I asked him why he had had that number of children. His answer is
instructive:
"I was desperate for sons"
He said that two or three children were enough :
"If you have more than this you will not be able to feed and clothe
them well. But plenty of people would have only girls and they would
continue to have children in the hope of a son or two."
When I asked him if he thought boys and girls were the same thing, he said:
"Boy equals girl is not wrong, but people here like boys better than
girls. Here in Hindustan, it is not like England. If a man had only
girls and they were all married then he will have to sit by himself
in his old age. If he has a son or two, then they will get jobs and
do their father's farming work and bring in wives and goods and
children. The house will grow full from them."
The importance of having sons of your own is paramount, even though it would
be possible for a daughter and her husband to come and live with her parents
after marriage. The status of ghar-jemai, however, is not a popular one
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among village men. It has great shame attached - the implication being that
you are living from the earnings of your wife. It also has little security,
as rights to affinal property are to say the least tenuous and may involve a
man in dangerous conflict with his wife's agnatic kin.
The only man with no sons who said he wanted no more children was a landless
chamar, Vikram. His wife was pregnant at the time of the interview and the
decision to have no more children was highly contingent on the outcome of the
latest pregnancy. His married sister, who was home on a visit for Tijo was
present during the early part of the interview.
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Vikram: "My wife is pregnant and after this I will have
enough children"
AL: "What if you have another girl?"
Vikram's sister: "He will certainly have a son. We have
all been praying that it will be a boy this time and
surely it will, because they have had two girls already"
AL: "The government says that two is enough. Is that right?"
Vikram: "Yes it is. Two children would be enough for me but I am
having a third to see if it will be a boy. Three or four children
are enough."
AL: "Is there no difference between two and four children?"
Vikram: "Two would have been enough but I do not have a son"
AL: "If the next is again a girl what will you do?"
Vikram: "It will be difficult to decide. I think I would have one
more after that. Girls go away after marriage and boys stay. A house
without a son would become useless."
Refering to Mamdani, I said that I had read that it was good to have as many
children as possible. What did he think of that?
Vikram: "This is not true. Daughters go away after their wedding
while boys would stay at home. Some men have eight children standing
behind them - where would they get the money to sustain and then
marry that many children on a daily wage of ten rupees when they
could get work. One boy and one girl are enough. I am having a third
child to try and have the one boy"
Only one man in the sample wanted his next child to be a daughter. When
interviewed, Jag Ram had four sons and he highlights the individual reasons
men have for wanting more children. Jag Ram now considers that he has more
than enough sons, but wants a daughter. Jag Ram had already told me that two
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children were enough. But the sex composition of your children has to be
acceptable too.
Jag Ram: "Ah! After the second son what we wanted was a daughter. We
have been looking for one ever since. When there are too many
children you cannot feed, clothe or send them to school nor arrange
good weddings for them. My sons will have very little land when it
comes their turn to be householders. If we could have a girl which
lived, we too would stop having children. My wife would be
sterilised. Sons and daughters are not the same . When a girl is
married, she goes away and stays at her own house. Who keeps their
daughters at home like their sons? - no-one! Boys stay at home and
look after the land, house and everything else. Because of this boys
and girls are different.
But you still need to have one daughter so that she can tie her
brother's Rakhi at Raksha Bandan. (the act during the festival which
above all symbolises the relationship between brother and sister as
one of love and protection) . You could have your neighbourhood
sisters do it for you, but this is not the same as a real sister. If
a son had no sister to tie on his rakhi he would be very upset.
AL: "Why then do you not need to have fewer or more than two sons.?"
Jag Ram: "If you have two daughters and a son, and the son died, the
daughters would have no one to go and fetch her from her sasural.
The sister would be stuck there on her brother's death. If you have
only one son he will have all the worry on his own head. If he had
no brother, who would look after the house while he was away
fetching his sister? It is impossible for one man to do all that
needed done on a farm - sometimes farming, sometimes a trip to the
sugar mill, sometimes visits to relations, sometimes ill."
For these reasons it is better to have two or three sons. It is
also possible that one son could turn out bad. If this were true, it
would be better to have a second son lest the first should fail you.
In any case, you certainly need to have one daughter, otherwise how
would sons be born." (Gales of laughter from accompanying men.)
Jag Ram then, in contrast to all the other men was waiting for a daughter.
But all the other men also had an idea of how many children they would like
and what the sex composition of their family should be. These were not a
group of men favouring unlimited fertility. Rather they were by and large at
an earlier stage in their life cycle with relatively strong views on how many
children they wanted and what their sex composition should be.
Devinder, a Dhimar in class III had already had four children by the time I
spoke to him. Three of these were still alive, all had been girls. He already
considered himself in a difficult position but wanted to have one more child
to see if it would be a son.
Devinder: "Two children are enough, otherwise how could a single
breadwinner earn all the money required to keep four or five
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children well fed and clothed. It is impossible. But I want to have
one more child and this should be a boy."
AL: "Are boys and girls the same thing?"
Devinder: "They are not! Boys are liked better. When a boy is born,
we sing and dance and make a big noise and have a jestawn and make
lots of celebrations. If it was a girl - then there was silence.
Boys have a big name and girls a little name. Girls go away after
they are married. Boys stay at home even after they are married to
look after their father and his land and so on. Daughters empty a
house while sons fill it.
It is possible of course that sons as well as daughters might leave their
parental home. However, in the study villages, outmigration is conspicuous
by its absence.
Class
Table 2 below shows the distribution of desire for more children by class
category.
Table 2:
Mean number of Children by Class and Desire for More Children
W A N T M 0 R E WAN T NO MORE
C H I L D R E N C H I L D R E N
NO. NO.
OF MEAN LIVE OF MEAN LIVE
CLASS MEN BOYS GIRLS MEN BOYS GIRLS
II 2 2.3 1.7 1 1.0 5.0
III 13 1.5 1.3 8 2.5 1.8
IV 4 0.8 1.7 2 1.5 1.5
V 4 1.5 0.8 2 1.5 1.5
TOTAL 24 1.5 1.3 13 2.0 1.9
Source: Key Informants 1983.
The numbers in the table are, of themselves, too small to be conclusive. They
suggest that the relationship between class and desired number of children is
positive. In the group wanting no more children, the class II man has six
children while those in classes IV and V have three on average. In the group
wanting more children, the class II households have four children and all the
other groups less than three. More qualitative data from the sample men
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suggest that the greatest difference is between those in class II and the
rest of the sample.
Only three male key informants thought that an unlimited number of children
was desirable and these men were all of class II and among the most wealthy
in the study villages. In Jhakri only Dilshad said he could see no limit to
the number of sons who would benefit him. He is an only son and was having
difficulty working the land because of labour shortage: his sister's husband
contrary to local norms lives in Jhakri and helps with the work.
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Dilshad: "I will take just as many children as God gives."
AL: "Will this never be too many?"
Dilshad: "No. I am on my own here and there is lots of room. There
are not enough people in the family to do all the work. The
government is wrong to say that two children are enough. One should
keep on having children.... we have lots of land and no one to work.
It will not matter if I only have girls from now on. I have only one
daughter and there is lots of room. The difference between sons and
daughters is not that great. Isn't my sister here with her husband.
He works for us. I will have more children, they will help with the
land and save me from being alone as I am now, the only worker?"
Bhagwana, a class II Dharmnagri farmer who originally said that his three
boys and three girls were enough finally said:
"As many children as I have, that many will benefit me. True, the
girls will go away. But the boys will bring brides in, and I have
equal numbers of both. I am not worried about having too many. I
will inherit 90 bighas (about 18 acres) from my father, so I will be
alright in my old age."
For these men, having many sons reduces their dependence on wage-labourers
and enhances income. Each son can expect a reasonable inheritance. Among the
others, only Nisar thought that a large number of children would benefit rich
and poor alike:
AL: "Are boys and girls the same thing?"
Nisar: "No boys stay and do service for their father girls go away
and if anyone sees benefit from their labours it is not her parents.
It is the same for labourers. If a labourer has three sons they
could earn Rs 10 - 15 a day each. If he had only one son then he
would earn a third of that. Is there not benefit in three sons?"
AL: "They would all have to be fed and clothed as well."
Nisar: "Yes, but they would earn more than they could eat. This is
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quite apart from the benefit of sons carrying on your name after you
were gone and giving you some rest in your old age."
The rest of the men think the benefit of more than two sons would be rather
limited no matter how much land a family holds. Liaqat, a Muslim in class
III, who owns about 20 bighas of bangar land has six sons and had this to
say:
I said that I had heard that it was good to have three or four sons to look
after the family farm when their parents were old. What did he think of this?
Liaqat: "Two sons are enough for this. I have about twenty bighas of
land and six sons. They will inherit just over three bighas each.
They will be neither farmers or labourers but will constantly be
worried about what type of work they should do to keep their family
alive. Two sons and a father were more than enough to look after
twenty bighas of land. Even two men were enough if the father should
become old and weak or if one of them should fall ill."
AL: "Is there any benefit in having eight children?"
Liaqat: "I am telling you there is no benefit, only pain. The
children have been born and of course they are my children and I
will look after and love them, but they will prove expensive. The
land will be fragmented and I have to arrange the marriages of all
eight and in the meantime I have to clothe and feed them and send
them to school.
Suleiman, a Shiekh, with only about 3 bighas land, was clear about the reason
for wanting more children and had a very definite idea that a smaller rather
than a larger number of children would have been beneficial to a man in his
position. He had had five daughters and wanted a son.
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Suleiman: (Laughing.) "I don't want anymore girls! I have more than
enough of them. I'd like to have a little bit of a boy. It is not
good to have lots of children. I think two boys would be enough, if
you have more than this, they just end up fighting over shares of
land. "
AL: "I have read that in the Punjab and Ludhiana, that a farmer of
labourer could benefit from just however many children he had. They
would all work and earn money for their parents. Is this true?"
Suleiman: "Well first of all you have to think of the
difference between boys and girls. If a man had a
hundred bighas then it might be true, but for people
like me with little land the right size of family is two
boys and a girl. Then I would have been able to give my
daughter away in marriage and the sons would have
brought in two brides. The sons would have been able to
help each other and my land would not be split into tiny
tiny plots when I die."
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Riasat a class III Teli, with about ten bighas of land said:
"I only have a little land. If I have few children I will be able to look
after them properly... if I have more, from where will I give them
anything?"
While Khalil, with 20 bighas pointed out that alternatives to using your
children as labour exist.
AL: "How many children do you need to work your twenty bighas?"
Khalil: "For twenty bighas, two men are more than enough. If there
were anymore than this they would not have enough to live in the
next generation after children had been born. Even if a man has a
hundred bighas, two men would be enough as they could hire mazdoors
(labourers)."
Rohtash, a class IV Dhimar whose wife had been sterilised after the birth of
their second child put it like this:
"Two children are enough - that is true for me. With two children I
will get some rest. We will stay happy. We ran into trouble with the
birth of our second child and we had to sell some prime bangar land
to pay of the debts we incurred then. We could not afford to do that
every time a child is to be born. If we had more than two children,
then I would have to work from morning till night to stop them from
going around naked and hungry. There would be no chance of keeping
them well fed and clothed. They would run around in rags on part
filled stomachs even if I could find work all the time.
It is reasonable to conclude here in the interim that outside of the richest
farmers, there is a wide ranging view that it is economically beneficial to
limit the number of children which you have. As we shall see below however,
this must be qualified somewhat to take account of other factors than class.
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Ethnicity
Table 3 shows the pattern of fertility desires by ethnic group.
Table 3:
Overall Pattern of Fertility Desires by Current Live Children
(Mean) and Religion
WANT MORE WANT NO MORE
CHILDREN CHILDREN
No No
of Number of Mean of Number of Mean
Men Children Number of Men Children Number of
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
HINDUS
12 16 19 1.3 1.3 7 10 17 1.4 2.4
MUSLIMS
12 20 13 1.7 1.1 6 16 8 2.7 1.3
TOTAL 24 36 32 1.5 1.3 13 26 25 2.0 1.9
Source: Key Informants 1983.
Of the 19 Hindu men in the sample 7 said that they now had enough children
and did not want any more. These men have on average just 3.8 living
children, 1.4 of whom are boys and 2.4 girls. The sex ratio is in favour of
girls, somewhat unexpectedly in the light of the arguments which I have made
relating to son preference. But as I have outlined above in relation to table
1, this is explicable by the birth order of children rather than sex
preference. The sample men in Dharmnagri who said they wanted more children,
were not expressing a blanket wish for an unlimited number of children.
Rather they had a clear idea of what the sex composition of their children
should be and they had not reached that composition as yet, either because
they were at too early a stage in their life cycle at the time of interview
to have had them, or they had had a string of children of one sex. The
pattern in Jhakri is more complex.
Table 3 shows that Muslim men who want no more children already have a
greater mean number of children than their Hindu counterparts. Thus Muslims
who want more children have as a group 1.7 mean boys and 1.1 mean girls,
while those Muslims who want no more children have a greater mean number of
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boys than corresponding Hindus (2.7 against 1.7).
The Jhakri group is more varied than the Dharmnagri group in terms of stage
in the life cycle. Some men are at very early stages, but equally six of the
ten have had five or more children - only two men are at an early enough
stage in the life cycle to have had the time only to have one child. In one
case, that of Ghulam's wife there was a period of infertility for which
treatment was sought. In the other, Ahmad's wife Asghari has
tuberculosis which affects her fertility. Yet another man,
Riasat, has had three children, two of whom have died.
The ethnic differences in the mean number of girls for the two groups is
somewhat more complex, with Hindus in both groups having more girls than
corresponding Muslims. As suggested above, this reflects the birth orders of
children rather than differing views on the sex composition of desirable
families.
Muslim men tended more to say that the number of children which they had
directly reflected the will of God. Accepted local rehtoric on fertility was
sometimes extremely difficult to get around. Without exception when asked
about fertility, their first reply was always that it was not up to them but
up to God. Nisar sums up the initial responses of Muslim men:
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Nisar: "I will take what God gives me. You should not ask anyone
else in the village this question, you will be wasting your time.
Everyone will say the same thing."
Jabruddin, for example, knew that he would prefer to have only three children
but would take what God had to give. When I asked how many more children he
would like, he replied:
"I will take what God gives."
AL: "God is creator, but you must think something about it in your
own heart."
Jabruddin: " Three children are enough, but only God knows what is
ahead of me. I have never tried to stop children and never will. The
government is wrong to say that two are enough, only God knows how
many children are enough. Even though I think that three children
are enough I will do nothing about it. It is up to God how many
children I have."
With the exception of one man, all those in Jhakri who say they have enough
children have four children or fewer. In additon, the sex ratio of live
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children for these men is heavily in favour of sons. All of the men in the
Jhakri sample who said they had enough children already have at least two
sons. This fits well with the general trend in discusions in which men by and
large preferred to have two sons. But I do not believe we are witnessing a
marginal process here. Some of the men, rather than stressing that they had
enough children were apt to say cynically sometimes that they had too many
children. But, as we shall see below, the feeling that they had too many
children should not be taken as a proxy for the imminent adoption of some
family planning technique.
Mortality
Table 4 summarises the infant and child martality experience of key
informants.
Table 4:
Infant and Child Mortality as a Percentage of all Live Births by
Sex of Children, Class and Desire for More Children
WANT MORE WANT NO MORE
Class CHILDREN CHILDREN TOTAL
Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All
II 0 17 8 50 0 14 11 9 10
III 27 35 28 9 42 26 19 38 29
IV 0 12 9 0 0 0 0 11 8
V 33 0 25 40 50 45 36 33 35




(10 ) (11) (21) ( 6) (12) (18) (16) (23) (39)
Source: Key Informants' Maternity Histories 1983.
Sample men as a group have extensive experience of child mortality. On the
whole, a quarter of all children born to these men have subsequently die.
Girls are more likely to die than boys (29% against 21%), although the data
are not sensitive enough to pick up differences in the survival chances of
first born and higher parous daughters.
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Comparing those men who want more children with those who do not highlights
that those with enough children have lost a greater proportion of girls
everborn than those who want more children (32% against 26%). Conversely
those who want more children have lost a greater percentage of sons everborn,
22%, than those who want no more, 18%.
The pattern of mortality by class is somewhat more difficult to discern,
partly because of the small numbers involved from a demographic point of
view. The data suggest that children in class IV have a much greater chance
of survival than those of any other class. However, the 6 households in class
IV, account for only 11% of children everborn to the sample. It is difficult
therefore to attach great significance to this finding. The pattern of
mortality experience is otherwise negatively related to class.
Among the more affluent, there is a clear pattern of higher overall mortality
among those who want no more children than those who want more. But the
numbers of men here are too small to allow any conclusion to be drawn with
confidence. However, this relationship disappears among the poorer class IV
and V informants, whose mortality experience is more varied than their richer
counterparts. Once again the number are small, but a qualitative analysis of
the data suggests an underlying trend of greater mortality among
poorer informants. For example, five of the eleven children born to the two
class V men who did not want any more children have subsequently died. Those
class V informants who want more children are at an early stage in their life
cycle. Their children are still young enough to be at greater risk of life
threatening illness than their older siblings.
The replies of some men to my line of questioning was certainly influenced by
recent tragic deaths among their children. Wajid, a class V Teli, had, in the
few months before fieldwork began lost a 14 year old son in a sudden illness.
There were rumours that the boy had been effectively killed by dispensary
staff, who injected him five times in one night before he died. Another of
his three remaining sons was sick with similar symptoms when I interviewed
him. He himself was sick with malaria.
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Wajid: "I cannot say, this is for God to decide. I have had four
sons which is more than enough, but God has not given me a daughter.
Now one of my sons has died and who knows whether the second will
live or not?
AL: "Are the government right when they say two are enough?"
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Wajid: "They are right, if I had two children I would be able to
feed and clothe them properly. But it is God who decides how many
children I will have not the government. They [the government] can
take away the power to have children by sterilisation, but they
cannot give you children back if they die"
Among the sample men, Mansur, a class III Sheikh, has extensive experience of
infant mortality. Of five children born to him and his wife three - two girls
and a boy - have died. He farms jointly with his father. He had this to say.
AL: "Are two children enough"
Mansur: "No, two children are not enough. If you only have two and
they die after you are sterilised, then you would be in great
trouble. You would have neither a daughter to give (in marriage) or
a son to look after the farm and his mother and father. Those who
have no children will lie on their charpais staring helplessly at
the thatch in their old age. They will be too old to make any money,
and will have no one to do it for them."
Zakir, a class V Teli exhibited similar logic when asked similar questions:
AL: "Are two children enough?"
Zakir: "No, if you only have two and then have sterilisation like
the government said and they die, then what would you do? If you
have lots of children and two die, you will still have some left."
The pattern of mortality is clearer among the sample by religion than by
class as the following table shows.
Table 5:
Infant and Child Mortality as a Percentage of all Live Births by


















TOTAL 22 26 24 18 32 26 21 29 25
Number of
Deaths (10) (11) (21) (6) (12) (18) (16) (23) (39)
Source: Key Informants' Maternity Histories 1983.
Looking at the overall pattern, those men wanting more children have lost a
greater proportion of sons and a lesser proportion of daughters than those
wanting no more. However, a greater proportion of Muslim children have died
198
than Hindu. Thirty-four percent of all children born to Muslim sample men
have died, against 14% of Hindu children. There are also large difference in
the sex-specific infant and child mortality rates. Among Hindus, the
proportions, at 10% for boys and 16% for girls, are relatively even compared
to the Muslims among whom 43% of girls everborn have died. Among those
Muslims wanting no more children half of all girls ever born have died.
Son preference leaves us with a conundrum to solve though. Why is it
reflected more starkly in the Jhakri than the Dharmnagri figures? The sample
size is small, and it may be that the different sex compositions reflect this
rather than any more meaningful configuration of explanations.
But what do data for the whole village show? If the same level of mortality
differential and sex composition, then there is a stronger case to be made
that this difference indicates some inadequacies in using a demographic
regimes approach to fertility. If we were to accept Dyson and Moore's
argument that marriage distance is a good proxy for female autonomy we would
expect Muslims to have have less drastic female mortality rates than Hindus
since they marry closer. The fact remains that Muslim rates of fertility and
female mortality are both higher than those of Hindus and not only among the
sample as table 6 below shows.
Table 6:
Mean Number of Births and Infant & Child (0-4) Mortality Rate by
Religion: Study Villages, September 1985
Average Number of Births per woman
Muslim Hindu Sched Caste All
All Ages 5.19 4.71 5.07 4.96
Mortality Rate per 1000 Births
Male 272 148 203 208
Female 399 157 260 275
All 336 156 229 242
No of (88) (102) (54) (244)
Mothers
Source: Maternity Histories 1985.
Demographically speaking, the numbers in this table are small - 244 ever-
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married women and 1136 live births and there are no statistically significant
differences. But the village data seem to fit with the picture of higher
Muslim fertility and mortality. Additionally, the sex specific rates are
higher for girls than for boys in every group, with the Muslim rate being
exceptionally high. Almost forty percent of all Muslims girls born die befoe
their fifth birthday. This finding corroborates the sample findings,
outlined above, in which Muslim men who said they did not want anymore
children have both a higher proportion of sons and female deaths.
Decisions about Contraception
One interesting feature of the interviews is that although men have a clear
idea of the number of children they want, they are less clear on what they
will do about limiting children once they have reached their desired number
and sex composition. A desire for no more children on the part of sample men
does not necessarily imply the imminent adoption of some fertility limitation
technique. We have already seen in the landholding chapter that some women
were already practicing some form of contraception. By definition, however,
women married to the men in my sample were not in this group. What factors
influence whether they are likely to do so?
The single most important factor is religion. The most important difference
between Muslim and Hindu men was in their willingness to use contraceptive
techniques. Muslim informants were not prepared to contemplate sterilisation
as a method of birth control, whereas Hindus gave this as the method they
were likely to adopt when they reached their desired family size and
composition. Suleiman is a good example of the Muslim position:
AL: "After you have two sons, will you make some arrangements to
stop having children?"
Suleiman: "No it is against my religion to do that, you cannot go
around saying that two is enough when the Koran says that god will
provide. There is only one instance when we would use pills. After
my grandchildren are born, it would look shameful if we had more
children. I would use the pill then.
For some Muslim men the Koran Sharif was interpreted to mean that they should
not accept sterilisation as a means of birth control, while for others it
meant that Muslims should not practice any form of birth control. We have
already seen instances of the latter above, where men who said they did not
want anymore children also said that they would not practice any form of
family planning. Haroon is a good example of this.
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Haroon: "I do not want anymore children. Three (two boys and a girl)
are more than enough. But what can I do, only God knows how many
more children I want, or rather will have."
He went on to say that the Koran Sharif told him that God would provide for
children and that sterilisation was contrary to the tenets of Islam. Then I
asked:
AL: "If you think you have enough children and it is not against
your religion, why don't you use the contraceptive pill?"
Haroon: "Maybe my wife will not have any more children, and then the
money I spend on pills will be wasted, if there are more children,
God will provide"
I pursued this point, but Haroon and the other men in the bhaitak were tense
and exasperated by my line of questioning. The final comment came from Yasin,
Khalil's father's younger brother who was also present:
"Muslims can use pills, but they will not and that is that. No
matter how many men you ask, you will get the same answer."
Haroon: "The government is wrong to say that two children is enough"
AL: "But you think that three are enough."
Haroon: "This is true, but only God knows how many children are
enough. I will tell God in a prayer that I want no more children,
but if they come, then they come"
This line was not however taken by all Muslim men who wanted no more
children. At least two of the men who wanted no more children, had with their
wives, tried to secure an abortion for their latest pregnancy ( successful in
only one case.) Some of the others had tried pills after our visit to the
village in 1983.
Khalil has four live children, two girls followed by two boys.
AL: "Do you want any more children?"
Khalil: "Definitely not."
AL: "Why not?"
Khalil: "Why do you only have two or three in your country, because
they are expensive? It is the same here. If you have lots of
children then how are you supposed to feed, clothe and educate
them?"
AL: "Why did you want four children?"
Khalil: (Laughing) "What should I tell you? It was God's will that I
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should have four."
AL: "Why did you not want a different number?"
Khalil: "Two would have been enough, if one of them had been a boy.
My children were just born without any planning. Now we have been
using the pill for about eight months. We buy it from Bijnor."
The most unequivocal statements of having too many children though came from
Liaqat. In 1983 I had a protracted conversation with him about the number of
children her had. He is father to six boys and two girls, none of whom have
died. He wanted no more than three children, and had gone to the dispensary
to ask about family planning after his third child. He was unsure about
sterilisation but thought that the dispensary staff would be able to suggest
something else, but
AL: "How many children do you have?"
Liaqat: (throwing his head back to the sky and laughing) "Eight!"
AL: "Do you think that is too many?"
Liaqat: "I will have no more children."
AL: "Were eight children necessary?"
Liaqat: (Laughing) "Are you joking? Of course it is too many."
AL: "What will you do?"
Liaqat: "I will get you to write down the name of some medicine."
AL: "If you did not want eight children, why did you not use some
medicine before now?"
Liaqat: "I didn't know about it. I have been praying let there be no
more children, let there be no more children, for a long time now -
since the third child was born. I went to see the doctor and the ANM
(Auxilliary Nurse Midwife) in the dispensary and they told me there
was no such medicine. They told me that the doctors were thinking
about it but had not come up with anything yet and that I should
have sterilisation instead. But I am a farmer and have to work hard
and am therefore scared that sterilisation would leave me or my wife
weak, the ANM called me about six months ago and said that there was
a new steriliasation operation [laproscapy] and that I could have it
done in Meerut. She said that they would pay for my wife to go and
would pay all her expenses until ten days after the operation. I was
ready to go, but then she said that I should bring one other woman
from Jhakri in addition to my wife. Bringing my own wife is one
thing but asking me to bring the wife of someone else is too much. I
have no right, nor have they (the ANM) to tell anyone that they had
better not have anymore children. I want no more children, but
someone else might want to have lots. I refused and they again told
me that there was no other medicine."
He asked me about the pill and I told him what I knew. He said that if he had
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known about this medicine he would have used it. Hindu sample men were more
likely to consider sterilisation as a form of birth control. For example, I
spoke with Pratap, a class III Dhimar. He had already told me that he
preferred the idea of a smaller rather than a larger family.
AL: "What does your wife think of this?"
Pratap: "She agrees that we should have a smaller rather than a
larger family. She is the same as me in wanting at least one son."
AL: "What will happen then?"
Pratap: "My wife will be sterilised."
AL: "What if your next child is a girl?"
Pratap: "We will then have to see what God has in store for us in
the next one. We need to have one son."
Pratap's younger brother Punni, though he exhibited the same logic when
discussing family size and composition, was in a better position to make more
definite plans as he already has a son.
AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Punni: "I want one more boy. Two boys are better than one as they
can help each other and bring their sister home from her sasural
more easily."
AL: "What if the next child is a girl?"
Punni: "Two boys and a girl would be best, but even if the next
child is a girl, my wife will still be sterilised. You could die
waiting for God to give you a
son."
Riasat in his mid 20's has one daughter. His wife had had another stillborn
daughter the year before and he now wanted one more child - a boy. He was
unsure about what they would do if a subsequent child was another girl. He
thought that he would try to have a son. He wanted to have at least one son.
If his still born daughter had lived, they would certainly have tried for
another pregnancy to obtain a boy. But he would not have an unlimited number
of daughters while trying for a son
AL : "What will you do when you have a son?"
Riasat: "I will not have sterilisation, that is against Islam. I
will fetch some medicine for my wife from Bijnor. I will buy those
goley poley (pills) you told me about from the chemist. What if my
wife does not agree? I will show her the fatstick I was talking
about earlier, [in an earlier conversation about taking permission
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from him to visit her parents he said that if she went to her
parents without taking his permission, he would beat her with a
bamboo stick]
Like other men in the Jhakri sample, he feels that sterilisation is not
possible and intends to use the pill as a method of contraception. Will this
be possible? In principle it should be. The dispensary has a supply, but
Riasat does not trust the dispensary staff to give him the correct pills at
all. This implies a trip to Bijnor to pick them up every time they run out,
on his own incentive and from his time, in a busy agricultural cycle.
Part of the key to understanding this I think lies in a basic and well placed
mistrust of government family planning services. All men who said they would
think about obtaining the pill for their wives said they would fetch it from
a private doctor in Bijnor and not from the conveniently placed dispensary.
This is part of a more general feature of distrusting government health
services, of which people's experience is generally bad.
This is a widely expressed distrust. Consider the following conversation. I
had spoken to Khalil about his own fertility plans and then asked him about
sterilisation. The ensuing conversation highlights many of the shortcomings
and misgivings which many people had about the government medical services on
offer.
AL: "Are two children enough?"
Khalil: "In one way it is right."
Nisar, who his cousin, was sitting in the background shaking his head in
disagreement and saying it was completely wrong.
Khalil sat back and drew on the hooka, reflecting for a moment, and then
continued on the subject of sterilisation.
Khalil: "It is wrong in this way though. The government say that two
are enough, they persuade you to have nasbandi, they take away your
possibilty of having any more children. Then when your children were
sick, they never look at you. If you go to the hospital and give
them the 50 paisa for the prescription, then they will give useless
pills which were all broken and powdered and old. They would not
give you good medicines unless you went privately and paid them four
or five rupees. If a man had nasbandi, and his children became sick
then you could expect the government to do nothing and they would
die.
The government have made this rule for their own benefit, to solve
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their own problem, they were not thinking of the poor at
all they have made their own law that two is enough to suit
themselves, and then they force sterilisation on people. Until they
start to think of the poor, and what they need, then sterilsation is
no good, people do not want a thousand children. Who wants a lot of
children these days? Who can afford them? But people do not like
sterilisation, because they think the governemnt will not look after
them afterwards."
Denial of medicines and rough treatment at the hands of the medical services
was something which villagers had in common, they had come to expect nothing
else. Anyone would tell you of their experiences at the government medical
centres. Santosh for example presented herself for ante-natal tetanus
injections, and was told she could have them - if she volunteered for
sterilisation after the baby was born.
Part of the reason for not adopting sterilsation as a means of family
planning, or using the government health service as a source of other forms
of family planning, is that the services themselves have done nothing to
prove that they can meet any need other than their own. If a villager goes
for advice on family planning other than sterilisation, the health worker is
likely to suggest precisely the latter. If you accept, the health service
will not look after your children when they are sick. Furthermore, both
sterilisation and the pill require proper pre and post-adoption check-ups,
neither of which was available to villagers at the time of the study.
The pill is not seen as a spacing contraceptive by the men in either village.
It is seen as an alternative terminal method to sterilisation. The men liked
the idea that as long as their wives took the pill they would not conceive
but that if any of their children should die they could have others if
necessary. Only Ghulam saw the pill differently. He had already confided to
me that he thought he had been married too early. He was studying M.Comm in
Bijnor and felt that early marriage and childbirth would interupt his
studies. Whenever we spoke about the issue of children, Ghulam was always
very secretive and would creep around and look up the sides of buildings in
the best ham tradition , to make sure no one would overhear, before embarking
on a conversation. He was afraid lest his father should find out that he was
not too keen to have children this early in his marriage. We were sitting out
in front of his father's bhaitak. I asked him how many more children he
wanted. He put his finger to his lips to quiet me and getting out of his
chair crept stealthily into the bhaitak to make sure that no one was asleep
inside. He came back and looked up and down the road. Leaning right across to
me he whispered:
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"It would have been better if I had not been married at all. I was
not ready for it. I told my father so, but he went ahead with it
anyway. I don't want to have too many children, I would be bogged
down by them."
AL : "So how many do you want?"
Ghulam: (grinning) "At least a hundred!"
Entering into the sprit of this I made to write his answer down.
Ghulam: "No! No! I'm only joking. Two or three children are enough.
It does not matter whether they are boys or girls. Then I will see
what God has in store for me."
AL: "When you have the number of children you want what will you
do?"
Ghulam: "You mean like nirodh (condoms) or tablets? [he lowered his
voice further still]. We have used tablets once already. They were
called something like UG40. I think they were for twenty-one days.
We used them only for one month. I bought them myself in Bijnor
without my father's knowledge and I will get more."
I was intrigued and asked more, whose decision had it been? Did his wife
agree? What if she hadn't?
Ghulam: "The decision was mine. My wife agreed with me. But if she
hadn't it would have made no difference. I would have made her eat
them in front of me. This would have been difficult though, she
might have told my father."
Ghulam was highly motivated not to have too many children too quickly, but as
his own story suggests, he was not really in a position to be completely in
control of his wife's fertility, or to have the number of children he wanted.
In fact his experience of using the pill is typical of those one or two
sample men who had used it with their wives. Its use was usually discontinued
after a short time either because it was too inconvenient to go to Bijnor
every time the supply run out or its further use was unacceptable becuase it
was deemed, through its effect on the menzstrual cycle to cause heating
illnesses associated with the retention of menstrual blood.
In these circumstances, it would appear that Hindu men are more likley to
have their wives adopt sterilisation as a method of contraception. In no case
are Muslims willing to try this. Sample Muslims were attracted to the idea of
the contraceptive pill, but under existing conditions are most likely to be
unable to obtain timely supplies if they choose to adopt it as a method.
However, it should be assumed that once the decision to adopt sterilisation
has been taken that it will immediately be followed through. Perhaps the last
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word on this should go to Mahipal. In the monsoon of 1985 Mahipal considered
his family complete. He thought that he would send his wife to be sterilised
in the winter. It was not possible to have the operation done in the monsoon.
He said this was partly because they would need money not only for the
operation itself, but also for medicine and sustaining food during the post
operative period. This money was not available to them in the monsoon, the
slackest agricultural period of the year.
Mahipal: "We have milk from our own buffalo and we could make some
ghee [clarified butter] but would need to have money in case
something went wrong. The monsoon is not a good time of the year to
have an operation, the weather is bad. The wound could become more
easily infected at this time of the year than at any other. We have
not made a decision about exactly when yet. We will wait and see
when we have the money and have the operation done then."
Just as the interview was finishing Mahipal added another reason for waiting,
the risk of his infant son, which he had desired for so long, dying during
his first six months of life.
"Look at my children! They are running around half naked! If I had
had boys in the begining we would have been much better off. We will
be better waiting till the winter in every sense before having the
(sterilisation) operation done."
I asked what he meant.
"Well, in addition to what I have told you before, my son is weak
still. If he is stronger in the winter and everything else is better
then it will all work out"
Conclusions
The first conclusion to be drawn from the data presented above is that as a
group, sample men did not want an unlimited number of children. With the
exception of three class II men, all had a clear idea of the size and sex
composition of family which they wanted.
Those who intially said they wanted no limit on the number of children they
had were mostly Muslims, and in discussion the reasons for this were either
that they thought it against Islam to use any form of family planning, or in
a few cases, some aspect of their own family history and experience led them
to want a high enough number of children for this to appear unlimited.
It is not surprising that men who said they had had enough children did not
want an unlimited number of children and most of these thought that two boys
and a girl would have been enough. But of these men, only one has fewer than
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this.
What is perhaps more surprising is that among the Dharmnag'ri men even those
men who said that they did not have enough children wanted to limit their
family size. They were in an early stage in their life cycle. They too
envisaged limiting their family size when their family had safely grown to a
size and composition which they deemed to be acceptable.
Secondly, a factor which strongly infuences completed family size is the sex
composition of surviving children. Not one of the men in my sample regardless
of any social indicator by which they might be grouped, thought that boys and
girls had the same worth. They all prefered boys. They all expected that
their sons would stay at home, while their daughters, when they reached
puberty would be married and move away from their parental home taking a
substantial dowry with them.The former could be expected to make some
contribution to the household in their adult years while the latter could
not.
Dowry as suggested above (in Chapter 3), does vary with wealth. But it also
has a minimally-defined level below which it cannot fall without the marriage
chances of daughters being harshly affected. Neither does this outflow of
wealth stop with dowry, it continues afterwards in numerous prestations and
the general ethos of aysymetrical relations between bride givers as inferior
and bride takers as superior.
But, the marriage of a daughter not only represents the outflow of a
substantial amount of wealth, but the permanent removal of women from their
natal households. This is why people talk about their houses becoming empty
on the marriage of a daughter. They mean not only wealth, but people and
possibility of the continuation of family line. Daughters produce heirs not
for their own parents but for the parents of their husbands.
In these circumstances, sons are essential not only to the continuation of
family line, but, in the absence of any other form of security, to ensure
that parents have some degree of rest in their old age. Some of the large
family sizes in the sample can be explained by this fact alone. Mahipal had,
by his own definition, to have too many children, in order to secure two
sons.
It is worth noting, however, that poorer men had fewer expectations on this
front than their richer counterparts, a fact which is born out by the more
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extended intergenerational structure of richer households. Poor men, by and
large, set up house on their own after marriage. While the sons of the more
landed, as suggested in earlier chapters, are more likely to remain in joint
production with their parents or siblings.
Most men wanted to limit their fertility, after they had safely reached a
certain number of children. This is complicated by the fact that sons are
preferred to daughters, so that in order to gain a certain number of desired
sons, it may be necessary, if earlier parity children are girls, to have
several children more than desired, in order to secure the required number of
sons.
The sample data would also suggest that religion is a contributory factor to
fertility desires. Muslim sample men reach larger family sizes before they
decide that they want no more children. In additon Muslim mortality rates for
both boys and girls, but especially the latter are higher than their Hindu
counterparts, both for the sample and the entire population of both villages.
I have not undertaken any detailed analysis of why this is so and to what
extent the two phenomenon are linked. However, conversations with Muslim
sample men would suggest that there is a positive link between the two,
although the direction of causation is not clear. Muslim men did, however,
state that a reason for not adopting sterilisation was the possibility of
further child deaths afterwards.
What are the implications of these findings for the economic theory of
fertility? Firstly, it would seem that there is a positive relationship
between fertility desires and class. Only three men in the sample wanted an
unlimited number of children and these were all class II men. However, among
the rest of the sample there is a widely held view that while some children,
especially sons, are necessary, there is a limit to this. There is no
evidence to suggest that the poor's knowledge of contraception is any worse
than their richer counterparts among sample men. Mortality, a supply factor
in economic terms} and not included in the demand for children,seems to
have a positive effect on desire for more children.
Perhaps the single most important conclusion to be drawn from the data
presented above is that there is wide variation both in experience of
fertility and mortality. Such wide variability, cautions against any
monocausal theory, whose assumptions are cast so widely that they explain
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everything and nothing at the same time. Conditions in the one village which
Mamdani studied in the Punjab in the early 1970's may have favoured high
fertility, but the data presented here suggest that a supranational theory of
peasant pronatality is immoderate.
In terms of Mamdani's framework, sample men do not agree with his conclusion
of1 more means better. All sample men but three suggested that family
limitation at some level was benficial. Of those three who did not, one
quoted religious reasons rather than economic ones as the spur to unlimited
fertility. Neither did sample men agree that boys and girls are of homogenous
value to their parents. In the next chapter I want to see if the views of
women differ from those of their menfolk.
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ChapterlO: Women and Fertility
"When I knew I was pregnant, I was very happy! When I have so many
children already, should I be happy? But when it has happened, then
what should I do? It's God's decision, what can I do about it? I
don't want anymore children, have I only a few? When do men ever
think about this, and what can we women do?
Latifan, mother of eight children.
The last chapter showed that sample men in Dharmnagri and Jhakri did not want
an unlimited number of children. Nor do they consider their sons and
daughters to be of equal value to them. One central question remains to be
answered. Do men and women always want the same number of children?
This issue is of considerable theoretical interest, since some recent studies
suggest alternative conclusions on this issue. Mead Cain (1984) explicit^
analyses the effect of son preferences on fertility and has a great deal of
explanatory value. His model, based upon risk-averting strategies, is
heuristic in that it alerts us to the inadequacies in a model which takes
little account of uncertainty. His treatment includes the usual argument that
a larger than desired number of children may be born to couples in order that
they may have a desired number of surviving sons. It goes beyond this,
however, to look at the need which women may have for sons in societies
where, because of restrictions on their movements, they are not able, in the
event of widowhoood, to earn an independent living.
His criticism of Dyson and Moore (1983) is that they build their argument on
the assumption that women, by and large, desire to have fewer children than
their husbands (assuming that no one else affects the decision). If women
had more autonomy, therefore, they would choose to have fewer children.
Cain maintains that this is mistaken. Lower fertility in the South India
where women have more autonomy comes not from different fertility desires,
but from the effect of underlying effects of other variables on fertilty.
That is through differences in the age at marriage operating through
education, which is allowed in the south because of lesser patriarchical
control over women, or patterns of cohabitation which may vary by
landownership (1982, 1984).
Cain argues then, that the family is a corporate unit and as such, women are
likely to have similar fertility desires to their husbands. The rest of the
paper then concentrates on showing how even when women have more autonomy,
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the effect of this on fertility can be mitigated by the form of the family.
For example women in Jamacia have a greater degree of autonomy than women in
Asia, but still have a high fertility rate because they enter a number of
unions with men who take no responsibilty for the bearing of children.
Cain's argument can be summarised as follows: the pattern of fertility we are
presented with on the subcontinent can be partly understood in terms of the
need to reduce the risk of destitution and overwork in the later stages of
life. Sons provide an insurance against such risk and are therefore
desirable. Other uncertainties - such as the defaulting of sons on their
duties to look after parents; infant and child mortality; the birth of
daughters etc; means that fertility is often higher than one would anticipate
if risk factors were not taken into consideration. To understand these
effects fully, one must take both the autonomy of women and the structure of
marriage into account. Briefly stated, this is presented by Cain as the
"strongest conjugal bond and the least independence for women give the
highest fertility rates." There are no fertility reduction success stories in
countries where the structures of patriarchy are strong. For Cain, the family
is a corporate unit in which women have a considerable interest and therefore
their fertility desires are likely to be similar to those of their husbands.
Cain's argument is a tempting one to accept for the sub-continent, as it
locates the fertility desires of women at the level of structure. But is it
really acceptable to say that the fertility desires of women in Dharmnagri
and Jhakri are similar to the men with whom they live?
The shortcoming in Cain's analysis is the assumption that considerable
interest means that women have the same interests as men within the family.
This is a considerable leap of faith. There is no logical connection which
leads one to the conclusion that having a considerable interest in the family
should lead women to have the same fertility desires as their husbands.
Socialist feminists in recent writings (Whitehead: 1981; Leonard and Delphy:
1984; Benria and Sen: 1982) suggest that the family is a considerable area of
interest for women but is also the the immediate locus of their oppression.
At the heart of Cain's cricism of Dyson and Moore's argument is that the
latter's marriage distance analysis is misguided, because it assumes that if
women were more autonomous, they would choose to have fewer children. Cain
argues that at the level of population growth, autonomy is likely to operate
through proximate variables, such as the effect of education on age at
marriage rather than through desires and autonomous action to limit
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fertility.
Women clearly have an interest in having at least some children. At present,
there is little viable alternative to marriage for most women in India, and
women therefore must make the best they can of it. Their future power and
well being depend upon having children. Like their husbands, they will depend
upon their sons to provide for them in their old age. The number of sons they
have will also determine the number of daughters-in-law they have control
over when these sons are married. But does this allow us to say that women's
fertility interests are the same as their husband's and that there is
therefore no conflict of interests between men and women within the family?
Here there is more than academic interest. If we are to understand what we
might effectively do to improve the position of women in India, we must
properly understand the structures and processes within which they live their
lives. At the level of policy Cain's analysis is not helpful. He maintains
that there are no success stories of fertility decline where the structures
of patriachy are strong, but makes no analysis of the meaning of structures
for women, in their everyday lives, within the family. That women cannot make
a living outside the family affects those women inside the family too. His
comparison of Asia to Jamaica is interesting and alerts us to the fact that
merely changing one aspect of structure or the other will make little
difference to fertility.
The important question arising from this is if Asian women had more autonomy,
would they choose, ceteris paribus, to have fewer children? What light does
an examination of data collected from sample women cast on this issue? The
rest of this chapter forms an examination of this question.
It is not my intention to examine the fertility desires of women on their
own, in the manner in which those of men were examined in the last chapter.
There are two main reasons for this. The first is that my main focus in this
thesis has been the fertility rationale of men. In this context, a
comparative analysis of the views of men and women serves to explainmore than
a replication of the last chapter, substituting women for men would. This is
not meant to be a denial of the importance of these views. Jeffery, Jeffery
and Lyon (forthcoming) provides for a fuller treatment of these views. Here
the focus is on fertility decison-making.
The second reason is that the data relating to women was collected, not by
me, but by other members of the Social Organisation of Childbearing Project.
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As I have already outlined, the main focus of that project is the social
organisation of childbearing. Consequently, the data collected from women has
a different direction than that collected by me from men. This makes a direct
comparison of the views of men and women on specific topics impossible.
Sources of Data
The women whose views form the basis of the fertility analysis in this
chapter are all key informants, the wives of the men whose views were
presented in the last chapter. These women were selected into our sample
primarily because they had either recently delivered a baby or were pregnant
when fieldwork began. Information on fertility was collected from these women
during the course of an interview, conducted by research assistants or
Patricia Jeffery which included questions on their most recent experience of
pregnancy and childbirth. In relation to fertility, the women were
specifically asked whether or not they were happy to find themselves pregnant
during their most recent pregnancy and whether they wanted more children.
The rest of this chapter takes the following form. Firstly the number of
living children which women with different fertility desires is examined.
Secondly, I examine whether the desire for further children among sample
women is the same as that of their husbands. Thirdly, the circumstances in
which these views coincide and vary are examined. Finally, some
conclusions on fertility decision making are drawn in the light of these
data.
Number of Living Children
Table 1 summarises the relationship between the number of children women have
and whether they want more children.
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Table 1:




















Total 37 62 57 119 1.7 1.5 3.2
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
It is clear from the table that those women in the sample who want more
children are at an early stage in their childbearing careers. In comparison
with the men as a group, it is interesting to note here that women as a group
say that they want more children at lower parities than men. The average
number of live children for men in this category is 2.6, for women the figure
is only 1.9.
In common with men as a group, women who want no more children have on
average 4 live children with almost exactly the same sex composition as the
men. In short, these women are at greater parities than those who want more
children.
Do Women and Men want the Same Number of Children?
It is difficult to arrive at the correct degree of subtlety in such an
analysis. It would be wrong to characterise relationships between men and
women as being interests ranged against each other at all times. Structural
factors working against the interests of women have already been outlined in
a previous chapter: isolation; separation of consumption interests; control
over resources; age and control over sexuality; do affect women in various
ways. One must bear in mind though that any attempt to describe the complex
ways in which these factors find their way into the daily behaviour and
expressed views of informants is likely to be overdrawn. However, the
following table illustrates that the views of women on fertility do differ
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from those of men outlined in the last chapter.
Table 2:











It is clear from this table that sample men and women do not have the same
fertility aims. A greater number of sample women than men are inclined not to
have any more children. However, this aggregate view, is too simplistic to
tell us much about what these differences mean in practice. If we introduce
religion into the analysis, the picture is that presented in table three.
Table 3:










WOMEN 4 9 13
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
14 10 24
This table indicates that while a smaller number of women than men want more
children overall, only 4 Muslim women, less than a quarter of Muslim women in
the sample want to have any more children, while two-thirds of Muslim men
want more children. This difference is not so stark between Hindu men and
women. Twelve Hindu men and nine Hindu women want to have more children. It
is wrong to assume from this data, however, that some Muslim women disagree
with their husbands while Hindu husbands and wives agree about the number of
children they should have. Table four looks at this data a little more
closely by an examination about the extent of agreement between husbands and
wives on fertility intentions.
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Table 4:
Extent of Agreement Between Husbands and Wives on Fertility
Desires
Number of Couples

























TOTAL 11 13 2 11 37
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
Several interesting features emerge here. The first is that, overall, 60% of
couples agree on whether they want more children or not. These are made up of
eleven couples who agree that they want no more children and another eleven
who agree that they both want more children. Between the two ends of this
ends of this spectrum there is considerable variation. Among the Hindus of
the seven couples who are disagreed, in five cases the husband wants more
children, and in two the wife. Among the Muslims, none of the women want more
children when their husband does not, while eight husbands do.
This variation goes to the heart of the debate outlined above. I intend
therefore to spend the rest of this chapter unpacking it in some detail. I
will proceed by discussing each of the categories in the table above in a
section of its own. In this way some understanding of the effects of these
agreements and disagreemnts and their effects on fertility can be understood.
It should be borne in mind throughout what follows that the relative views of
husbands and wives were collected at different times, in all except one case.
Both Husband and Wife want More Children
This group, perhaps not surprisingly, has the smallest mean number of boys
and girls. Typically, they are at early stage in their married life, when the




Numbers of Children Where Both Husband and

















Total 11 8 11 19 0.7 1.0 1.7
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
All of the couples in this table are first or second parous women, with the
exception of one Hindu, Promilla, married into a class III household. She
has three girls and wants to have at least one son.
"..if there is any medicine to change the sex of my pregnancies I
will certainly take some the next time I am pregnant."
Pregnancy early in marriage is welcomed by the other women in this group and
is a cause of some celebration. However, the underlying power of the husband
to control his wife's fertility is not forgotten. Shakuntala and Shankar form
a class IV chamar household. Shakuntala was obviously happy to have had her
first child as the following quote from her shows, but compare her views on
her own fertility with those of her husband:
"I was happy when I knew I was pregnant and so were the other
people in the house. It was my first child, and only a year
after I was married. We did chati on the fourth day and the naming
ceremony on the 11th, when we gave a feast to the whole village.
So far my periods have not begun again, and I don't know whether
I will have another child quickly or not. With only one child
what can be said [about family planning] . My husband knows
Shankar: "I want three children. Two boys and a girl. I already
have one boy. This means I want one boy and one girl more."
AL:"What will happen if you have two girls in a row?"
Shankar: "That would be difficult but I would still not want more
than three children."
AL:"What will you do to stop children?"
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Shankar: "I will have my wife sterilised."
AL:"I thought people in the village were scared of sterilisation"
Shankar: "Why should I be scared? It is my wife who will be done
and not me. What about pills? The 28 day type would be good, as
after sterilisation, you could have no more children, and one might
die."
Durgi and Devinder are part of a class III Sahni household, they have two
daughters and would like a son. Durgi was acutely aware of her husband's
anger when their last child was a girl. They have also had a son and a
daughter who subsequently died.
Durgi: "I was happy to be pregnant again. Two of my children
had died and we also did not have a son. When I had a girl, we
just did the chati and the naming ceremony, nothing else, for there
was already one girl and now we had another. My husband thought
so badly of this that in his anger, he did not come to visit me
for three days. I want to have one boy at the very least and so
does my husband. When I am pregnant again, I will take medicine
to ensure the birth of a boy.
Devinder: "It is essential to have one boy."
AL:"Is it better to have two sons?"
Devinder: "If they came first and then a girl, it would be best.
But now I have two daughters and a daughter and a son have died.
But it would be stupid to go on having girls and hope for a boy and
so have ten girls. Ask me how many children I want next year."
AL:"What if the next child is a boy?"
Devinder: "I will think about having my wife sterilised. My wife
agrees with this and will stand by what I say."
Among the Muslims in this group, those at low parities, have similar opinions
to their Hindu counterparts. Take Asghari, living in a class II Sheikh
household. She has one daughter. She also suffers from tuberculosis.
Asghari: "This is just my first child so what can I say about other
children? I want only a few children, but I have not said anything
to anyone yet"
Listening to her husband Ahmad talk about fertility, one is left wondering
whether Asghari will find herself in a similar position to those women above
who want no more children but whose husbands will not contemplate family
1imitatedon.
AL: "How many children do you want?"
Ahmad: "It has nothing to do with me, I will take what God gives me.
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It does not matter whether it is a hundred or two hundred....1 have
no power in this, God will give, I will take"
In her answer, Ruxana, married to Riasat, a class III Teli is aware that
having given birth to only one child, a daughter, she is at too early a stage
in her maternity career to have any influence over her husband in this matter
"So far I have just one child, what can I tell you about other
children? They all come from God and that is why I cannot say
anything and also I cannot say anything to my husband yet."
Her husband Riasat's ideas on family size are, as we saw in chapter 9 a
little more formulated:
"I want to have one more child, a boy [after that]...I will not have
sterilisation, that is against Islam, I will go to Bijnor and get my
wife some pills. My wife is agreed. If she is not I will show her
a fatstick [beat her]".
Wife Wants More Children and Husband Does Not
This is the smallest grouping among the sample. There are no Muslim couples
in this group, and only three Hindu couples. These are characterised by small
family size relative to the two groups discussed above as the table below
shows.
Table 6:
Numbers of Children Among Sample Couples Where Wife Wants More
Children and Husband Does Not.
Number Number of
of Children





HINDUS 2 224 112
ONLY
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
This group is also the most indeterminate in relation to fertility desires.
For example Tarabati, a class IV chamar told us that she wanted one more son,
but we were unable to ascertain why this should be so. She already has two
sons and a daughter. When I interviewed her husband, Tulsi, there was a
considerable crowd in attendance when he said he was thinking about having
Tarabati sterilised as he wanted no more children. This led to a general
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discussion on sterilisation, which was interesting, but the circumstances
were not condusive to an intimate conversaion with Tulsi.
One of the women, Viramvati, has two daughters and was pregnant with her
third child at the time of her interview. For both her and her husband, their
future fertility plans were contingent on the outcome of the latest
pregnancy. Her husband was inclined towards having no more if the current
pregnancy turned out to be a son and Viramvati towards having one more after
the current pregnancy.
The most definite conclusion which can be reached about this group is that it
is the smallest of all four, containing only three couples. This reasonably
indicates that as a group, women are not so pronatal as their husbands.
Neither Husband or Wife Want More Children
Table 7 below summarise the number and sex of children which couples in this
group have.
Table 7:
Number of Children Among Sample Couples Where Neither Partner
Wants More Children by Religion
Number Number of Mean Number
of Couples Children of Children
Religion Boys Girls All Boys Girls All
Hindu 5 9 15 24 1.83.04.8
Muslim 6 16 8 24 2.71.34.0
Total 11 25 23 48 2.3 2.0 4.3
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
This group forms 30% of sample couples. On the whole they have as a group
more mean live children than those outlined above where the husband wants
more children and the wife not. Among this group, the Muslims have fewer
live children than their Hindu counterparts, but the sex ratio of their
children is weighed more heavily in favour of boys. They have more than two
live boys for every girl, compared to less than one among the Hindus.
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This is partly expainable by the fact that two Hindu couples have a larger
than average number of girls. One of these couples is Maya and Mahipal, who
as we have already seen in the last chapter, had daughters first and kept
having children in the hope of having a second son. The other couple
includes Adesh, who is married into a Rajput class II household. She has
five live girls and one son and had this to say about her last pregnancy:
"I was not happy when I found out I was pregnant for it was after
seven years that I became so. If this girl had been a boy, then
things would have been better, but it is not my fate to have two
children. I do not want anymore children. In trying to have a son
another girl has come."
It was also clear from my conversation with her husband, Ashok that he did
not want more children either. The couple considered themselves menopausal
and had never used any family planning method nor would they.
This raises the question of what couples who are decided they do not want
anymore children are going to do about contraception. Other Hindu couples
were not so clear about their intentions. Urmila for example, has two
daughters and two sons. She and Udayan her husband, want no more children,
but are scared to have sterilisation.
Urmila: "I do not want any more children at all.. .neither does my
husband. I am frightened of having any operation or the copper-T.
My husband does not want me to have the operation either. I will
get medicine from a lady doctor in Bijnor to lenghten the time
between my pregnancies"
Her husband Udayan was less sure, even about that. He was sitting with some
friends when I asked him what he would do to stop having children.
"I'll use local medicine what else."
Friend: "What kind will you use?"
Udayan: "I don't know - that stuff they use in the temple."
Friend (to me): "There write that down he'll use local medicine but
he doesn't know if there is any!"
Udayan: "No! No! what about neem leaves mixed up with grass and all
mixed up into a paste?"
Friend: "Sure!"
Udayan: "There'll definitely be some. Here write this down. I'll
go to a doctor and ask him to give me some local medicine so we
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don't have any more children."
AL: "Why not have the [sterilisation] operation done?"
Udayan: "Once they start playing about with your insides you would
always be ill"
AL: "Does your wife agree with you on this?"
Udayan "Yes."
AL: "What if she was not?"
Udayan: "I am the boss in the house, she will do what she is told."
Among Muslim couples in this group, sterilisation was not an option at all.
No Muslim couples said they would consider this. It was against their
religion. The interpretation of Islam in relation to contraception for some
men sometimes meant that although men did not want any more children, they
were not prepared to contemplate any form of contraception. Take Imrana and
Irfan. Neither wants more children, but Imrana is prepared to try some form
of contraception, Irfan is not.
Imrana: "I do not want any more children. I have enough, but what
does my husband know of the difficulty this causes me. He does not
want me to have treatment so that I do not have more children."
Irfan: "I do not want any more children I have enough, but is has
nothing to do with me. God gives and God takes away."
Even in cases where the husband does agree to the use of contraception^
where it is not a once-of treatment, like sterilisation, logistic problems
can stand in the way of a lasting contraceptive effect. Khalil and
Khurshida, a class III Muslim couple had decided to use the pill. Khalil
said:
"I definitely don't want any more children. ..two would have been
enough if one had been a boy. . .We have been using the pill. I
bought it from Bijnor."
Khurshida during her interview said:
"I do not want any more children. I have taken pills, but when they
were finished, my husband did not bring me any more. I am six weeks
pregnant."
Even when husband and wife agree on having no more children there is still
the possibility that they will not be able for one reason or another to
practice contraceptive techniques which have any lasting effect.
Husband Wants More Wife Does Not
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Thirteen couples, accounting for 35% of the sample, fall into this category.
Of these, five are Hindu and eight are Muslim. The numbers of living
children they have are summarised in table 8 below.
Table 8:
Numbers of Children among Sample Couples Where Husband
Wants More and Wife Does Not
Number
of Total Number Mean Number
Couples of Children of Children
Boys Girls All Boys Girls All
Hindus 5 8 10 18 1.6 2.0 3.6
Muslims 8 19 11 30 2.4 1.4 3.8
Total 13 27 21 48 2.1 1.6 3.7
Source: Key Informants 1982-83.
Overall, this group has 3.7 living children, of whom 2.1 are boys and 1.6
girls. Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is that while both
Hindus and Muslims have a similar number of children, the Muslims have a
larger mean number of sons than daughters.
The women in this group stressed the effect on their health of bearing large
numbers of children. However, they stressed that it was their husband's
decision rather than their own how many children they would have. This raises
the question of the extent to which women are prepared to keep on having
children because they want to, or because their husbands want them to. For
some women at least this was very clearly a question of power. Take the case
of Santosh for example. She was pregnant with her first child, when I asked
her whether she wanted a boy or a girl. She thought for a few seconds and
said:
"I want to have a boy"
AL:"Why?"
Santosh: "The name of boys is big. When they are born there is
singing and dancing, lots of presents. My husband wants a son. This
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will make him happy. If my husband is happy then I too will be
allowed to be happy."
The baby was a girl, and two years later Santosh was pregnant again. This
time I spoke to Santosh and Sunil together. The conversation was harrowing,
as Sunil was goading Santosh by suggesting that she broke rules of acceptable
behaviour surrounding visits to her mainka. He said specifically that she had
gone without his permission and that he had gone to fetch her back and beaten
her with a stick. Santosh was crying bitterly and exploded that it was not
funny, especially when she was trying to be a good wife in the face of
adversity. She said that she could die here and he would not go and tell her
parents. He had not allowed her to go home for months on end.
When I asked how many more children they would have Sunil was clear enough.
He said:
"If this child is a boy then we will have Santosh sterilised. If not
then we will have just one more to see if we can have a son."
Santosh though, did not find pregnancy easy. Her first pregnancy had ended in
miscarriage and she suffered stomach pains throughout her last pregnancy. The
current pregnancy was similar. When she heard her husband's view, she let go
a long and weary sigh and said in a quiet and tired voice, while pointing at
their daughter, who was sitting on the charpai with us.
"Even if we have another one like this, let's still do it [have
sterilisation] let's have no more after this."
Another Hindu woman in this group is Lakshmi. She is the only woman in a
household shared by two Sahni brothers. Their's is a class III household. She
is the fifth or sixth wife of the younger brother. The elder brother has one
daughter aged about twelve, but his wife is now dead. All three adults in the
household were happy that Lakshmi. was pregnant. But when the baby was born a
girl, her husband's elder brother was so angry, he locked the grain cupboard
and refused Lakshmi any food. He had wanted a boy. Celebrations for the birth
were kept to a minimum. When asked how many more children she wanted Lakshmi
had this to say:
"I have just one daughter aged 8 or 9 months, and even yet my
periods have not started again. That is why I have no idea about
how many children I should have or how many boys I will have. I do
not know how long it is between my pregnancies. I will only know
this when I am pregnant the next time. ... I do not know anything
about this. It is my husband's decision. I cannot say anything
about this matter.
Her husband, Lalit, had the following to say.
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AL: "How many more children do you want?"
Lalit: "It is up to God really. But I want to have at least one
boy. Maybe I could even have two."
AL: "What if God gives you six?"
Lalit: "I don't want that many. After I have one or two boys I will
have my wife's sterilisation operation done."
AL: "Does she agree with this?"
Lalit: "It does not matter. I am her boss and she will stand behind
me if I say what I want."
For these women, the ability to influence their husband's decision is
crucial. For the Hindu women in this group, having some form of family
planning is at least negotiable, even if the outcome was not always
favourable. This is not the case for Muslim women in this group, who as well
as having to face the power of their husbands, also had to contend with the
power and ideology of Islam. Maqsudi provides an apt illustration. She is a
Sheikh married to Mansur and lives in a class III household. She has had five
children, only two of whom are still alive. In 1983, she wanted no more
children. She highlights the lack of control, which women have in this
matter.
Maqsudi: "I do not want any more children. These which I have are
enough. But it is a matter for my husband. If he fetches me
contraception, then that's fine, what can I do on my own? I have
said nothing to my husband, but I will talk to him. If my husband
does not listen, then I will be able to do nothing. With my sas the
question is this : if my husband gives the medicine, what can she
say?
Compare this with what her husband had to say to me on the subject.
"However many children there are, it is still not enough. It is
God's will how many children we have and when he gives them he will
also provide for them. My wife agrees with me on this. We have
never used any contraception, and we never will."
This raises many issues. That Maqsudi can do nothing without her husband's
permission, is restricting in the extreme. She has no money with which to buy
contraceptive items herself and she has not the freedom of movement which
would allow her to do this undetected anyway. She must live her life in her
husband's haveli. and stepping out of line on this issue or any other could
have severe consequences. Take the case of Wasila a class V Muslim Teli
woman. She has three sons, and in 1983, said she wanted no more children. But
as the quotes below from both she and her husband show, she had to take into
226
account her poverty and the views of her husband on family size and could do
nothing about it on her own.
"I was happy to be pregnant again! It is something to be happy
about! It is given by God! What should we do, it is necssary to
take. Otherwise, I pray and tell God that I have enough children. I
cannot have the operation, that is wrong and I am also frightened.
Tell me of some medicine. I cannot have an abortion. This is
dangerous and we are poor and if anything went wrong I would not be
able to have treatment. I have not talked to my husband, he would
never be ready to take medicines. If I were to mention it to him,
he would swear at me and say if anything has happened then I will
beat you!"
Wajid: (her husband) "I cannot say how many children I want, this is
for God to decide."
These sample women were very clearly aware of their position in relation to
their husband's. It would be misleading to suggest that they never tried to
contracept without their husband's knowledge. Several wanted to take action
to prevent having more children, but were scared of the consequences should
their husband find out. One Muslim woman, Zubeida, from a class V Teli
family, had tried to prevent further pregnancies, without her husband's
knowledge, by eating carrot seeds, an indigenous abortificiant.
Zubeida: "When I knew I was pregnant what could I do, it was
necessary, what else could I do, I was happy. I was also afraid
because in previous pregnancies I had had a great deal of
difficulty and had just escaped with my life. I did not try to
cause a miscarriage but I took some medicine at my mother's house.
I drank carrot seeds so that I will have no more children. I have
not told my husband. I did it behind his back. If he gets to know,
he will beat me. My husband does not know because he does not
permit me to take medicine. But I have to bring up the children.
We don't have much food and not enough workers. When you don't have
enough to eat, your health gets very bad."
Zakir: "Among the Muslims we do not think about things like family
planning. Mo matter how many children I have God will provide."
AL:"Do you think you have too many children?"
Zakir: "No, but even if I did, where would I put them after God has
given them to me?"
Several Muslim women when saying that they did not want any more children,
stressed the effects of childbearing on their health and their husband's
insensitivity to this. This is highlighted in the following excerpt from a
conversation with Dilruba a woman living in a class II Sheikh household. She
has five children, four boys and a girl.
"I do not want to have any more children! I have to bring up the
children, not my husband. Now I am not well either. As many
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children as you have - that's just how bad your health gets.
Her husband Dilshad: "I will take just as many more children as God
gives there is lots of room"
Or Imrana:
"I don't want any more children, I have enough, but my husband wants
more children. What does he know how difficult it is for a woman."
Her husband Irfan: "More children? I have enough, but it has
nothing to do with me, it is up to God"
For the women in this group, the data suggest that control over their own
fertility is denied. The key factor is that their husbands are not convinced
of the need to stop having children. Control over resources excercised by
their husbands is a key factor preventing them from taking part in any form
of fertility averting behaviour. Independent covert action to prevent further
pregnancies is possible,but very difficult, and not without risk if a woman's
husband should find out she has 'gone behind his back' to obtain
contraception.
Conclusion
A comparison of husbands' and wives' views on fertility suggests that women
are not in control of their own fertility. Even where fertility desires are
similar, women seem to defer to the views of their husbands. This seems most
prevalent among Hindu women, especially where the women consider that they do
not yet have the number or sex composition of children they would prefer.
This highlights the fact that, not surprisingly, women do want to have
children as borne out by the testimony of women at earlier parities. Women
share the benfits of sons with their husbands and gain some power over
daughter-in-laws later in their lives when their sons marry.
Husbands and wives are not always in agreement about how many more children
they should have. Forty-percent of sample couples did not agree on whether
they should have more children or not. Among these fifteen couples, the
husband wanted more and the wife not in all but two cases, with disagreement
being strongest among the Muslim couples in the sample. In such cases, the
husband's control over economic resources is crucial to contraceptive
behaviour. Women cannot move around easily, nor have they the money to spend
on modern contraceptive techniques.
Deferring to husband was one of the three most common replies to questions
about fertility planning. The other two were that there were still not enough
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children, usually sons or that the woman was still in a period of post-partum
amenorhea and did not need to take any precautions just yet but would when
the time came. While it is possible for a woman to act 'behind her husband's
back' to obtain contraception, while on a visit to her natal village for
example, this is a risky strategy for women and not one to be entered into
lightly.
Zubeida, quoted above, resorted to an indigeneous method of fertility
control, probably because she did not have free access to the resources which
would have enabled her to pay for the services of a modern practiceone^or to
buy the contraceptives which he or she would prescribe. Nor could she openly
seek such help, her husband would beat her if she acted against his wishes.
Some women did have the support of their husbands in seeking out a modern
contraceptive technique, but even this does not always lead to a lasting
contraceptive effect. Khurshida and Khali1 had jointly decided that they
wanted no more children and obtained a supply of the contraceptive pill from
Bijnor. When it ran out, Khalil did not go or take his wife to fetch anymore.
This highlights the difficulty of women maintaining control over their
fertility when they are not free to move around at will or have the resources
to make demand for contraception effective.
But even where women do have the key support of their husbands in obtaining
some form of contraception and if this support continues to be effective, the
medical services on offer by the government are not effective. Muslims in
Jhakri considered nasbandi to be against the tennets of Islam as propounded
in the village. There have been four cases of sterilisation in Jhakri that I
know about. Of these one had been forcibly done with tragic consequences. One
man had died after the operation and a woman who had been sterilised without
her consent while giving birth in the government hospital in Bijnor had lost
her new born child afterwards. None of these events had enhanced the
reputation of sterilisation as a form of family limitation.
In Dharmnagri, female sterilisation is more acceptable. But there too, the
decision to be sterilised is not an easy one. The timing must be right, so
that the new.eetl' child is through the most life threatening period. The
season must also be right, the monsoon is no good as wounds are likely to
fester in the humidity and an operation put off has more lilkb'hood of not
being performed at all.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion
Before starting on the conclusions, I wish to point out that the main body of
the text closely follows chapter 8 of Jeffery, Jeffery and Lyon
(forthcoming), the writing of which I was intimately involved in.
The Demographic Regime
a) Fertility
Fertility rates in Dharmnagri and Jhakri are high. On average forty children
per year were born betwwen 1976 and 1985, giving a crude birth rate of 42 per
1000 per year during each of those years. Women aged forty-five an over
reported an average of between seven and eight pregnancies lasting to term.
Fertility rates are higher for Muslim and Harijan, just over eight such
pregnancies than for Caste Hindus with just over six. Women from classes II
and III averaged eight full term deliveries, while those in classes IV and V
averaged seven. These figures may underestimate the case since women may
not report some births, especially where the child died soon afterwards.
Ethnic differences in social organisation may help to explain some of the
difference, while better nutrition and higher life-expectancies provide a
partial explanation of higher fertility among the richer households.
Better nutrition and longer life-expectancy may also have contributed to a
rise in fertility for the whole population. Women born in the 1930's seem to
have had more children by age 35 than those born in the 1920's or 1940's, but
the differences are small and the village data on birth-dates deteriorate the
further back they go. However older women believe that women these days
become pregnant more quickly now than in the past. Changing social
practices could certainly be having unintended consequences for fertility.
For example, people now tend to marry at an older age than used to be common,
but do not wait so long after marriage before cohabiting. Consequently, the
age at cohabitation has gone up but not so much as the age at first marriage.
These factors could help fertility to decline, but if the age at menarche has
fallen, more women are likely to be menstruating, and therefore at risk of
pregnancy, when they first begin to cohabit. Similarly, if, as some older
women suggest, sons and daughters-in-law set up separate hearths more quickly
these days than previously, this could increase fertility in two ways.
Firstly while sharing a hearth with his mother, a man's sexual access may be
controlled by his mother. Secondly, when living in a separate chula a
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woman's responsibilities may restrict her more to her sasural than when she
is sajey and thus less able to visit and stay in her natal home, where she is
sexually unavailable to her husband. This tendency may be re-inforced if
increasing expectations of gifts from her natal to her marital kin on her
return from such visits prevent her parents from asking her home too often.
These factors in conjunjuction with a possible intensification of women's
work as a result of "green revolution" changes, has increased the time over
which a woman is sexually available to her husband.
Other potential contributors to fertility are: variations in the length of
time children are breast fed; the impact of post-partum taboos on
intercourse; changes in rates of widowhood; changes in seasonal migration and
the impact of better nutrition. I have no evidence to offer on these
factors. But even if the rate of fertility has not been rising, the
population has been growing, largely because of a decline in mortality.
b) Mortality
Children in Dharmnagri and Jhakri are raised in an environment which poses
severe threats to their health well-being and survival. The causes of death
are difficult to diagnose, but more often than not, illness and death among
children results from combinations of poor nutrition, intestinal infections
dehydration and infectious diseases. During the fieldwork period in 1982-83,
eight percent of all babies delivered at term died in the first month of
life. But most children die in the following few years. When Patricia and I
returned to the villages in 1985, it was to find that twenty-five percent of
the 78 children born to our key informants after 1980 were dead.
These figures are grim. However, the maternity histories indicate that
infant and child mortality were much worse before 1960. Of babies born
before this date, fewer than 65% lived to see their fifth birthday. Survival
to age five was worst in Jhakri and among the Harijans (55%), while about 75%
of Caste Hindu children survived. The children of class II and III parents
had a better chance of survival (67%) than those of class IV and V (58%). Of
the children born in the 1960's, 74% lived to age five while 82% of those
born in the 1970's did so. Harijan children of the 1970's were almost as
likely to survive to age five (85%) as Caste Hindus (89%), but the chances of
Muslim children were still much lower at 74%. Class differences in child
mortality have all but disappeared.
Even without a rise in fertility, declining child mortality would have
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resulted in larger completed families. Women age 45 and over gave birth to
more than seven children on average, but have on average only five live
children. Older women in Jhakri have had more children than those in
Dharmnagri, but because of lower survival rates have fewer than 4.5 children
alive compared with five in Dharmnagri. Women in both villages born in the
1940's have over five children still alive, while for younger women in both
villages the relatively poor have fewer living children than the relatively
wealthy. Women from class II and III households have had more children, more
of whom have survived.
Overall, the possible rise in fertility and the definite decline in mortality
suggest a recent change in the contex of family building. Before 1960, the
most pressing problem for couples was probably to ensure child survival.
While fear of child death is still a factor, the possibility of having "too
many" children has become an issue for parents in Dharmnagri and Jhakri.
Family building in such an environment is still a risky business but
increasing chances of child survival mean that people now have to consider a
changing balance between the benefits of having children and the costs of
bringing them up.
The Value of Children
In Dharmnagri and Jhakri, the chula is the basic unit of consumption and
often the unit of production as well as the prime source of welfare. Even
small children can be useful in this enterprise, tending animals, helping in
the fields at peak times, running errands or looking after younger brothers
and sisters. However, few key informants contend that the labour of pre-
adolescent children is crucial. Even where children do not attend school,
they are primarily considered consumers who must be clothed, fed and looked
after while making a minimal contribution to the chula's well-being. Most
key informants take a longer term view. By middle-age, landed men are
unlikely to be in joint production with their brothers and landless men have
been alagh for many years. When the ability to work declines, couples need
children to grow or earn their daily bread. The alternative is a dismal and
lonely old-age.
But this need for children is more accurately construed as a need for sons.
Sons learn men's work gradually, working alongside their fathers until, by
late adolescence, they perform a full day's work. A son's work should
continue to benefit his parents into their old age. From this perspective
his work in earlier childhood pales into insignificance. Under prevailing
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circumstances in Dharmnagri and Jhakri, sons are perhaps the best form of
security which men and women have for their old-age in the absence of
pensions, state benefits or substantial savings of any kind.
Not all parents are equally endowed from sons, however. Sons cannot be
guaranteed to be dutiful. Landowning parents are in a better position to
persuade sons to stay in the joint chula enterprise by refusing to allocate
land to them until after the parents death. Post mortem inheritance is the
most common form of inheritance for sons in the study villages. Landless
parents find it more difficult to hold this kind of sway over their sons and
consequently expect the material benefits from their sons to be more short¬
lived and psychological, long term security if it comes from sons is viewed
more as a bonus by this group.
Despite these benefits of sons, very few key informants want to have an
unlimited number of children. Only three men foresaw no limit to the number
of children from whom they would derive benefit. All of these men are in
class II and among the wealthiest in either village. For these men having
sons reduces their dependence on wage labourers, while the extent of their
landholdings will ensure that each son can still expect a reasonable, viable
inheritance. The general feeling among the rest of the key informants is
that the benefits of having sons must be weighed against their costs and the
responsiblity which they have as parents to secure reasonable livelihoods for
their children. For those with land the threat of fragmentation dominates,
while those without foresee a more bleak future with fewer opportunities for
wage labour as richer farmers use more family labour.
The possibility of having daughters must also be added to the family building
equation. Given the present structure of work, marriage and residence, there
are no economic grounds for wanting daughters in the study villages. After
marriage a daughter should go to her "own house" and from that time be
under the tutelage of her in-laws. The contribution of a daughter to her
natal chula can only be short-lived and in the long run it is her parents-
in-law who benefit from her labours not her parents. By and large parents
are more worried about placing their daughters well in marriage and the
attendant dowry and continued gifts she will take with her than they are
happy about the merit which attaches to bringing daughters up. Consequently
all the men preferred to have sons rather than daughters as did most of the
women.
In summary, almost everyone in Dharmnagri and Jhakri weighs the benefits of
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having children - especially sons - against their costs - especially
daughters. Among the landed, all but the wealthiest are worried about the
effects of fertility on land fragmentation. Among the landless the extra
cost of feeding and clothing children who are less likely to provide support
in the long run are paramount. Central to these calculations are the
different futures of sons and daughters and the possibility that children
might die.
As I have suggested above child death rates are higher in Jhakri than
Dharmnagri and this is reflected in the approaches of Muslims and Hindus to
fertility. However, not all of the difference between the religious groups
can be explained by differing levels of mortality. In Dharmnagri all men
were eventually able to talk about family planning and fertility. Indeed,
almost all of them accepted contraception in principle and as something
which they would contemplate when their need for sons had been fulfilled.
In Jhakri, many key informants refused to discuss the issues surrounding
contraception in depth at all in 1983. Instead they espoused the view that
the use of contraceptive techniques was a sin against their religion which
would prevent entry to Paradise in the afterlife. This was true even in some
cases where Muslim men considered their children to be expensive and said
that if it were up to them they would have no more. According to these men
there was no point in asking them how many more children they would have
since only God knew the answer. For most men though, the possibility of
family limitation is something to be taken seriously.
Contraceptive Decision Making
However, men are not the only people who are affected by family building.
Women too have have views on this and they do not always co-incide with those
of their husbands. The sex and number of children born and dying, the value
and costs of children as well as the morality of trying to control fertility
can be perceived differently by men and women. To unpick patterns of
contraceptive use and intention requires considering the politics of decision
making between men and women within the houehold.
Men maintained, especially in public, that they decided on family plainning
and connected matters and that their wives agreed with them - one way or
another. Nearly every woman agreed that her husband's role is decisive in
the decision to contracept or not. Without his support it is difficult for a
woman to take action. Women do not have independent sources of income to
generate cash which they may freely spend nor are they free to go around as
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they please. These factors make it difficult for a woman to take independent
action to limit her own fertility. While it may be possible for a woman to
take unilateral (and covert) action to limit her own fertility, this is
something which she can easily do. Nor is it without risk. Women are
subject to their husband's rule. Different fertility outcomes among key
informants arise because husbands view fertility differently, not because
they view being master of the house differently.
That said, in 1983, about 60% of couples agreed on the number and sex of
children which they would like to have, though some of these couples were at
earlier stages in their life-cycles and the possibility of disagreement as
they approach their own personal targets for family size cannot be ruled out.
For the rest the wife's desire for family limitation is often frustrated by
her husband's power over her circumstances. Most women would settle for
fewer children than their husbands and in these cases, the effect of the
husband's rule is forcefully felt. Even where women do have the key support
of their husbands for fertility limitation, this is sometimes not translated
into a lasting contraceptive effect, usually because such support is not
carried over into practical action. This is especially true when couples
choose to use oral contraceptives and menfolk, who are mobile and have cash,
do not replenish stocks as necessary.
Among most couples, then, the wife is more likely to want to take action to
limit family size than her husband. If she has one or two sons beyond the
most vulnerable ages, her husband may agree. The question then arises which
method to use. Use of indigeneous methods of contraception are conspicuous
in Dharmnagri and Jhakri by their absence. "Country" methods do exist and
most people knew about some method or another, especially among the women,
but they were sceptical about their efficacy. Effectively the choice of
method is limited to the available modern techniques of contraception.
Of these methods, sterilisation is the one most strongly advocated by the
Government - both nationally in policy and locally in practice. In the study
villages sterilisation is acceptable only to Hindus as a possible method of
birth control. Before 1977, most sterilisations were vasectomies, but after
the emergency most sterilisations were tubectomies and more recently
laproscopy has become available. However, both Hindus and Muslims, women and
men alike, express strong doubts about the suitability of sterilisation as an
option These doubts come from a combination of the uncertainty that existing
children will survive after sterilisation has taken place and from mistrust
about the intention and ability of the medical services to provide proper
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after-care, both for the sterilised couple, and their children should they
fall sick.
From the Government's perspective, nasbandi is the most cost-effective method
of preventing births, as it requires no monitoring infrastructure or
distribution services to mainatain a regular supply of contraceptives.
Further, it does not rely upon skill and motivation in use. Currently,
health staff have targets to reach in providing sterilisation cases and face
penalties if they consistently fail to provide them. Acceptors also receive
"compensation" in cash, officially for lost earnings and medical expenses.
The pressure on the local Auxilliary Nurse Midwife to provide sterilisation
cases has not escaped villagers' notice. Many complained that the ANM lost
interest in the health and welfare of people once sterilisation had been
completed. This preoccupation of the health service with sterilisation is an
important factor in people's mistrust of it. Villagers, especially Muslims,
maintain that sterilisation suits the Government's ends and not their own
and consequently resent it.
There is also a widely held belief that sterilisation is physically weakening
and that people never really recover from it. Additionally among the Muslims
it is considered a sin against God who will provide for the number of
children which a couple have been allocated by Him. Only four Muslims have
been sterilised and all but one felt under some pressure from the government
to have the operation done. In Dharmnagri some people, especially men
sterilised before 1977, complained of being pressurised into accepting
sterilisation, but others adopted it freely and happily when their desired
family size and composition had been safely reached.
From the information available it is reasonable to conclude that abortion
is not a popular method of birth control in the study villages. Its
unpopularity stems both from its cost, about Rs300 if performed privately and
on moral grounds. IUD's were also unpopular during our initial fieldwork
period. Only five had been fitted at the dispensary. Their unpopularity
comes from fears of problems in use - there is no monitoring service - and
from the fact that if problems do arise, the ANM refuses to remove the device
unless the woman agrees to have nasbandi after removal. Condoms were
consider unaesthetic by men and consequently not in use at all, except in the
Bengali colony. This leaves oral contraceptives as a possibility.
In 1982, the ANM denied to villagers that oral contraceptives were available
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at all in India, despite the fact that it was possible to buy them at any
pharmacy in Bijnor town. At the begining of the fieldwork period women and
men in the study villages had not heard of oral contraceptives. Indeed, some
of the men refused to believe they existed even after we had discussions
about them. They argued that if such pills really did exist then why did the
government persist with nasbandi. However, oral contraceptives were made
available at the village dispensary from 1983 and several women, with the
consent of their husbands obtained them there. Others, wishing to avoid the
pressure of the ANM to have nasbandi preferred to buy them in Bijnor. One
or two of the men also said that, on the completion of desired family size and
composition, this was a course of action which they would take.
The Current Situation
If I had conducted my PhD. research on my own, I would probably draw to a
close at this point. However, my involvement in the wider Social
Organisation of Childbearing Project has meant that my understanding of the
dynamics of fertility in Dharmnagri and Jhakri have been enhanced by two
return visits to the field. The first of these took place in 1985 when
Patricia and I returned for three months, the second in 1986 when Patricia
and Roger returned.
These visits suggest that 1982, when all three of us first went to the study
villages, stands as a crucial time in their demographic history. Fertility
remained high, but mortality had been declining for at least twenty years.
In 1982, the overriding family building concern among villagers was to have
sufficient children, especially sons, to ensure that enough would survive the
first threatening years of life. Given the overall arrangements locally for
production, marriage and residence, this is understandable. These features
remain, but the decline in mortality and the change in production associated
with the 'green revolution' have improved living standards. For most people,
the prospect of land fragmentation, fewer wage-labour opportunities and the
prospect of increasing dowry mitigate against previous levels of fertility.
In the early 1980's, these were fears which many key informants had begun to
formulate, but, by 1986, it had become a major concern. The more widespread
aim of family building now is to have the desired number of sons within a
smaller completed family size.
The fertility experience of villagers and its interpretation vary
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considerably across groups, as I have suggested in the main body of my
thesis, but now only the most wealthy are insulated from the pressure of the
changing logic of their own position.
This view is reinforced by the changing pattern of contraceptive behaviour of
our key informants, and villagers in general, over this period.
When we first arrived in the village, to study childbearing and fertility,
people were suspicious that we had been sent by the government as part of a
'family planning' campaign. Questions about fertility were answered with
suspicion, if at all. This gave way to more open discussion of these matters
and, among the women, to direct requests - with their husbands' permission -
for Patricia's help in obtaining contraception.
The most dramatic change has come from Muslims, who, for perhaps the first
time, have knowledge of acceptable alternatives to nasbandi. Overall,
including Hindus, contraceptive use was widespread by December, 1986. In
1982, fewer than 10 women then under the age of 45 were effectively protected
from conception by IUD, tubectomy or their husband's vasectomy. By 1986, 41
women had copper-T's inserted and a further eight had been sterilised.
Another eight women - seven from Jhakri - regularly received supplies of oral
contraceptives from the ANM, with others buying them privately in Bijnor.
The rhetoric of Muslim men against contraception in 1983 had transformed
itself into support for contraceptive action by 1986.
Apart from the changing logic of their own position, some of these changes
are partly due to our presence, some to the Government's policy of making
contraceptive techniques other than nasbandi more freely available and some
to the presence of a new ANM who seems more concerned than was the previous
one to provide a more comprehensive maternal and child health care scheme.
The following table compiled from the village dispensary record books shows
patterns of contraceptive behaviour in the study villagesin 1986.
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Table 1:
Contraceptive Behaviour of all Fertile Women^
in Dharmnagri and Jhakri, September 1986
(PERCENTAGES OF ALL WOMEN IN EACH GROUP IN BRACKETS)
No of Women in Group Contracepting.
CLASS Muslim Hindu Harijan All
I&II 9 (45) 7 (47) 0 (0) 16 (43)
III 1(5) 4 (20) 4 (27) 9 (16)
IV&V 1 ( 7) 4 (33) 5 (36) 10 (25)
All 11 (20) 15 (32) 9 (29) 35 (26)
Source: Clinic Records Dharmnagri Dispensary 1986.
Note 1: Number of Women = 133, Fertile defined as ages 15-44
It can be seen from this table that contraceptive behaviour is now fairly
widespread in the study villages. However, class I and II combined, the more
wealthy, display a more widespread use (43%) than class IV and V combined,
the poorest (25%).
I do not not have the data to give any idea why these changes have taken
place in the villages since our first days there and our last. But these
changes in contraceptive practice are dramatic and not without problems.
That couples who want to limit their fertility seem more easily able to do so
is encouraging, but the modern contraceptives currently on offer all have
unsatisfactory side-effects which are borne most directly by women. Nasbandi
operations should have after-care facilities but do not, while the use of
IUD's and oral contraceptives ought to be preceded by a medical examination
for contra-indications, and followed by adequate monitoring in use, but are
not.
Furthermore, the medical infrastructure presently available to villagers does
not have the resources to provide these services. The Government's pre¬
occupation with nasbandi highlights its emphasis on population control, not
family planning, while incentives for health workers to provide nasbandi
cases gives them no reason to prioritise after-care or alternative methods of
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contraception. Villagers in Dharmnagri and Jhakri have indicated in their
changing pattern of family building behaviour that there is a need for a
convivial and mother-child centred health service, of which family planning
can form a part. But such changes in behaviour may be too slow for a




Note: Words given here are those used frequently in the text. Words that are
used only occasionally always appear with their translation. In
transliteration, I have omitted diacritical marks to indicate different
values of d, t, r, glottal stops etc., and have made plurals by adding "s".
akeli: (f) akela (m): alone; in this context, after the death of her mother-
in-law or (for a man) after the death of his father
alagh: separate; in this context, for a woman, living apart from her mother-
in-law; for a man, operating an economic unit separately from his father and
brothers
andarki: Gur which is finished into a flat slab shape, usually for the
production of boora or "country sugar"
ANM: Auxilliary Nurse-Midwife; originally, nurse with 18 months training, now
with 2 years training after 10th grade schooling; usually posted at sub-
centres or Primary Health Centres with duties covering maternal and child
health, including family planning
bahu: bride, wife; more generally, an in-married woman, especially a son's
wife
band: retaining wall or dyke.
bangar: light upland soil away from the Ganges
bigha: unit of land that varies in size in different parts of India. In
Bijnor, a katcha bigha is approximately one-fifth of an acre; three katcha
bighas equal one pakka bigha. I use katcha bighas, the most common unit in
everyday speech
chati: purification ceremony after a birth when festive food is cooked,
especially but not exclusively among Muslims (see jesthawn).
chula: cooking stove; more generally, the people who eat meals cooked at one
hearth; household.
colhu: gur boiler or manufacturer
compounder: pharmacist
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dai: traditional birth attendant
dal: pulses, seeds of leguminous plants, such as lentils and split peas
dhoti: cotton sari worn by Hindu women; also wrap-round lower garment worn by
men
Diwali: Hindu festival of lights held at new moon during the month of Kartik
(October)
dukh-sukh: happiness-sadness, and news thereof
Id: two Muslim festivals, one at the end of the month of Ramzan (during
which Muslims should fast between sunrise and sunset) and often called
"sweet" Id because of the distribution of sweetmeats; the other on the tenth
day of Zulhaj when pilgrimage to Mecca takes place and often called "goat"
Eid since goats and other animals are sacrificed
garam: hot, warm, stimulating; quality of foods, climates, or people, within
a theory of humours, not directly equivalent to the physical concept (see
badi, thanda)
garami: heat, warmth, stimulation
ghar-jemai: in-living son-in-law, a man who has left his natal village and
lives in his wife's parent's house
ghee: clarified butter
gindaurey: golfball sized lumps of finished gur
gur: unrefined sugar
hakim: practitioner of Unani medicine (generally Muslim)
haveli: a group of chulas
Holi: Hindu spring festival held during month of Phagun (March), marked by
breaking of norma], social rules (women attack men with powdered dyes and
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coloured water, men dress as women etc. )
imam: Muslim religious specialist
jacha: new mother, particularly during immediate post-partum period of "one-
and-a-quarter months" or "40 days"
Janamasti: Hindu celebration of the birth of the God Krishna
jesthawn: Hindu ceremony after a birth at which priest removes birth
pollution and names the baby (occasionally known as jasuthan)
kanya dan: the gift of a 'virgin' in marriage
khader: low lying alluvial soil next to the Ganges, clayey in texture
khandsari: country sugar boiler or manufacturer
khushi: celebration, jollity, happiness
khushi-ki-bat: matter of celebration
len-den: taking-and-giving; established gift exchanges, normally between kin
at life-cycle events such as births and marriages
mainka: of the mother, the mother's home; a woman's natal village, where her
mother lives
masur: Egyptian lentils.
maulwi: Muslim religious specialist
nand: husband's sister
nasbandi: "closing the tubes", that is male or female sterilisation
nauluck: the first season's growth of sugarcane after planting
neem: tree whose leaves have medicinal qualities; also half-trained, quack
paidey: second year's growth of sugarcane from a single planting
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paisa: one-hundredth part of a rupee
pandit: Hindu priest
puja: Hindu prayer offering
roti: bread, generally griddle-baked unleavened wheat bread
Rs: rupee, the Indian currency; in 1982, Rs 18 were equivalent to £1
sajey: joined or jointly; in this context, (for a woman) sharing with her
mother-in-law or daughter-in-law, or (for a man) being part of production
unit with his father, brothers or sons
saidey third year's growth from a single planting of sugarcane
sas: mother-in-law (see susri)
sasur: father-in-law
shann: (negatively) shame, embarrassment; (positively) modesty, bashfulness
sharm-ki-bat: shameful or embarrassing matter,
sasural: father-in-law's village (for women and men)
Shivaratri: Hindu festival in celebration of the God Shiva. Held on the 14th.
Magh, February/March, in the dark half of the month.
susri: mother-in-law, term of abuse used by women
Tijo: Hindu festival during Sawan (August), when married women return to
their natal villages and sing songs while being swung on swings specially
erected for the festival
Tikidar: a partner, in the villages, business partners in the operation of a
gur boiler.
urad: type of lentil, black when unhusked and white when husked
Note on kinship terminology: kin terms used in Bijnor by Hindus and Muslims
conform to the structure discussed by S. Vatuk in "Contributions to Indian
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Sociology", vol.3, 1969, pp.94-115. Terminological distinctions between kin
(and their associated roles) do not conform to those in English. I have
adopted the notation M = mother, F = father, W = wife, H = husband, Z =
sister, B = brother, D = daughter, S = son, e = elder and y = younger and
inserted them in the text beside the less precise English term where relevant
(eg MBD = mother's brother's daughter).
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